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A central criticism of global financial institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) is that they are insufficiently 
democratic.  In particular, it has been suggested that they are not democratic because 
they utilize weighted voting and impose conditions on loans.  In the IMF and the WB, 
votes are weighted by economic status.  Richer countries such as the United States and 
the United Kingdom have more votes than poorer countries such as Burkina Faso and 
Bangladesh.  The IMF and the WB also impose conditions, in the form of policy 
conditions, on the money they lend.  Distribution of money is contingent upon taking 
up certain policies such as liberalization and privatization of the economy.   I have two 
basic projects in this dissertation.  The first and main project is to provide an 
explanation of why weighted voting and conditionality of loans are not consistent with 
foundational democratic values.  The second project is to suggest some means of 
overcoming the deficit of democracy in global institutions in both current and future 
generations. 
 In the first chapter of my dissertation, I develop an account of the value of 
democratic institutions within nation-states.  The account that I argue for here is 
broadly Rawlsian.  I follow Rawls in emphasizing the value of exercising our two 
moral powers as citizens (i.e., the capacity for justice and the capacity for a conception 
of the good) and the value of having a secure sense of self-respect as foundational 
democratic values.  My arguments depart from Rawls’s in two main respects.  First, 
 while Rawls emphasizes the cognitive aspect of our capacity for a conception of the 
good, I focus on the practical aspect of this capacity, arguing that experientially testing 
out our tentative ends and aims is integral to the formation of a rational conception of 
the good.  I argue that exercise of this more practical aspect of the capacity for a 
conception of the good requires democratic decision-making procedures.  Second, I 
move beyond Rawls’s own arguments regarding self-respect, and argue that self-
respect is undermined when political arrangements are not conducive to the equal 
advancement of citizens’ interests and that the equal advancement of interests requires 
democratic procedures. 
In chapter 2, using and extending the arguments that I develop in chapter 1, I 
explain why both weighted voting and conditionality of loans are not consistent with 
basic democratic values.  My arguments here are largely negative.  I consider what I 
take to be the most plausible arguments for weighted voting and conditionality of 
loans and I show that they fail.  For instance, I argue against the claim that developed 
countries should have more votes simply because they contribute more funds to the 
IMF and the WB.  I also argue against the suggestion that conditionality of loans can 
be justified on the basis of the IMF and the WB’s similarity to corporate or private 
banks.  In responding to these arguments, my aim is to show that weighted voting and 
conditionality of loans are incompatible with citizens’ exercise of their capacity for a 
conception of the good and with their secure sense of self-respect.  
In chapter 3, I discuss the prospects that I find most promising in ending the 
deficit of democracy.  I argue that there is a real challenge to democratic values that is 
not met by procedural mechanisms and that, at least in current generations, the 
solution is largely an economic one: egalitarian measures in the global economy will 
promote democratic values.  Only when countries are closer to being economic equals 
can democratic values be expressed in global financial institutions.  Until this point is 
 reached, I suggest that it is best that global financial institutions be dismantled.  Given 
that countries (particularly the poorer ones) will still need loans for growth and 
development, I also suggest that, for the time being, commercial banking and regional 
institutions should take the place of global financial institutions. 
However, things will not always be as they are.  If egalitarian measures are 
pursued, then eventually countries will be much closer in economic status to one 
another.  I argue that, at this point, global financial institutions will be better able to 
express democratic values and can be reinstated. Questions of procedure and policy 
now become important, for questions remain about how to distribute votes and what 
form loans should take.  Using the domestic sphere as my model, I argue that votes 
should be distributed equally, and that majority rule should be used but, because of 
worries about persistent and predictable minorities, that it should be tempered by a bill 
of rights, bicameralism, and legislative districting.  I also suggest that, because it is 
more consistent with democratic values, structural adjustment loans should be 
conditional on reaching desired outcomes, that is, outcomes mutually decided upon by 
borrowing countries and lending agencies (e.g., certain levels of growth, inflation, 
international reserves). 
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Introduction 
§1.  Explanation and Context 
In the era of increasing economic globalization – the closer integration of the 
countries in the world economy through increased flow of goods and services, capital 
and labour – global institutions have become of great importance.  This is because 
economic globalization and its effects are managed or governed in significant part by 
global financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (the IMF) and the 
World Bank (the WB).  However, more recently, these global financial organizations 
have come under heavy criticism.  A central criticism of global financial institutions is 
that they suffer from a deficit of democracy.  Critics often argue that these 
organizations do not manage globalization in a way that is consistent with democratic 
values.  
The clearest examples of the democracy deficit within the IMF and the WB are 
weighted voting and conditionality of loans.  In the IMF and the WB, votes are 
weighted by economic status.  Richer countries such as the Japan and the United 
Kingdom have more votes than poorer countries such as Burkina Faso and 
Bangladesh.  Because of its great economic status, a single country, namely, the 
United States, has effective veto.  Critics such as Joseph Stiglitz (chief economist of 
the World Bank from 1997-2000) worry that weighted voting is not consistent with 
democratic values because “little weight is given, for instance, to the voices and 
concerns of the developing countries.”1 The IMF and the WB also impose conditions 
on the money they lend. These conditions take a variety of forms.  Generally, they 
involve economic policies and reforms that are meant to lead to growth and 
development and to ensure repayment of the loan.  The economic policies associated 
                                                
1 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), p. 
12. 
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with the IMF and the WB’s structural adjustment loans are not chosen by the 
borrowing countries’ elected officials; they are usually determined by economists who 
work for the IMF or the WB, who, in turn, are influenced by the US and other 
developed countries who have the greatest number of votes.  Because there is little 
opportunity for citizens of the borrowing countries to influence which economic 
policies are pursued, critics worry that conditionality is not consistent with democratic 
values.  
This dissertation is an attempt to explore the charge of a democracy deficit 
through the lenses of weighted voting and conditionality of loans in global financial 
institutions.  In this dissertation, I have two basic projects.  The first and main project 
is to develop and to explain the charge of a democracy deficit by providing a nuanced 
explanation of why weighted voting and conditionality of loans are not consistent with 
foundational democratic values and why both arrangements would be rejected by 
those who accept a liberal conception of justice.  The second project is to suggest 
some means of overcoming the democracy deficit in global institutions.  
 
§2. Justification of Project 
I have chosen to focus on the deficit of democracy within global financial 
institutions for a number of reasons.  The first is a desire to respond to those who are 
sceptical of any talk of democracy at the global level.  Traditionally, many liberals 
have viewed “democracy” as referring to a regulative ideal governing decision-making 
about collective affairs among members of a shared community, where the shared 
community is a people, a group of people who share in common a language, a culture, 
and a delimited territory.  It is quite clear that, at the global level, there is no demos in 
this sense.  Hence, some argue that the notion of democracy at the level of global 
institutions is senseless.  As will become clear, my arguments are in opposition to 
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those (within the liberal tradition) who are sceptical of any talk of democracy at the 
international level. 
 My second reason for exploring this topic is a genuine discontentment with the 
way the charge of a democracy deficit is applied in international ethics.  On the one 
hand, many popular critics of global financial institutions, such as activists, 
journalists, and policy makers who are engaged in the evaluation of global institutions, 
simply take for granted that, because they do not allow all countries to have an equally 
effective and influential voice, weighted voting and conditionality of loans are 
objectionable.  For this reason, the charge of a democracy deficit is often difficult to 
pin down.  It isn’t always clear how they see global arrangements as being inconsistent 
with underlying democratic values or what underlying democratic values are being 
appealed to by those who lay the charge of a democracy deficit.  This is 
understandable because the idea of democracy is itself a loose and contested notion; 
there have been many different ideas about what constitutes a democracy and what its 
justification is.  As a result, it is unclear which of the various understandings of and 
justifications for democratic arrangements are relevant in the global context.  Given 
that the charge of a democracy deficit is one of the main criticisms launched against 
global financial institutions, it seems important to fill in the gaps and to address these 
further issues.  I take my work to be a step in this direction.  My aim is to give an 
account of underlying democratic values and to explain how exactly the structure of 
global financial institutions is inconsistent with these values. 
 On the other hand, as Thomas Pogge notes, philosophical discussion of 
international ethics has focused on important questions relating to just war 
(particularly the rules governing the use of force) and individual duties to aid (to 
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donate to) needy non-compatriots. 2  For the most part, it has not been concerned with 
questions about the design and conduct of existing international organizations such as 
the IMF and the WB.   Philosophical discussion of global ethics has been unconcerned 
with the apparent deficit of democracy within global financial institutions.  This is 
another gap that I wish to fill. 
 One might wonder why philosophers should be engaged in the moral 
assessment of global institutions such as the IMF and the WB.  We come now to my 
third reason for pursuing this project: it stems from a genuine concern with justice at 
the global level.  If we are concerned with justice at the global level, then we must also 
be concerned with the structure and organization of global institutions such as the IMF 
and the WB and hence with the apparent deficit of democracy within such institutions.   
Two points are important here.  First, Rawls argues that “the basic structure is 
the primary subject of [domestic] justice because its effects are so profound and 
present from the start.”3  Something similar can be said of global financial institutions 
and their effects.  People’s life prospects and expectations are determined in 
significant part by the global economy and the benefits it produces.  Global financial 
institutions are part of the global basic structure: global financial institutions manage 
the economy and the benefits it produces and, as a result, have a profound effect on 
people’s everyday lives and how well they go.  In this sense, the IMF and the WB are 
the global analogue to those institutions that are part of the domestic basic structure.  
Global financial institutions, such as the IMF and the WB, have a profound effect on 
peoples’ life prospects and for this reason should be the primary subject of global 
justice. 
                                                
2 Thomas Pogge, “Introduction: Global Institutions and Responsibilities,” Metaphilosophy 36.1/2 
(2005), p. 1. 
3 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1999), p. 7; hereinafter ATJ. 
 5 
 Second, Rawls argues that “justice is the first virtue of social institutions.”4  
On his view, “laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be 
reformed or abolished if they are unjust.”5 However, justice is not only a virtue of 
social institutions at the domestic level; it is also a virtue of institutions at the global 
level.  If we are concerned with justice in international relations, then we will want to 
consider whether global institutions suffer from a deficit of democracy.  This is 
because, as I will try to show in some detail, democratic institutions are a demand of 
justice not only at the domestic level but also at the global level.  In short, if we are 
concerned with just international relations, then we should be concerned with the 
structure of global institutions and whether they suffer from a deficit of democracy.  
This is the fundamental reason for considering and developing the charge of a 
democracy deficit. 
 
§3. The Argument 
My project proceeds in the following manner.  Part I focuses on the value of 
democratic procedures in the domestic setting.  I focus on the domestic setting because 
my hope is that once we have an understanding of the values that support democratic 
decision-making procedures at the domestic level, we will be able to see more clearly 
how these same values support democratic decision-making procedures at the global 
level and, in turn, how these values are violated in current (undemocratic) decision-
making processes at the global level.  Since it provides the foundations for the rest of 
the dissertation, this part is much longer and more detailed than the rest.   
In Part I, after giving a brief definition of democracy in §1, I turn, in § 2, to the 
question of what makes democracy morally important.  Here, I give a detailed account 
                                                
4 Ibid., p. 3 
5 Ibid., p. 3. 
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of why democracy is something to be valued.  I explore and defend the case for 
democratic decision-making procedures within constitutional democracies.  The 
account that I argue for here is broadly Rawlsian.  I develop and defend arguments 
that are implicit in Rawls’s work but that are not well developed there.6  I also go well 
beyond Rawls’s own arguments, offering additional arguments of my own, which, for 
the most part, I take to be consistent with the spirit of Rawls’s work. 
I follow Rawls in emphasizing the value of developing and exercising our two 
moral powers as citizens (the capacity for justice and the capacity for a conception of 
the good) and in securing a sense of self-respect as foundational democratic values.  
My arguments go beyond Rawls’s arguments in three main respects.  First, unlike 
Rawls, I develop an argument for democratic procedures on the basis of our higher-
order interest in developing and exercising our capacity for justice.  I argue that the 
development and exercise of our capacity for justice requires a sense of ownership and 
that a sense of ownership is most likely to develop under democratic institutions.  
Second, while Rawls emphasizes the cognitive aspect of our capacity for a conception 
of the good in his arguments, I focus on the practical aspect of this capacity, arguing 
that experientially testing out tentative ends is integral to the formation of a rational 
conception of the good.  I argue that exercise of this more practical aspect of the 
capacity for a conception of the good requires democratic decision-making 
procedures.  Third, moving beyond Rawls’s own arguments regarding self-respect, I 
argue that self-respect is undermined when political arrangements are not conducive to 
                                                
6 There has been little sustained discussion of Rawls’s arguments for democracy.  There are a few 
exceptions: Joshua Cohen, “For A Democratic Society,” in Samuel Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 86-138; Amy Gutmann, 
“Rawls on the Relationship between Liberalism and Democracy,” The Cambridge Companion to 
Rawls, pp. 168-199; and Harry Brighouse, “Political Equality in Justice as Fairness,” Philosophical 
Studies 86.2 (1997), pp. 155-184.  The three of these papers are largely in support of Rawls’s 
arguments.  Challenges to Rawls’s arguments are raised in Steven Wall, “Rawls and the Status of 
Political Liberty,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87(2006), pp. 245-270. 
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the equal advancement of citizens’ interests and that the equal advancement of 
interests requires democratic procedures.   
In Part II, sections §1, §2, and §3, I outline a critique of weighted voting and 
imposed loan conditions in the IMF and the WB that will play a central role in my 
construal of the democracy deficit.  Using (and perhaps extending) the arguments that 
I develop in Part I, I try to explain why both weighted voting and the conditionality of 
loans are not consistent with basic democratic values.  I focus on weighted voting and 
the conditionality of loans because, as I mentioned, they are the clearer examples of 
the democracy deficit within global financial institutions. 
In Part III, I end by briefly sketching the issues that I find most pressing and 
the prospects that I find most promising in ending the democracy deficit.  In §1, I 
argue that there is a real challenge to democratic values that is not met by procedural 
mechanisms.  I argue that, initially in current generations, the solution is largely an 
economic one: egalitarian measures in the global economy will promote democratic 
values.  Only when countries are closer to being economic equals can democratic 
values be expressed in global financial institutions.  Until this point is reached, I 
suggest tentatively that it is best that global financial institutions be dismantled.   
If current institutions are dismantled, then there arises a further question: what 
is to be done in the meantime?  After all, countries (particularly the poorer ones) will 
still need loans for growth and development.  In answer to this question, I briefly 
suggest that commercial banking and regional institutions present the most viable 
option.  
However, things will not always be as they are.  If egalitarian measures are 
pursued, then eventually countries will be much closer in economic status to one 
another.  So, in §2, I argue that, at this point, global financial institutions such as the 
IMF and the WB will be better able to express democratic values and can be 
 8 
reinstated.  Questions of procedure and policy become important here, for there are 
still questions about how to distribute votes, how collective decisions are to be made, 
and what form loans should take.  
With respect to the questions about voting procedures, using the domestic 
sphere as my model, I argue that votes should be distributed equally, and majority rule 
should be used but that, because of the problem of persistent and predictable 
minorities, it should be tempered by a bill of rights, bicameralism, and legislative 
districting.   
Finally, I discuss the structure of loans.  Here, I suggest that, because it is more 
consistent with democratic values, structural adjustment loans should be conditional 
on reaching desired outcomes.  That is to say, money should be dispersed mainly on 
the basis of reaching desired economic objectives, objectives mutually decided upon 
by borrowing countries and lending agencies (e.g., certain levels of growth, inflation, 
international reserves, etc.).  Insofar as what must be agreed upon are only objectives 
and not the content of policies aimed at reaching the desired objectives, outcome 
based conditionality would give borrowing countries the space they need to implement 
economic policies of their own choosing.  Since dispersal of money is contingent on 
reaching desired outcomes agreed to by the lender, outcome based conditionality will 
also serve to safeguard the money of lending agencies.   
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Part I 
Domestic Institutions and The Value of Democracy 
§1.  A Definition of Democracy   
I will begin by saying something about what I take democracy to mean.  This 
will set the stage for the arguments that I make in the following sections.  Democracy 
is not easy to define.  As Amy Gutmann notes, “it is among the most contested of 
moral and political concepts.”7  So, what I say here about the concept of democracy 
should be taken as  preliminary and as something to be filled out further as we 
progress.    
Democracy is sometimes defined simply as majority rule.  For reasons that I 
will explore at the end of this chapter, I am reluctant to immediately link democracy 
with winner-take-all majority rule or any other decision-making rules such as 
consensus or supermajority decision-making.8  The definition of democracy that I start 
with here leaves it an open question as to what counts as democratic decision-making 
rules or procedures.   
As I see it, democracy has four features.  First, democracy is commonly 
understood as a form of collective decision-making.  Collective decision-making is 
concerned with making decisions for groups that are binding on the members of the 
group.9  Democratic decision-making can occur within a variety of groups; there can 
be democracies within families, the workplace, the state, and global institutions.  I 
focus on the last two.  Second, democracy is associated with equality: political 
equality implies equality among members, at least at some stage, in the process of 
political decision-making.  What exactly this means will become more clear as we 
                                                
7 Gutmann, “Rawls on the Relationship,” p. 169. 
8 Gutmann is also reluctant to identify democracy with majority rule or other alternative decision-
making rules and procedures.  See ibid., p. 169.  
9 Thomas Christiano, “Introduction,” Philosophy and Democracy: An Anthology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 4.  
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proceed.  Third, democracy is also usually associated with certain liberties such as the 
liberty to vote and the liberty to run for public office.  Fourth, democracy is usually 
associated with the value of deliberation; engaging in reasoned deliberation about how 
society should be arranged is a central democratic ideal. 
 
§2.  Arguments for the Value of Democracy  
In the following section, I develop and defend Rawls’s arguments for 
democracy, exploring how Rawls’s arguments for equal political liberty and its fair 
value support a democratic system of government.  These arguments will provide a 
basis for criticizing weighted voting and the conditionality of loans in later sections. 
Rawls argues for what he calls “the special conception of justice.”10  This 
conception consists of three principles: the principle of equal liberty, the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle.   
The first principle, the principle of equal liberty, states that “each person is to 
have an equal right to the most extensive system of equal basic liberties compatible 
with a similar system of liberties for all.”11  This principle requires protection of 
liberties such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, freedom of conscience 
and freedom of thought, freedom of the person, and the right to hold property; it also 
requires protection of the political liberties such as the rights to vote and to hold public 
office.12  
                                                
10 Rawls’s special conception of justice, which prioritizes liberty, is to be put into practice only after 
society has reached a certain level of material well-being.  Prior to this point, the general conception of 
justice applies and the difference principle arranges the distribution of all social primary goods, 
including liberty.   
11ATJ, p. 220.  For Rawls, “liberty” simply means that persons are not under a constraint (or a set of 
constraints) to do (or not to do) a particular act (or particular acts).  Rawls is concerned with liberty in 
the sense of constitutional and legal restrictions. 
12 Ibid., p. 53. 
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Also included in the first principle is the proviso which states that the political 
liberties, and only the political liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.  This 
means that the worth (or usefulness) of political liberties must be sufficiently equal in 
the sense that all citizens have a fair opportunity to hold public office and to affect the 
outcomes of elections.13  The fair value of political liberties ensures “that citizens 
similarly gifted and motivated have roughly equal chance of influencing the 
government’s policy and of attaining positions of authority irrespective of their 
economic and social class.”14 
 The second principle states that social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they meet two conditions: (i) social and economic inequalities must 
be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity, which means that those who have similar levels of talent and motivation 
should have the same prospects of success regardless of socioeconomic position (this 
is the principle of fair equality of opportunity); (ii) social and economic inequalities 
must be to the benefit of the least advantaged (this is the difference principle).15  
Moreover, Rawls argues that the first principle is prior to the others; that is, the 
principle of equal liberty is to be satisfied first – this is the doctrine of the priority of 
liberty.  For Rawls, the priority of liberty means that “liberty can only be limited for 
the sake of liberty itself.”16  Basic liberties can only be restricted when they come into 
conflict with other basic liberties.  They cannot be limited for the sake of greater social 
or economic advantages, for example.17   
                                                
13 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 
149; hereinafter JF.  C.f., ATJ, p. 197. 
14 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 358; hereinafter 
PL.  The proviso is essentially fair equality of opportunity applied to the political realm.  
15 JF, pp. 44-46. 
16 ATJ, p. 214. 
17 It is worth noting that the priority of liberty holds only when social and economic development is 
enough for effective exercise of basic liberties.  Until this point, it may be permissible to forgo certain 
political rights for the sake of significant social or economic returns.  For example, if citizens are 
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 The special conception of justice supports a democracy because the first 
principle of justice requires it.  This principle supports a constitutional democracy, in 
particular, not only because it requires protection of the political liberties but also 
because it requires protection of the nonpolitical liberties as well.  As Cohen notes, 
“Rawls’s idea is that the nonpolitical liberties, will be, in some way, entrenched in a 
constitution (perhaps in a bill of rights) along with the political liberties and not be up 
for consideration in normal politics.”18  Rawls writes, 
 the first principle of equal liberty is the primary standard for the constitutional convention.  Its  
main requirements are that the fundamental liberties of the person and liberty of conscience 
and freedom of thought be protected and that the political process as a whole be a just 
procedure.19 
Rawls’s arguments for a constitutional democracy are found, primarily, in his 
arguments for the first principle of justice and the proviso, that is, in his arguments for 
the protection of equal basic liberty (political and non-political).  So, given our interest 
in Rawls’s argument for democracy, our focus here will be on Rawls’s arguments for 
the principle of equal liberty and the fair value of liberty, placing special emphasis on 
the political liberties.  Turning to Rawls’s justification for this principle, his arguments 
suggest two strategies.  The first focuses on the content of some of our “fundamental 
aims,” aims which are commonly part of our conceptions of the good.  The second 
strategy focuses on our “higher-order” interests, interests which flow from our moral 
powers as citizens.20  In a sense, Rawls offers these arguments as a package.  He 
believes that a few different arguments can be given for the value of democratic 
institutions and that these arguments work together to support the value of democratic 
                                                                                                                                       
starving and only a benevolent dictator would be able to provide enough food for everyone, then an 
undemocratic political order might be permissible on Rawls’s view.  
18 Cohen, “For a Democratic Society,” p. 92. 
19 Ibid, p. 92. ATJ, pp. 174-175. 
20 ATJ, p. 475.  See also Cohen, “For a Democratic Society,” p. 104. 
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institutions.  Some of these arguments are not as strong as others, but Rawls believes 
that when taken together, as a package, these arguments offer strong and persuasive 
reasons for supporting democratic institutions. 
 
§2.1 An Argument from our Fundamental Aims 
Let us begin with the first argument based on our fundamental aims.  The 
original position is very important to Rawls’s argument. The original position is a 
purely hypothetical situation in which we picture ourselves as choosing the 
appropriate principles of justice, the principles by which major social or public 
institutions are to be arranged which are suited toward free and equal people.  In the 
original position, we are rational and self-interested.  We have some knowledge of the 
world and ourselves.  We know general facts about science, human psychology, and 
sociology.  Particularly important for our project here, we also know that we have 
certain fundamental interests, interests that are commonly part of our determinate 
conceptions of the good.  For example, we know that we have an interest in the 
expression of our religious attitudes.21  From the original position, we do not know the 
particular forms these interests will take, but we are certain that we have such interests 
and that we would not willingly sacrifice them.  
The restrictions imposed by the original position are meant to represent 
“equality between human beings as moral persons.”22  They “define principles of 
justice as those which rational persons concerned to advance their interests would 
consent to as equals when none are known to be advantaged by social and natural 
contingencies.”23  
                                                
21 ATJ, p. 131. 
22 Ibid., p. 17. 
23 Ibid., p. 17. 
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Rawls makes his case for equality of liberty by focusing on liberty of 
conscience.24  From the original position, we know that we have a deep interest in 
protecting our religious and moral freedom.  Yet, we do not know what our religious 
or moral convictions are.  We do not know whether we do in fact hold a particular 
religious outlook, but we might or we might hold a more secular moral outlook.  We 
do not know, however, how our religious or moral views fare in society.  Our views 
might be in the minority or in the majority.  Given this limited information, we are to 
decide what principle should be adopted to regulate our religious and moral interests.   
Rawls argues that equal liberty of conscience is the only principle that we 
would accept.  It could happen that our particular religious or moral convictions are in 
the minority and are open to suppression by the majority.  Given the deep importance 
we place on protecting our religious and moral convictions, we would not be willing to 
take this chance, even if it is more than likely that our views will belong to the 
majority and will not be suppressed.  This unwillingness to gamble with our 
convictions is not, as is sometimes supposed, a matter of what we would choose when 
we do not know the possibilities.25  It is a matter of integrity.  It is a matter of seeing 
our own fundamental interests as being of great value, and properly expressing this 
value.  We would not properly express the value of our religious and moral 
convictions if we were willing to take a chance with them (“by permitting the 
dominant moral or religious doctrine to persecute or to suppress others if it wishes”).26  
As Rawls states, “to gamble in this way would show that one did not take one’s 
                                                
24 The argument, as I present it, is extrapolated mainly from ATJ §33, pp. 180-186. 
25 c.f., John C. Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality,” American 
Political Science Review 69 (1975), pp. 595-606. 
26 ATJ, p. 181.  I wouldn’t wager my mother in a poker game, even if it was very unlikely that I was 
going to lose the game.  To wager her would not be consistent with my deep valuing of her.  Indeed, it 
would suggest that I didn’t value her.  I think something similar applies in the case of the religious 
interest.  My suggestion is that we attach so much value to our religious interest that we know that we 
cannot properly express this valuing if we gamble with it. 
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religious or moral convictions seriously, or highly value the liberty to examine one’s 
beliefs.”27  Rawls argues that “in order to secure their unknown but particular interests 
from the original position, they are led, in view of the strains of commitment (§29), to 
give precedence to the basic liberties.”28 
 Only one more point is needed to make Rawls’s argument for the principle of 
equal liberty complete.  Rawls argues that when we enter into an agreement we must 
take into consideration the “strains of commitment,” that is, whether we could hold to 
our agreement even if the worst possibilities prove to be the case.  If we could not hold 
to it under such conditions, then we have not made an agreement in good faith. 
 When we couple the considerations of the strains of commitment with our 
fundamental interest in expressing religious and moral attitudes, we have compelling 
reason for choosing equal liberty of conscience.  If we were to choose a conception of 
justice that did not ensure equal liberty of conscience, there would be great risk that 
we would not be able to uphold the agreement.  This is because it might require us to 
disregard what we take to be in our fundamental interests.  As Cohen puts it, “we 
cannot, therefore, make good faith agreement to a conception that does not ensure 
liberty of conscience.”29 
Rawls claims “that the reasoning in this case can be generalized to apply to 
other freedoms, although not always with the same force.”30  This would suggest that a 
similar argument can be given in the case of the political liberties.  Rawls, however, 
never actually gives such an argument.  So, we might wonder, how would such an 
argument proceed?  
                                                
27 Ibid., p. 181. 
28 Ibid., p. 475. 
29 Cohen, “For a Democratic Society,” p. 106. 
30 ATJ, p. 181. 
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  As Cohen notes, a parallel argument would need to start with a fundamental 
aim, a certain interest that is “especially important in the way that religious and moral 
views present interests in fulfilling their own fundamental requirements as of special 
importance.”31  Cohen points out that one cannot appeal to the Aristotelian view that 
humans are political animals who realize their good only by participating in political 
life, or to the Rousseauian view that freedom is the supreme good and that we only 
achieve freedom when we participate in collective decision-making.32  This is because, 
from the original position, we know that we have determinate conceptions of the good 
life, but we do not know their content.  In turn, both of these views about what is our 
good are unavailable to us from the original position, for both appeal to a particular 
view of what the best human life consists in.  In short, appeals to either the 
Aristotelian or the Rousseauian views are in violation of the restrictions placed on us 
(and our reasoning) by the original position.  As a result, Cohen suggests that Rawls’s 
argument concerning equal liberty of conscience cannot be generalized to the case of 
equal political liberty.   
Cohen’s dismissal of Rawls’s arguments is too quick.  There is at least one 
fundamental aim that we can appeal to in support of equal political liberty and its fair 
value: namely, the interest in political participation.  On the face of it, this seems to be 
an interest that is commonly part of our determinate conceptions of the good.  It also 
seems to be an interest that people would not tend to give up willingly.  Moreover, the 
interest in political participation does not depend on any particular conception of the 
good.  It could arise from an Aristotelian or Rousseauian conception of the good; it 
could also arise from any number of other conceptions of the good.  As a result, an 
                                                
31 Cohen, “For A Democratic Society,” p. 106. 
32 On Rousseau’s view see Joshua Cohen, “Reflections on Rousseau: Autonomy and Democracy,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 15.3 (1986), pp. 275-297 and Frederick Neuhouser, “Freedom, 
Dependence, and the General Will,” The Philosophical Review 102.3 (1993), pp. 363-395. 
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appeal to an interest in political participation would not violate the conditions of the 
original position.  If we appeal to the interest in political participation, then I think an 
argument that parallels Rawls’s arguments for equal liberty of conscience can be given 
for equal political liberty.   
From within the original position, we know that we have a fundamental 
interest in political participation, but we do not know how our interest in political 
participation will fare.  It could happen that members of society have unequal rights of 
political participation.  For example, we might live in a society where women and 
racial minorities are denied voting rights.  Given the deep importance we place on 
protecting our interest in political participation, we would not be willing to take this 
chance, even if it is more than likely that we will belong to the majority and that we 
will have the right to vote.  As a result, we would not agree to a scheme of justice that 
fails to ensure equal political liberty.   
 We might legitimately wonder whether this line of argument supports the fair 
value of political liberty (not just having a say, but having an equally effective say).  It 
is important to note that this line of argument was not initially intended to support the 
fair value of equal political liberty.  This line of argument is derived from Rawls’s 
arguments in ATJ, and he did not come to accept the fair value of political liberty until 
he wrote PL.  However, given that Rawls eventually does endorse fair value as part of 
the principle of equal political liberty, and that he thinks this endorsement is consistent 
with his arguments in ATJ, it is important to see if this line of argument can be 
expanded to support the fair value of political liberty. 
 Imagine that society is arranged so that all individuals have a say in political 
decision-making, but that some individuals have less of a say in it than others.  For 
example, imagine a society where the government consists solely of men and that only 
they have the power to make decisions about the arrangement of social institutions.  
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Imagine that there is also a procedure of consultation in which the voices of women 
are heard. Women, through this consultative procedure, can express political dissent 
and the government has an obligation to take this dissent seriously, to provide a 
conscientious reply, and to make institutional changes where necessary.  The 
government is responsive to the views of women.  Call this a consultative assembly.33  
In this case, women are able, through the process of consultation, to participate in 
political decision-making.  The decisions that are made are responsive to and are, in 
this sense, a result of women’s intelligent reflection about justice and the common 
good.  Would parties, within the original position, wish to protect themselves from 
such an arrangement by ensuring the fair value of political liberty?    
  It seems that, in theory, we can properly express the value we place on political 
participation and accept having less of a say than others in political decision-making. 
Under a genuine consultative assembly, though we are unable to do so to an equal 
extent, all individuals are able to genuinely participate in political decision-making.  If 
the government is in direct and real consultation with its people, it considers and is 
responsive to their views, then people are able to satisfy their fundamental interest in 
political participation.   
 However, in order for our interest in political participation to be satisfied by 
participation in a consultative assembly, it is integral that consultations be genuinely 
responsive.  To see that this is the case, consider a mock consultative assembly.  Just 
as before imagine that citizens are part of a consultative assembly but that the 
consultations are not genuine.  Individuals give voice to their political opinions and 
dissent, but political officials do not genuinely listen to these concerns and only 
pretend to give conscientious responses.  Participation in this kind of mock 
                                                
33 I borrow this example from John Rawls, Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1999), pp. 71-78; hereinafter LP. 
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consultative assembly does not satisfy our interest in political participation.  There is a 
relevant difference between genuine participation and pretend participation in political 
decision-making.  If I share my political views and dissent and they are not heard or 
taken seriously, then I am not in fact participating in political decision-making.  I am 
simply an observer.  It is much like standing on the sidelines at a game of football.  If I 
am on the sidelines, then I am not playing football.  I am only watching football.  In 
the case of a mock consultative assembly, we would be standing on the side-lines, 
watching politics take place, and not genuinely participating in political decision-
making.  This kind of arrangement would not satisfy our interest in political 
participation.  To satisfy our interest in political participation, we must genuinely 
participate in political decision-making.  Only a genuine consultative assembly, with 
genuinely responsive consultations, can satisfy our fundamental interest in political 
participation.   
 While one can certainly imagine a political process, such as a genuine 
consultative assembly, in which individuals without an equally effective vote are able 
to adequately satisfy their fundamental interest in political participation, in the real 
world deep and pervasive facts of human psychology make this an unrealistic option.  
It is very unlikely that there are or that there will be any real-life examples of a 
genuine consultative assembly.  As a result, in the real world, our fundamental interest 
in political participation is not likely to be satisfied by any other principle than equal 
political liberty and its fair value. 
 As Rawls himself emphasizes, the tendency toward partiality is an ineliminable 
characteristic of human nature.34  The tendency towards partiality makes meeting the 
                                                
34 Consider one of Rawls’s arguments against utilitarianism.  Rawls suggests that promoting average 
utility is not the right social standard.  It leads people to be governed by calculations that they will tend 
to get wrong because of being partial to themselves.  In other words, it is hard for us to calculate what is 
in the best interests of all because we tend to be partial to our own interests.   
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conditions of a genuine consultative assembly, especially that of genuine 
responsiveness, very difficult.  In particular, non-democratic political elites are not 
likely to yield to good consultative arguments in important matters.  They are more 
likely to favour their own views over others’, even when they are in consultation with 
others.  Political elites are often blinded by self-interest and greed.  Yet, even when 
this is not the case, and those in power have good motives, it may still be difficult for 
them to give way to or be responsive to good consultative arguments.  For example, 
even those who are well-meaning have gotten it wrong when it comes to the place of 
racial minorities in the political order.  Genuinely responsive consultations are 
difficult because it is often hard to listen to those who have different backgrounds and 
viewpoints from our own.  It is also easy to see the downside, without seeing the 
upside, of other people’s views, especially when they are very different from our own.  
For these reasons, it will likely be hard for those in power to be genuinely responsive 
to the arguments and positions of those they are in consultation with.  In the real 
world, consultative assemblies are likely to be a “sham”. 
 Given our tendency toward partiality and the unlikelihood of genuine 
consultations, if we, as parties within the original position, wish to ensure that our 
fundamental interest in political participation is satisfied, then we would wish to 
ensure that both equal political liberty and its fair value are protected.  This is because 
we would not be willing to risk the satisfaction of our fundamental interest in political 
participation by allowing for the possibility of bogus consultations (which would fail 
to satisfy our fundamental interest).  Our unwillingness to gamble with our 
fundamental interest in political participation is part of what it is to deeply value 
political participation and to properly express this valuing.  
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Objection. 
 Rawls has been criticized for grounding his conception of justice in contingent 
facts of empirical psychology rather than in moral arguments.35  This general worry 
might be applied to Rawls’s attempt to ground the arguments for equal political liberty 
and its fair value in our fundamental interests. 
 The argument that justice requires equal political liberty and its fair value is 
grounded in, what Rawls takes to be, an empirical fact about our psychology: we 
commonly view certain interests as being fundamental to our good.  Rawls argues, 
given these interests, parties within the original position will choose the principle of 
equal liberty and its fair value.  One might question this methodology.  It might be an 
empirical fact that many individuals value political participation, for example, but why 
should this interest rather than some other interest be the basis for claims about the 
requirements of justice?  For example, it might also be the case that many individuals 
commonly value segregation, domination, or servility.  Why shouldn’t we focus on 
these interests in our attempts to determine the requirements of justice?  Rawls gives 
us no answer to this question.  He fails to give us reasons or arguments for focusing on 
any particular set of fundamental interests (for focusing on an interest in religious 
expression or political participation, for example).   
 On Rawls’s behalf, one might be tempted to claim that the interests in religious 
expression and political participation are somehow more fundamental than others to 
our essential human nature.  But, Rawls wishes to stay away from such metaphysical 
claims about the person.  One might also be tempted to claim that possessing these 
                                                
35 The most important criticisms of Rawls for over-reliance on empirical psychology in the original 
edition of A Theory of Justice are his own.  See, for example, (the “Preface”) ATJ, p. xiii.  G.A. Cohen 
might also be seen as a critic of over-reliance of a sort, since he criticizes Rawls for letting justice be 
determined by the incentive structure of people who are insufficiently concerned with justice. This is a 
major theme of Cohen’s work that culminated in Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2008). 
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interests is an ineliminable characteristic of human nature (much like the tendency 
toward partiality), but this seems false.  Many of those we consider to be human do 
not see themselves as having such interests.  
  In response, I think it is important to note that Rawls seeks to take into 
account and, in turn, takes for granted certain “considered judgments” and 
“fundamental intuitive ideas” that are implicit in the public culture of a democratic 
society.  For example, central considered judgments include the beliefs that racial 
discrimination and slavery are morally objectionable.  Rawls thinks that any 
appropriate theory of justice must take into account these considered judgments and 
fundamental intuitive ideas.  His aim is to construct the original position so that it 
adequately expresses these considered judgments and fundamental intuitive ideas, and 
then to build an argument on the basis of the original position to support the principles 
of justice.  
From this perspective, it seems right to think that an argument for just 
institutional arrangements must take into account our interests in religious expression 
and in political participation.  The belief that such interests are vital and ought to be 
protected by social institutions is both implicit in and fundamental to the public culture 
of a democracy.  Something similar cannot be said of segregation or domination.  
Indeed, the belief that these interests are antithetical democracy is central to the public 
culture of a democracy.   
In the end, Rawls becomes somewhat unsatisfied with his methodology, and 
attempts to refine his arguments by basing them more closely on a political conception 
of the person as a democratic citizen who is free and equal. This later justification for 
equal political liberty and its fair value no longer appeals to the fundamental interests 
of people, but rather to the higher-order interests of free and equal citizens.   
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§2.2  An Argument from our Higher-Order Interests. 
The second strategy (which comprises three different arguments) focuses on 
what Rawls calls higher-order interests, rather than fundamental aims.  Unlike 
fundamental aims, these interests are not grounded in a particular notion of what is 
commonly part of conceptions of the good.  Rather, they are interests that are 
grounded in a political conception of the person.   
On Rawls’s view, from within the original position, we are to conceive of 
ourselves as citizens who are in possession of two moral powers: a sense of justice and 
a capacity for a conception of the good.  A sense of justice is the capacity to 
understand, to apply, and to willingly act from the principles of justice.36  The capacity 
for a conception of the good is the capacity to form, to revise, and to rationally pursue 
a determinate conception of the good, a conception of what is valuable in human life.37  
In addition to these two moral powers, persons are conceived as having, at any given 
time, a determinate conception of the good that they try to achieve.   
Rawls’s conception of the person (or citizen) is a political conception in the 
sense that it is “a conception that is suited for the basis of democratic citizenship.”38  
Following in the tradition of liberal democratic thought, Rawls views citizens as free 
and equal persons.  The equal status of citizens is a function of their possession of the 
two moral powers: having the two powers to the required minimum degree necessary 
to be a fully cooperating member of society makes citizens equal (not socioeconomic 
position or natural abilities).39 
                                                
36 PL, p. 19. 
37 Ibid., p. 19.  A conception of the good usually “consists of a more or less determinate scheme of final 
ends, that is, ends we want to realize for their own sake, as well as attachments to other persons and 
loyalties to various groups and associations” (ibid., p. 19). 
38 Ibid., n. 20, p. 18. 
39 C.f., ibid., p. 19. 
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Return to Rawls’s argument for the equality of political liberty.  Rawls argues 
that, as citizens, we have higher-order interests in the development and exercise of the 
two moral powers. “To say that these interests are ‘higher-order’ interests means that, 
as the fundamental idea of the person is specified, these are interests that are viewed as 
basic and hence as normally regulative.”40  It also means that they are interests that 
would not willingly be sacrificed.  Rawls argues that we have a higher-order interest in 
the development and exercise of the two moral powers because it is either a means to, 
or a part of, our good (what exactly this means will become more clear as we 
proceed).  Moreover, Rawls argues that equal political liberty and its fair value 
guarantee equally for all persons the social conditions necessary for the adequate 
development and the full exercise of the two moral powers.  Hence, he concludes, 
persons would not accept anything less than equal political liberty and its fair value. 
 
The Argument Concerning the First Moral Power 
Let us begin with considerations relating to the first moral power, the capacity 
for justice, that was earlier defined as the capacity to understand, to apply, and to 
willingly act from the principles of justice.  Rawls argues that parties will be moved to 
adopt the principles of justice which most effectively secure the development and 
exercise of the capacity for justice.41  And they “are moved not from the desire to 
realize this moral power for its own sake, but rather view it as the best way to stabilize 
just social cooperation and thereby to advance the determinate conceptions of the good 
of the persons they represent.”42  On Rawls’s view, from the perspective of the 
original position, the value of developing and exercising the first moral power is 
purely instrumental.   
                                                
40 Ibid., p. 74.   
41 Ibid., p. 317. 
42 Ibid., p. 318. 
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 A stable conception of justice is one where all citizens regularly comply with 
the principles of justice.  However, Rawls is concerned not with simply general 
compliance, but with compliance for the right reasons.  That is to say, he is concerned 
with citizens’ wholehearted and willing adherence, adherence that represents complete 
sincerity and commitment, to the principles of justice rather than reluctant adherence 
that results as a part of a modus vivendi or from some type of coercion. 
Furthermore, Rawls argues that we have greater ability to advance our own 
determinate conceptions of the good when everyone adheres to the principles of 
justice willingly; “and a scheme of just social cooperation that is made stable by an 
effective sense of justice is a better means to this end than a scheme which requires a 
severe and costly apparatus of penal sanctions, particularly when this apparatus is 
dangerous to basic liberties” (i.e., when it involves coercion).43  So, because this is the 
best way of advancing citizens’ determinate conceptions of the good, we will want to 
ensure that citizens will act from the principles of justice willingly, i.e., that citizens 
have an effective sense of justice.  
Rawls suggests that these considerations support equal political liberty and its 
fair value.  For reasons having to do with ensuring the development and exercise of 
the capacity for a conception of the good (something I discuss in the next section) and 
for reasons having to do with ensuring the social bases of self-respect (which is 
something I discuss later but will put aside for the time being), the only system of 
justice that citizens will willingly agree to uphold is one that secures equal political 
liberty and its fair value.  Citizens will only willingly uphold a scheme of justice if it 
ensures that they will be able to fully develop and exercise their second moral power.  
Rawls thinks that citizens will only be able to fully develop and exercise their second 
moral power when they have equal political liberty and its fair value.  
                                                
43 Ibid., p. 316. 
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This argument for equal political liberty and its fair value is not an independent 
argument.  It stands and falls with the other arguments based on the capacity for a 
conception of the good.  Rawls never considers whether an independent argument can 
be given.  This may be because he thinks nothing further can be said for equal political 
liberty and its fair value regarding the capacity for justice that does not also depend on 
the capacity for a conception of the good (or self-respect).  This presumption would be 
false, however.  Rawls misses out on a plausible independent argument concerning the 
capacity for justice in his arguments for democratic procedures.  To the extent that a 
further argument from the capacity for justice would bolster his position, this is a 
weakness of Rawls’s arguments. 
In what follows, I supplement Rawls’s arguments by giving an argument for 
equal political liberty and its fair value that concerns the capacity for justice, and is 
independent of considerations relating to the capacity for a conception of the good 
(and self-respect).  Take as our starting point Rawls’s claim that a developed or 
effective sense of justice is required for a stable society and that a stable society will 
advance citizens’ determinate conceptions of the good.  The next point is that having 
one’s sense of justice come to bear on political decisions will lead to a stable society.  
The general idea is this: stability for the right reasons involves having a sense of 
ownership.  If citizens actually participate in the development and application of fair 
terms of cooperation, then they will come to feel a sense of ownership over them, and 
this sense of ownership will, in turn, make them more likely to adhere willingly to 
these terms and to the institutions they support.     
As a free and equal citizen, I see the exercise of my two moral capacities as 
being constitutive of my identity.  It is my capacity for the two moral powers that 
makes me what I am, that makes me a free and equal citizen.  When I take part in 
making a decision, my exercise of my first moral capacity – that is, my capacity for 
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intelligent reflection about justice and the common good – is taken into account and 
given weight in the decisions that are made.  In this way, it can be said that the 
decision that is made is joined with an essential part of myself (namely, my exercise of 
my moral powers). Insofar as an essential part of myself is joined with that decision, I 
will properly come to feel that the decision, at least in part, is part of or belongs to me.  
I will properly come to feel a sense of ownership over the decision made. 
If citizens feel a sense of ownership over political decisions and institutions, 
then they will be more likely to adhere to them willingly (without penal sanctions, for 
example).  Feelings of ownership will encourage citizens to be loyal to the scheme of 
justice.  If citizens care about themselves, then they will want themselves and 
whatever they view as being part of (or associated with) themselves to do well and to 
be successful.  In turn, they will be willing to put their efforts and energy into ensuring 
that this is the case.  This is simply part of what it is to care about oneself.  So, if 
citizens care about themselves, and they feel a sense of ownership over the scheme of 
justice, then they will want the scheme of justice to be successful and will be willing 
to do what they can to ensure its success.  This, in turn, will motivate citizens to 
adhere to the scheme of justice.  So, if we wish to ensure that citizens feel a sense of 
ownership over the scheme of justice, then we must ensure that citizens are able to 
participate in the development of the scheme.  For this reason, I would argue, we need 
to ensure equal political liberties (such as equal voting rights) and their fair value.44 
                                                
44 Some might worry that these claims, about ownership and what underwrites an effective sense of 
justice, are psychological in nature and as such need to be verified by empirical data.  In response, I 
follow Rawls in emphasizing that “it is a moral psychology drawn from the political conception of 
justice as fairness.  It is not a psychology originating in the sciences of human nature but rather a 
scheme of concepts and principles for expressing a certain political conception of the person and an 
ideal of citizenship” (PL, p. 87; my italics). I believe that the kinds of considerations that I appeal to 
here, such as the sense of ownership and what underwrites it, for example, are not only reasonable but 
justified given that citizens conceive of themselves in a particular way, that is, as having the two moral 
powers. 
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 One might wonder whether the argument from ownership supports the fair 
value of political liberty.  Reconsider a consultative assembly where women can 
express political dissent, through a consultative procedure, and the government has an 
obligation to take this dissent seriously, to provide a conscientious reply, and to make 
institutional changes where necessary.  In this case, women are able, through the 
process of consultation, to participate in political decision-making.  The decisions that 
are made are responsive to and are, in this sense, a result of women’s intelligent 
reflection about justice and the common good.  In this case, it seems that a sense of 
ownership and, in turn a sense of justice (a genuine desire to adhere to the laws and 
decisions) would develop among the women.   
 Nevertheless, a consultative assembly is not a compelling way of ensuring a 
stable society.  Rawls argues that, other things being equal, persons in the original 
position will be moved to adopt the most stable system.  On his view, “one conception 
of justice is more stable than another if the sense of justice that it tends to generate is 
stronger and more likely to override disruptive inclinations and if the institutions it 
allows foster weaker impulses and temptations to act unjustly.”45  In this sense, a 
democracy seems more stable than a consultative assembly.  This is because a 
democracy is likely to engender stronger feelings of ownership over political 
decisions.  While members will certainly feel some sense of ownership over the 
decisions made in a consultative assembly, in the sense that their intelligent reflection 
and values play a significant role in the outcomes of decisions, it seems obvious that 
they will feel a greater sense of ownership when their participation in decisions is 
equal to that of others.  
   
 
                                                
45  ATJ, p. 398. 
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Argument Concerning the Second Moral Power  
Let us now turn to the second moral power, the capacity for a conception of the 
good.  Our capacity for a conception of the good enables us “to think of ourselves as 
affirming our way of life in accordance with the full, deliberate and reasoned exercise 
of our intellectual and moral powers.”46  Rawls argues, this relationship between our 
way of life and our deliberative reason becomes part of our determinate conception of 
the good.47  Because we have the capacity to intelligently and reflectively form our 
ends, we come to want our conceptions of the good to be the result of our own moral 
and intellectual reflection, rather than their being forced on us or handed down to us.  
As Rawls puts it, we “seek to make our conception of the good our own;” and we will 
not be content “to accept it ready-made from our society or social peers.”48  “This 
possibility is contained in the conception of the person.”49   
To ensure that our ideals, attachments, and loyalties are really our own (shaped 
by our own moral and intellectual faculties, that is), we must have room to fall into 
error, to revise our existing conceptions of the good or to form other and more rational 
conceptions of the good.  For as Rawls points out, there is no guarantee that we will 
identify all aspects of our present way of life as the most rational for us.50  For 
instance, there is no guarantee that all aspects of our present way of life best cohere 
with our other commitments and priorities.  So, it may happen that our conception of 
the good is in need of some kind of revision.51  Thus, Rawls argues, in order to allow 
for this possibility, we would adopt principles that protect the liberty of conscience.  
                                                
46 PL, p. 313. 
47 Ibid., p. 313. 
48 Ibid., p. 313.   
49 Ibid., p. 313. 
50 Ibid., p. 313. 
51 This is not to say that, on Rawls’s view, we must always revise our conceptions of the good. We may 
affirm a conception of the good that we have been raised and educated in, and “which we find, at the 
age of reason, to be a center of our attachments and loyalties. In this case what we affirm is a tradition 
that incorporates ideals and virtues which meet the tests of our reason and which answers to our deepest 
desires and affections” (ibid., p. 314). 
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Rawls never fills this argument out fully, but the idea seems to be something like this:  
Imagine that we are essentially handed down a religion and forced to accept it, no 
questions asked (say, on pain of being persecuted, or subject to hostility or ill 
treatment by state officials).  In such a state, we would have little if any understanding 
of alternative religious and secular traditions.  Without an understanding of alternative 
practices and traditions, we could not be certain that the state enforced religion is most 
rational for us.  To make a rational decision about whether the state enforced religion 
is part of our conception of the good, we must have access to a variety of rich and 
diverse practices and traditions, both secular and religious.  We must acquire a real 
understanding of alternative practices and traditions in order to know which we would 
most identify with as rational and moral agents, that is, in order to determine which 
best coheres with our other commitments, values, and priorities.  Insofar as a state 
enforced religion would prevent this, we would not agree to such an arrangement.  In 
short, we need freedom of conscience to ensure that we will have the space to form 
rational conceptions of the good that are genuinely our own.52   
Rawls has focused on the liberty of conscience in arguing for equal liberty.  
We must now determine how and whether this kind of argument can apply in the case 
of equal political liberties, such as equal voting rights.  It is not clear that an analogous 
argument can be made.  After considering the argument for the freedom of conscience, 
it seems that, on Rawls’s view, the capacity for a conception of the good is largely a 
cognitive capacity.  I exercise this capacity by thinking about what is most rational for 
me and choosing in this light.53  It is hard to see how this kind of exercise could 
                                                
52 This argument illustrates that the social conditions necessary for the development and full exercise of 
the second moral power are quite demanding.  It, for example, implies that much more is required than 
simply “no persecution.” Indeed, much more is required than liberty of conscience.     
53 For example, when discussing our capacity for a conception of the good, Rawls suggests that our 
final ends are the result of “conviction, reason, and reflection” (PL, 312).  He also speaks of “examining 
our beliefs” and determining whether our ends meet the “tests of our reason” (ibid., 314).  This suggests 
that, for Rawls, the capacity for a conception of the good is largely a cognitive capacity.   
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require equal voting rights.  After all, as long as I have freedom of conscience, I can 
think about what is most rational for me even if I do not have a vote in political 
decision-making. It isn’t clear, then, that Rawls’s argument concerning equal liberty of 
conscience can be generalized to the case of equal political liberty and its fair value.   
 Though Rawls’s own arguments regarding the capacity for a conception of the 
good fail, I believe that an alternative argument can be given in its place.  The 
cognitive or intellectual capacity to choose final ends in one’s head is intimately 
connected with a practical capacity, a capacity to implement or put into practice final 
ends.  It is this more practical aspect that supports equal voting rights.  Rawls ignores 
or at least misses out on this kind of argument for equal voting rights.  This is largely 
because Rawls over intellectualizes the capacity for a conception of the good.54  He is 
mainly concerned with the cognitive aspect of this capacity.  However, I do think that 
Rawls would grant the importance of the practical element in the capacity for a 
conception of the good.  Though he never discusses this matter in any detail, in 
describing the capacity for a conception of the good, he describes it not only as the 
capacity “to form” and “to revise” one’s determinate conception of the good but also 
as the capacity to “rationally pursue a determinate conception of the good.”55 
On my view, barriers to implementing one’s ends can be barriers to rationally 
revising one’s ends.  This is because, in order to determine if my ends are most 
rational for me, I need to be able to implement or put into practice my ends.  As Mill 
says, we need “different experiments of living.”56  On Mill’s view, conceptions of the 
good must be tested by trying them out.  He writes, “the worth of different modes of 
                                                
54 The practical component is something that Raz emphasizes in his work.  See Joseph Raz, The 
Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 371. 
55 PL, p. 19; my italics.   
56 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Vol. 18 (1832), in J.M. Robson, Collected Works of John Stuart 
Mill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963-1991), pp. 260-267. 
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life should be proved practically.”57  For example, I cannot appropriately determine if 
being a doctor is part of my good just by thinking about and reading books about 
being a doctor.  I need to experience, at least in some sense, what is it like to be a 
doctor.  I need to engage in some kind of practice.  To make an informed decision 
about whether being a doctor is the most rational end for me, I need to participate in 
frog dissections in high school biology and volunteer at hospitals and clinics.58  
Similarly, to make an informed decision about whether literature and music are parts 
of my conception of the good, I need to experience what it is like to read books and to 
hear music.  It is essential to pick up books and to read them, to try my hand at a 
variety of instruments, to hear a variety of music, contemporary and classical.  Similar 
things can be said with respect to religion as well.  I cannot determine if Christianity 
or Islam is right for me just by reading and studying about these religions.  Without 
putting religious customs and traditions into practice – without actually going to 
church services, or praying, for example – I cannot be certain which religious 
conceptions are most rational for me.  My suggestion is that appropriately determining 
which ends are most rational for me requires some kind of experience or practice; it is 
a matter of putting my tentative ideas about the good to a kind of experiential test.   
Experience is essential to forming a rational conception of the good because it 
gives me access to information that is new and different from what I acquire when I 
simply think about what is best for me.  The information is of a specific qualitative 
kind; it is a what-it-is-like experience.  Having this kind of information is important to 
making an informed decision about what is right for me.  After all, the what-it-is-like 
experience of hearing classical music is part and parcel of what it is to listen to 
                                                
57 Ibid., p. 261. 
58 This may explain why a variety of programs, including medical and teaching programs require 
(among other things) a significant amount of volunteer hours in related areas (e.g., in the hospital or at 
schools) before granting admittance. Before admitting you, they want you to be sure that this is the right 
career for you. 
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classical music.  The what-it-is-like experience of cutting into flesh is an essential part 
of being a surgeon.  Without an understanding of the qualitative aspect of listening to 
music or of dissection, I cannot make an informed decision about whether listening to 
classical music or being a doctor is genuinely right for me.  In short, being able to put 
into practice or to experience a determinate conception of the good is essential to 
finding out whether a particular conception of the good is the one I identify with most 
as a rational and moral agent. 
In forming a rational conception of the good, I not only need to make decisions 
about what career or which religion is right for me but I also need to make decisions 
about the value of participating in political life and whether it is right for me.  This 
seems particularly important for those who view themselves as free and equal citizens.  
As in the other cases, practice is important to making such decisions.  In order to make 
an informed decision about whether participation in political life is part of my rational 
conception of the good, I need to try my hand at it.  It is only by actually participating 
in political decision-making with fellow citizens that I can come to understand its 
value and the feeling of fellowship with other citizens that it underwrites.   
This argument supports equal political liberty and its fair value.  If each citizen 
is given a vote in political decision-making, then each can participate in the process of 
political decision-making and, in turn, each can make an informed decision about 
whether such participation is part of her rational conception of the good.   
 
Objections. 
As with the previous arguments, one might wonder whether these arguments 
do support something more than just some kind of political participation (i.e., not just 
having a say, but having an equal and effective say).  Return to the notion of a 
consultative assembly.  In a consultative assembly, the government is responsive to 
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the views of minorities.  For example, racial minorities are able, through the process of 
consultation, to participate in political decision-making.  They are able to experience 
what-it-is-like to participate in political life and political decision-making.  In turn, it 
might seem that considerations relating to the capacity for a conception of the good 
cannot explain why racial minorities should have equal voting rights rather than being 
part of a consultative assembly. 
I concede the point.  It follows from my arguments, regarding our capacity for 
a conception of the good, that each citizen should have a say in political decision-
making, but it does not necessarily follow that every citizen must have an equally 
effective say in political decision-making. In short, these arguments do not necessarily 
require democratic decision-making procedures.  They support any political 
arrangements that allow citizens to have first-hand experience of participation in 
political decision-making.  Participation in political life through a consultative 
assembly can be sufficient to determine whether such participation is part of one’s 
rational conception of the good.  If citizens are able, through consultation, to discuss 
their political views, and have others genuinely listen to and conscientiously respond 
to these views (which will at times involve institutional changes), then citizens will 
have first-hand experience of what-it-is-like to take part in political decision-making.  
Consequently, I would argue, participation in a consultative assembly can provide 
citizens with sufficient experiential basis for determining whether participation in 
political life is right for them.  
In order for citizens’ interest in exercising their capacity for a conception of the 
good to be satisfied by participation in a consultative assembly it is integral that 
consultations be genuinely responsive.  Participation in a mock consultative assembly, 
for example, would not satisfy citizens’ interest in exercising their capacity for a 
conception of the good.  As I argued earlier, there is a relevant difference between 
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genuine participation and pretend participation in political decision-making.  If I share 
my political views and dissent and they are not heard or taken seriously, then I am not 
in fact participating in political decision-making.  I am simply an observer. If, for 
example, I am on the sidelines at a football game, then I do not experience what-it-is-
like to play football.  I only experience what-it-is like to watch football.  Watching 
football isn’t enough to determine if football is the right sport for me.  I need to 
actively play football to make an informed decision about whether it is right for me.  
Similarly, standing on the sidelines in political decision-making is not sufficient to 
determine if participation in political life is right for me.  To determine if political life 
is right for me, I must experience what-it-is-like to take part in political life.  This 
means that I must actively take part in political decision-making.  Only a genuine 
consultative assembly, with genuinely responsive consultations, allows for this 
possibility.  So, only when a consultative assembly is genuine, can it realize citizens’ 
interest in exercising their capacity for a conception of the good.  
As I argued earlier, genuine consultative assemblies are very unlikely.  It is 
very unlikely that there are or that there will be any real-life examples of a genuine 
consultative assembly.  This is because tendency towards partiality makes meeting the 
conditions of a genuine consultative assembly, especially that of genuine 
responsiveness, very difficult.  In particular, I suggested that, non-democratic political 
elites are not likely to yield to good consultative arguments in important matters.  
They are more likely to favour their own views over others’, even when they are in 
consultation with others. Given our tendency toward partiality and the unlikelihood of 
genuine consultations (and our knowledge of these facts), if we, as parties within the 
original position, wish to ensure that our higher-order interest in exercising our 
capacity for a conception of the good is satisfied, then we would wish to ensure that 
both equal political liberty and its fair value are protected.  This is the only way to 
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ensure that citizens are able to genuinely experience what-it-is-like to participate 
political decision-making. 
Even if the argument from the capacity for a conception of the good does not 
in itself provide reason for preferring equal voting rights over a consultative assembly, 
the other arguments do.  As I noted earlier, Rawls’s gives different arguments to 
support equal political liberty and its fair value, and they are meant to work together.  
This is to say, the matter of ownership is still relevant and provides reasons for 
preferring equal voting rights rather than a consultative assembly.59  Even if minorities 
are able to participate in political decision-making through consultation, they play less 
of a role than those in power.  To this extent, they will lack a sense of ownership over 
decisions made and they will be less apt to adhere to them willingly.  So, if we wish to 
ensure the most stable system, we will still want to ensure equal political liberty and 
its fair value, for this will support a greater sense of ownership and hence a more 
effective sense of justice among citizens.   
 
An Argument from Self-respect 
I would now like to consider Rawls’s argument from self-respect.  Rawls is 
concerned with the self-respect of citizens as free and equal persons.60  On his view, 
self-respect is a sense of oneself as having equal status or equal value as a citizen, 
which “is rooted in our self-confidence as a fully cooperating member of society 
capable of pursuing a worthwhile conception of the good over a complete life.”61  
Self-respect involves two elements: (i) a sense of one’s equal worth rooted in the 
capacity to develop and exercise the two moral powers (the capacity for justice and the 
capacity for a conception of the good) necessary to be a fully cooperating member of 
                                                
59 The argument from self-respect will also be relevant.  See n. 72, p. 45. 
60 PL, 319. 
61 Ibid., p. 318. 
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society; (ii) a sense of one’s equal worth rooted in the belief that one’s conception of 
the good and plan of life are worth carrying out.62   
 Rawls argues that self-respect is important to citizens because “without self-
respect nothing may seem worth doing or if some things have value for us, we lack the 
will to strive for them.  All desire and activity becomes empty and vain, and we sink 
into apathy and cynicism.”63  If we do not have a secure sense of self-respect, then we 
will no longer see our ends and aims as worth pursuing; they will cease to be of value 
to us.  When we feel that our ends have little value, we will not be motivated to pursue 
them.  In turn, I suggest, we will not be motivated to develop and to exercise our two 
moral powers, for we have an interest in developing and exercising the two moral 
powers only because they can be a means to, as well as a part of, our good.  In short, 
without a secure sense of self-respect, we will not be motivated to develop and to fully 
exercise our two moral powers.  To the extent that we have a higher-order interest in 
exercising and developing these two powers, “parties in the original position would 
wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect.”64  
 For this reason, Rawls argues that self-respect is a primary good – a good that 
is necessary to realizing the two moral powers and that the state is responsible for 
distributing.  However, he has in mind here “not self-respect as an attitude toward 
oneself but the social bases of self-respect.”65 “The social bases of self-respect are 
those aspects of basic institutions that are normally essential if citizens are to have a 
lively sense of their own worth as moral persons.”66 
                                                
62 Ibid., p. 319.  
63 ATJ, p. 386; PL, p. 318.  
64 ATJ, p. 386. 
65 JF, p. 60. 
66 John Rawls, Collected Papers, Samuel Freeman (ed.) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 
p. 366; hereinafter CP.  See also CP, p. 314 and ATJ, p. 256. 
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 Rawls focuses on the social bases of self-respect rather than the personal 
attitude of self-respect for two reasons.  First, it is not the role of the state to 
distribute self-respect as an attitude toward oneself, because this is not something that 
the state can in itself distribute.  The most that society can legitimately do (i.e., 
without too much interference in private life) is to provide the social bases for 
realizing self-respect. Second, certain social bases of self-respect are essential to 
citizens’ secure sense of self-respect.  Self-respect is not something that we are born 
with.  It is something that must be learned and encouraged over time.  As Rawls 
writes, “basic institutions must educate people to this conception of themselves . . . 
Acquaintance with and participation in . . . public culture is one way citizens learn to 
conceive of themselves as free and equal, a conception which, if left to their own 
reflections, they would most likely never form, much less accept and desire to 
realize.”67  Thus, Rawls suggests, “self-respect depends upon and is encouraged by 
certain public features of basic social institutions, how they work and how people who 
accept these arrangements are expected to (and normally do) regard and treat one 
another.”68  On Rawls’s view, citizens’ sense of self-respect is diminished unless 
social institutions express equal respect. 
 We must now consider what it is to be respected by others.  We are respected 
when we are treated and regarded in ways that “confirm the sense of our own 
worth.”69  We regard ourselves as having equal worth by virtue of our having (i) the 
capacity to develop and exercise the capacity for justice and the capacity for a 
                                                
67 JF, p. 56. 
68 PL, p. 319.  The fact that self-respect is supported or encouraged by social institutions seems 
particularly plausible when we think about how people initially develop their sense of self-respect.  
Self-respect is not something that we are born with.  It is something that is learned over time.  And it is 
through our interactions with others that we learn to conceive of ourselves as having equal worth.  
Insofar as social institutions shape the way we interact with others, they seem important to the 
development of self-respect. 
69 Rawls uses this phrase in ATJ, p. 389.  Joshua Cohen makes a similar suggestion in “For a 
Democratic Society,” p. 109. 
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conception of the good and (ii) a conception of the good that is worth pursuing.  In 
turn, we must be treated and regarded by others in ways that express an 
acknowledgment of our being an equal member in the system of social cooperation by 
virtue of our having (i) and (ii).   
With this background information in mind, Rawls argues that a less than equal 
liberty would establish people’s position in public life, or social institutions, as 
inferior.  He suggests that people’s equal worth is respected by social institutions 
when all individuals have the same political rights and liberties.  Thus, if we wish to 
ensure a secure sense of self-respect, we would not accept anything less than equal 
political liberty.   
 Though commentators have generally failed to notice this, part of having the 
capacity for a conception of the good involves having a conception of the public good, 
a conception of what is valuable in public life.  The capacity for justice and the 
capacity for a conception of the good overlap: both involve a vision of the way in 
which society is to be arranged.  Suppose that racial minorities are denied the right to 
vote.  It would then be difficult for racial minorities to maintain a secure sense of their 
equal worth.  Our sense of equal value is grounded in our ability to exercise the 
capacity for justice and the capacity for a conception of the public good.   So, to 
respect us is to treat and to regard us in ways that take our exercise of these two 
powers to be of equal value.  If racial minorities are denied the right to vote while 
others are not, then the equal worth of racial minorities is not affirmed. As Charles 
Beitz aptly puts it, inequalities in political liberty convey “social acceptance of a belief 
in the inferiority or lesser merit of racial minorities as distinct from others.”70  
Denying voting rights to racial minorities suggests that their views on the public good 
                                                
70 Charles Beitz, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1989), p. 110.  Beitz has a rather different explanation of why unequal political liberties convey 
acceptance of such a belief. See ch. 5 of Political Equality.    
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and justice are of less value than other’s.  For example, it suggests that their views on 
such things are of less value than white people’s.  It suggests that the exercise of racial 
minorities’ two moral powers is less important, less valuable than others’.  The equal 
worth of racial minorities is degraded by this kind of social institution.  Under these 
conditions, it would be difficult for racial minorities to sustain a secure sense of self-
respect.  Thus, racial minorities would not be able to support institutions that did not 
support the equal liberty to vote.71   
From the original position, we do not know whether we will be part of the 
racial minority or not.  It may happen that we are part of the racial minority and that 
we may suffer accordingly.  Given that we are concerned to ensure “at all costs” the 
social bases necessary for a secure sense of self-respect, we would not be willing to 
take chances by permitting lesser political liberties to racial minorities.  Taking such 
chances would not be consistent with a deep and proper valuing of self-respect.  Thus, 
we could not make a good faith agreement to uphold institutions that did not guarantee 
equal political liberty.  The only acceptable choice is equal political liberty.72 
                                                
71 These arguments are not meant to suggest that all exclusion from public decision-making is insulting.  
For example, denying voting rights to inmates, particularly those who have committed severe crimes 
like murder or sexual abuse, does not seem insulting in the same way that denying voting rights to 
minorities is.  As with minorities, denying voting rights to those who have committed grave crimes 
certainly will suggest that their exercise of the two moral powers is of less significance or of less value.  
But, unlike with minorities, it will not undermine inmates’ sense of self-respect as citizens.  Remember 
that as citizens we see ourselves as having equal worth in virtue of our having the two moral powers to 
the level necessary to be fully cooperating members of society.  In committing such severe crimes, 
inmates have shown that they are not able to exercise the two moral powers – particularly the sense for 
justice – at this level. And so, as rational agents, we can suppose that inmates will recognize this and 
will see the denial of their voting rights as consistent with this fact and as a proper valuing of their 
capacities as citizens.  In turn, I suggest, inmates will not have their sense of self-respects as citizens 
undermined even if they are denied equal voting rights.  
72 This example illustrates that self-respect seems to turn on having equal authority.   It is interesting to 
note that we now have further reason for rejecting a consultative assembly and for favouring equal 
voting rights instead.  In a consultative assembly, non-racial minorities have greater authority over 
collective decisions.  This, however, is degrading of racial minorities’ sense of self-respect.  If non-
racial minorities have more power than racial minorities over political decisions, it singles them out as 
inferior.  It suggests that their exercise of the two moral powers is somehow of less value than others.’  
This is damaging of racial minorities’ sense of self-worth.  So, to ensure a secure basis for self-respect, 
citizens will reject a consultative assembly and will wish to secure to equal voting rights. 
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Though he never explores this suggestion in any detail, Rawls suggests that an 
analogous argument can be made with respect to the fair value or equal worth of 
liberty: inequalities in the worth of political liberty undermine self-respect in the way 
that inequalities in political liberty do.73  Imagine a society where the poor have the 
right to vote, but are less able to make effective use of their right to vote, say, because 
the wealthy are able to make greater contributions to political campaigns and, in turn, 
are more able to influence legislation.74  If the poor have less of an opportunity to 
influence political outcomes than the rich, the suggestion is, their self-respect would 
be undermined for reasons similar to those in the last case. 
The private financing of political campaigns is not consistent with ensuring 
self-respect.  To take me to be of equal value is to take my exercise of the two moral 
powers to be equally valuable.  Since the poor lack the funds to contribute to private 
political campaigns, private financing of political campaigns allows the views of rich 
citizens, on justice and the common good, to shape the course of public life to a much 
greater extent than those of the poor.  Moreover, there are other equally feasible 
arrangements that are available and that allow the views of both the rich and the poor 
on justice and the common good to influence public life relatively equally – for 
example, one option is the public financing of political campaigns.  Insofar as we 
choose not to take up such alternative arrangements, it suggests that the views of the 
poor on justice and the common good are not of significant value.  If they were of 
significant value, we would not implement arrangements that give unequal weight to 
the views of the poor.  We would implement institutions that allowed citizens to 
influence the course of public life in a more equitable manner.  Insofar as a different 
                                                
73 Rawls did not discuss the fair value of liberty and its connection to self-respect in ATJ, but he says 
later in PL, n. 29 p. 318, that “it should have been.”  This development is in response to Norman 
Daniels, “Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty,” in N. Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1975), pp. 253-281. 
74 This is an example that Rawls is particularly concerned with.  See PL VII, §7, §12. 
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and more equitable scheme is available and isn’t taken up, it is suggested that the 
poor’s exercise of the two moral powers is somehow less important than the rich’s 
exercise of the two moral powers.  Assuming that the poor are aware of these points, 
the poor’s sense of self-respect will be undermined.75  Thus, insofar as agents within 
the original position are concerned to accept principles that ensure the social bases of 
self-respect, they would not permit unequal worth of political liberties.  They would 
only accept equal worth of liberty. 
Self-respect is damaged in such a case for reasons unrelated to the two moral 
powers.  Our self-respect can be damaged when others do not treat us in ways that are 
consistent with regarding us as having a conception of the good that is worth pursuing.   
Suppose, that because of their contributions to political campaigns, the rich are able to 
control the course of legislation to their advantage.  Also imagine that the poor tend to 
live in one state or province.  Because of the greater political influence of the rich, the 
poor persistently lose out.  Many of the country’s garbage dumps are built there, less 
money is spent on schools, the maintenance of roads and other public buildings, for 
example.  It seems clear that, under this kind of institutional arrangement, an undue 
burden is placed on one social group – the burden of social cooperation falls much 
more on the poor than the rich.76  It seems to me that any procedural arrangement that 
has this effect or was likely to have this effect would be rejected by parties in the 
original position.  This is because the interests of the poor are disregarded by this kind 
of social arrangement, and the poor are encouraged to feel that this disregard exists at 
                                                
75 I assume that the publicity condition is satisfied here.  Rawls, believes that in a fully just society the 
relevant pattern of benefits is sought for publicly available reasons.  This is to say, the basic justification 
for social arrangements in a fully just society is one that is available to everyone.  This justification 
includes everything that would be said when the system of justice is set up and why we would proceed 
in one way rather than another (PL, 67). 
76 In discussing the fair value of liberty, Rawls suggests that “instituted arrangements must not impose 
any undue burdens on various political groups in society and must affect them all in an equitable 
manner” (PL, p. 357).  I take myself, here, to explain why this is a requirement of equal respect. 
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public sanction.  This, I suggest, is likely to be undermining of the poor’s sense of 
self-respect. 
Private financing of political campaigns allows the rich to control the electoral 
process to their advantage.  As a result, the poor are less able to advance their own 
interests.  There are other arrangements, such as public financing of political 
campaigns, that are feasible and more conducive to the equal advancement of 
interests.  Insofar as we choose not to take up such alternative arrangements, it 
suggests that the poor’s interests are not of significant concern.  For if they were, we 
would not implement institutions that allowed (or were likely to allow) their interests 
to be ignored.  We would implement institutions that allowed the poor’s interests to be 
advanced in a more equitable manner.  Awareness of these points is likely to be 
undermining of the poor’s sense of self-respect.  As Beitz argues, it is hard to see 
ourselves as having equal value when social institutions establish or reinforce the view 
that our interests deserve less concern simply because of our membership in one rather 
than another social group.77  Our interests and aims are part of our determinate 
conception of the good.  They are part of our conception of what is valuable in human 
life.  To dismiss our interests as being less worthy than others’ is to suggest that our 
conception of the good is not as valuable as others’, is not as worthy of pursuit as 
others’.  This is undermining of our sense of self-respect.78  Thus, given that agents 
wish to ensure the social bases of self-respect, they would not permit unequal worth of 
political liberties. 
                                                
77 c.f., Beitz, Political Equality, p. 110. 
78 A person can continuously lose out simply because she doesn’t know how to her exercise influence, 
say because she lacks charisma, or because she simply can find no support for her views in larger 
society.  But perpetual loss under these circumstances is not undermining of self-respect. Perpetual loss 
in these cases seems more a matter of bad luck than it is a matter of being ignored or discounted.  
Because unlike in the last case, there isn’t much that society can do to change things, at least without 
too much interference. (For example, society could brainwash others into sharing your views, but this 
significantly interferes with citizens’ liberties.) 
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Objections. 
 I have suggested that racial minorities’ sense of self-respect is undermined 
when non-racial minorities have greater power or authority over collective decision-
making.  This suggestion may raise a concern, however.   If this argument holds, why 
isn’t it the case that other inequalities in authority are undermining of self-respect?  
For example, people who hold public office, like those who are President or Supreme 
Court Judges, have more authority than average citizens, but this is not usually 
considered to be undermining of their sense of self-respect (assuming, of course, that 
equality of opportunity holds – that is, assuming that everyone has a fair chance of 
attaining public office).  What can account for this?  I think the following can: I am 
not a Supreme Court Judge and I do not have the authority of a Supreme Court Judge 
for any number of reasons – because I do not have the knowledge and skills that are 
required, or I do not have the opinions or the temperament that is necessary to gain 
support, etc.  My failure to be a Supreme Court Judge is not because of the exercise of 
my two powers or because my interests are less important or less valuable than others.  
Similar points can be made in relation to not being President. For this reason, my not 
having as much authority as a Supreme Court Judge or the President is not 
undermining of my sense of self-respect 
Moreover, one might object that societies can have other ways of affirming 
self-respect than ensuring equal basic liberty and its fair value.  Consider, for example, 
a feudal society.  In a feudal society, those who hold land (on the basis of heredity) 
have administrative and judicial power.  Yet, it seems possible for all members of such 
a society, even the serfs, to maintain their sense of self-respect.  As Rawls puts it, in 
such a society, “each person is believed to have his allotted station in the natural order 
of things . . . Men resign themselves to their position should it ever occur to them to 
question it; and since all may view themselves as assigned their vocation, everyone is 
 45 
held to be equally fated and equally noble in the eyes of God.”79  In this society, 
people’s sense of self-respect comes from a belief of having equal worth in the eyes of 
God.  And so, even though serfs have unequal political liberties – in the sense that 
they have less influence over political outcomes than others such as the landholding 
elite – they are able to maintain self-respect.  It seems, then, that equal political liberty 
and its fair value is not necessary for self-respect.  
 Rawls attempts to respond to this objection.  He argues, from the original 
position, “our problem is how society should be arranged if it is to conform to 
principles that rational persons with true general beliefs would acknowledge.”80  In 
other words, when we are attempting to decide the principles of justice that are to 
guide the arrangement of social institutions, we are not to be guided by obviously false 
beliefs.  Thus, Rawls argues, “when the belief in a fixed natural order sanctioning a 
hierarchical society is abandoned, assuming here that this belief is not true, a tendency 
is set up in the direction of the two principles of justice in serial order.”81  Rawls’s 
view is that once the belief in a fixed natural order is given up, “the effective 
protection of the equal liberties becomes increasingly of first importance in the 
protection of self-respect.”82 
Rawls’s response here is unsatisfying.  Insofar as his response relies on the 
view that belief in a fixed natural order or hierarchy is false, it seems to be inconsistent 
with the value and importance that both we and Rawls usually place on religious 
belief.  But Rawls has the means for providing a more plausible response.  I think, in 
the end, he would admit that there are some who derive their sense of self-respect 
from other spheres of life than the political sphere.  Some will derive a secure sense of 
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self-respect purely from being a good Christian or being a good Buddhist (i.e., from 
their religious beliefs and practices), others from being a good mother or a good doctor 
or a successful lawyer, for example, and not at all from the development and exercise 
of the two moral powers.  But Rawls seems to suggest that we should not be 
concerned with this kind of person when making decisions about the basic structure of 
social institutions.  Why might this be?  He is making a judgment about what 
constitutes a proper sense of self-respect among those who view themselves as free 
and equal citizens.  On Rawls’s view, free and equal citizens value themselves 
properly only when they “care about . . . opportunities in order to develop and exercise 
their moral powers [as citizens]” and “they show a lack of self-respect and weakness 
in character in not doing so.”83  Properly valuing oneself as a citizen involves valuing 
the development and exercise of the two moral powers.   
It seems clear that from this perspective the serfs’ (proper) sense of self-respect 
will be undermined by a feudal system.  As part of properly valuing themselves, serfs 
will take their participation in political decision-making to be as valuable as others.’  
A feudal society does not support or affirm this valuing.  In feudal society, the 
landholding elite make decisions about the arrangements of social institutions, while 
serfs are deemed as unworthy of participation in decision-making.  In this scenario, the 
serfs’ exercise of the two moral powers is branded as inferior to the landholders’.   For 
this reason, peasants will find it hard to maintain their (proper) sense of self-respect 
within a feudal society (a society where there is neither equal liberty nor fair value of 
liberty). 
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More Objections. 
On the view I have argued for, disrespect is shown when not everyone is 
valued equally.  The disrespect associated with unequal voting rights is relative or 
comparative; it is a matter of some being viewed and treated as inferior relative to 
others.  What if there is anarchism?  In this case, no one has a vote and so, it would 
seem to follow, that no one is insulted or degraded.  If this is right, then it is not clear 
that Rawls’s arguments are enough to explain the general importance of having a right 
to vote.  So, how might Rawls’s arguments get us out of anarchy? 
Part of the picture is the importance of the rule of law and its protections.  On 
Rawls’s view, the rule of law and its protections are an important ingredient in having 
maximum equal liberty.  He suggests that certain regulations can maximize the 
effectiveness and meaningfulness of the liberties.  For example, certain rules of order 
are necessary for regulating discussion: Rawls suggests that “without the acceptance 
of reasonable procedures of inquiry and precepts of debate, freedom of speech cannot 
serve its purpose.”84  If, for example, everyone were to speak at once, speech would 
lose its point.  It would be neither meaningful nor purposeful.  Thus, certain 
regulations or, rather, rules of order, are necessary for effective and meaningful 
freedom of speech.  In a similar fashion, the rule of law seems necessary for effective 
and meaningful basic liberty.   
The argument is this: in the state of nature there is no rule of law that will 
restrict liberty in the way necessary to ensure effective and meaningful equal basic 
liberty.  Thus, if we wish to secure maximum equal liberty, we will not choose to be in 
a state of anarchy.  We will choose to live under the system of law and the protections 
afforded by it. 
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Rawls’s insistence on our higher-order interest in developing our capacity for a 
conception of the good is of importance here, and provides perhaps the strongest 
argument against anarchy.  Citizens view themselves as free in virtue of their being 
capable of revising and pursuing their conception of the good.85  It seems that in a 
Hobbesian state of nature, the level of violence is so great that one has to put all of 
one’s efforts into simply surviving and this is not consistent with liberty.  This is 
because one would not be able to exercise the capacity for a conception of the good in 
a Hobbesian state of nature.  To take a parallel example from Raz, imagine a woman 
who shares a small desert island with a fierce carnivorous beast who perpetually hunts 
for her.86  All the woman’s energies and efforts are aimed at escaping the beast.  This 
woman is significantly unfree.  All her efforts are put toward survival and not toward 
forming and pursuing freely chosen goals.  For this reason, she is not able to exercise 
her capacity for a conception of the good.  Something similar can be said of us in the 
state of nature.  In the state of nature, so much effort would be put into sheer survival 
that our freedom would not be effective and meaningful.  The sort of freedom Rawls is 
concerned with is restricted if the processes of forming and pursuing life goals is too 
difficult, as it would be in a state of anarchy.  We need a system of law and 
governance in order to form, revise, and rationally pursue our conceptions of the good; 
we need it in order to be free. 
Steven Wall raises a further concern in relation to the argument from self-
respect.  Wall writes, in ATJ, “Rawls seemed to deny that the political liberties must 
be equal for society to be well-ordered.  In discussing Mill’s proposal for plural votes 
[for the educated], he allowed that ‘plural voting may be perfectly just.’”87  Wall aptly 
asks, how can Rawls’s claim about plural voting be squared with his claim that the fair 
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value of liberty must be guaranteed for citizens to have a secure sense of self-respect?   
In what follows, I will try to answer Wall’s question.  That is to say, I will try to 
illustrate how these two claims can be reconciled.  
 Let us begin by considering Mill’s argument.  Mill argues that those with 
greater education, which is supposed to be a mark of superior knowledge and 
intelligence, should have plural or more votes.88  Mill agrees with Rawls to the extent 
that he thinks that everyone has a claim to a voice and cannot, without great insult, be 
excluded from matters of common interest, such as national affairs.  However, Mill 
argues that this does not entail that everyone ought to have an equal voice in such 
matters.  The voice of those with superior knowledge and intelligence, which is 
measured by one’s level of education, should be given greater weight.  Although 
everyone should have a say, those with a greater capacity for the management of joint 
interests should have a greater say.  Mill suggests that the superior influence of the 
educated should be enough to protect them from the class legislation of the 
uneducated, but not so much as to allow them to enact their own class legislation.  As 
Rawls puts it, on Mill’s picture, ideally those with superior knowledge “should act as a 
constant force on the side of justice and the common good, a force that, although 
always weak in itself, can often tip the scale in the right direction if the larger forces 
cancel them out.89”  As a result, Mill thinks that everyone, even the uneducated who 
have less of a vote, will benefit from weighted voting. 
 Mill suggests that plural or weighted voting of this kind is not insulting or 
damaging of the uneducated’s sense of self-respect.  He writes,  
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entire exclusion from a voice in the common concerns is one thing: the concession to others of 
a more potential voice on the ground of greater capacity for the management of joint interests 
is another . . . Everyone has a right to feel insulted by being made a nobody and stamped as of 
no account at all.  No one but a fool, only a fool of a peculiar description, feels offended by the 
acknowledgement that there are others whose opinion, and even whose wish, is entitled to 
greater amount of consideration than his.”90 
Rawls considers Mill’s proposal.91  Here, Rawls insists that unequal votes, if 
justifiable at all, must be justifiable from the standpoint of those with fewer votes – the 
uneducated in the Millian context.  Rawls takes Mill to accept this burden of proof.  
The high burden of proof stems from our concern with self-respect.  Remember on 
Rawls’s view, we ought to be able to regard ourselves as equal participants in the 
system of social cooperation.  Being an equal participant, in turn, involves being able 
to exercise our two moral powers as equals (i.e., to the extent that others are).  Our 
sense of self-respect turns on this.  Rawls suggests that weighted voting can only be 
permitted if it is consistent with our sense of self-respect.  For weighted voting to be 
consistent with self-respect, there must be a powerful (and not just a plausible) 
argument that unequal suffrage will serve the interests of the uneducated as a whole.  
To show that we value the uneducated as co-participants, we must give a powerful 
argument showing that the interests of the uneducated will be advanced more 
systematically if they are given less votes, if they are given less of an ability to 
exercise their two moral powers.  And, on Rawls’s view, “the gain to the uneducated 
is to be estimated in the first instance by the larger security of their other liberties.”92  
Unequal suffrage can only be justified if it serves to make basic liberties more secure 
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and effective.93  Rawls concludes, “admitting these assumptions, plural voting may be 
perfectly just.”94 
While such an argument could be given in principle, I doubt that Rawls thinks 
the high burden of proof could be met in reality.  Even if unequal suffrage were to 
serve the basic liberties, that is, to make them more secure and effective, it is unlikely 
that weighted voting would serve citizens’ interests as a whole.  While Rawls argues 
that people’s interests are respected in the first instance when the basic liberties are 
more securely protected, he also argues that people’s interests are only absolutely 
respected when the difference principles is observed.  The difference principle is hard 
to apply and there are many judgment calls that need to be made – empirical and 
otherwise.  The most fundamental threat to justice is, perhaps, not being appropriately 
impartial.  Different groups of people are going to have different conceptions of how 
to apply the difference principle.  Furthermore, there is a tendency for our conceptions 
of how to apply the difference principle to represent our own interests 
disproportionately.95  This seems only natural given that people have a more intimate 
and sensitive understanding of their own interests than of others’.96  No education 
level, or qualification of any kind for that matter, is going to help us overcome this 
fact.  An education from Cambridge or Oxford, for example, will not guard against 
partiality.  So, if people tend to advance conceptions of how to apply the difference 
principle that reflect their own interests, it follows that those who lack equal 
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opportunity to advance their own conceptions of how to apply the difference principle 
will tend to lose out.  If, for example, those with superior education are given a greater 
say, it is likely that the interests of the uneducated will be ignored.  Consequently, it 
seems unlikely that weighted voting will ever meet the high burden of proof that 
Rawls requires.  For this reason, if weighted voting were adopted, it would be 
damaging to the self-respect of the uneducated.  Fair value of political liberties must 
be guaranteed if we wish to secure citizens’ sense of self-respect.   
I have argued that agents who seek to ensure a secure sense of self-respect will 
reject weighted voting procedures.  But why assume that arguments related to self-
respect require voting procedures of any kind.  Might not citizens’ sense of self-
respect be consistent with certain non-voting procedures?  
 David Estlund has recently argued that there is no strong moral argument for 
favouring standard voting procedures over his Queen for a day proposal.97  Under the 
Queen for a day proposal, one voter is picked at random from the set of all voters to be 
monarch and is required to decide one political issue.  Each citizen is regarded and 
treated equally: each citizen has the same chance of her views on justice and the 
common good influencing public affairs.  It would seem that Queen for a day 
expresses an equal valuing of citizens’ exercise of their two moral powers and, in turn, 
is consistent with their sense of self-respect.  One might legitimately wonder whether, 
from within the original position, there are any grounds for rejecting such a proposal. 
Rawls has available to him at least two grounds for rejecting Estlund’s 
proposal.  Recall that the principle of equal basic liberty requires not only that equal 
political liberties are guaranteed but also that equal civil liberties (such as free speech, 
freedom of conscience, and so on) are guaranteed as well.  Rawls suggests that equal 
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basic liberty, both political and civil, are required for the self-respect of citizens.  In 
light of this, it seems that agents within the original position would not opt for Queen 
for a day.  
In a sense, being Queen for a day is like being Supreme Court Justice for a day 
with the assumption that you only had one case to decide.  The main task of a 
Supreme Court Justice is to ensure that the basic liberties are protected.  To be a good 
at her job, a Supreme Court Justice must know certain things and have certain skills.  
For example, she must have an extensive knowledge of the constitution, precedent, 
and the rule of law.  Assuming that equality of opportunity holds (that everyone has a 
fair chance of attaining public offices), there doesn’t seem to be anything wrong with 
having these types of requirements.  If a Supreme Court Justice is chosen at random 
from the set of all citizens, there is no guarantee that the person chosen would have the 
required knowledge or skill set.  Without the specific knowledge and skills, the person 
is unlikely to be very good at securing the basic liberties.  Similar things can be said 
about Queen for a day.  There is no guarantee that the person chosen to decide an issue 
will have the knowledge and skill set required to ensure that equal basic liberty is 
protected.  Equal basic liberty would be jeopardized by Queen for a day.  Because of 
the importance of the basic liberties to citizens’ sense of self-respect, this isn’t a risk 
that we would be willing to take.  We would not accept such a scheme, from within 
the original position.  
 I also think Rawls has something further to offer when we consider his 
argument against F.Y. Edgeworth.98   Edgeworth believes that the principle of utility 
would be chosen by rational self-interested agents in the original position as a political 
principle to assess social policies.  One would wish to promote utility with each 
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choice, whether it is about taxation, property legislation, and so on.  On Edgeworth’s 
view, this is the best procedure for all.  Even if one doesn’t benefit now, say when a 
certain taxation policy is chosen, one’s time will come later, say when a certain policy 
concerning property is chosen.  Therefore, by adopting a principle of utility, self-
interested and rational parties have assurance that they will not lose out in the end and 
will best improve their life prospects.99   
 To a certain extent Rawls agrees with Edgeworth.  He suggests that 
Edgeworth’s reasoning seems plausible in the case of lesser policy issues, that is, in 
cases where decisions have relatively small and temporary influence on the 
distribution of advantages and where there is some institutional device insuring 
randomness to prevent disadvantages from perpetually accruing to a small few, for 
example.100  If, for example, it is decided that the electricity will be cut in a particular 
area for a few hours, it seems reasonable to respond to those who lose out from such 
an arrangement with “Don’t worry you’re time will come.”   
However, in other cases, where questions of social policy are more vital, where 
they are likely to result in large and enduring shifts in the institutional distribution of 
advantages, Rawls suggests that Edgeworth’s reasoning isn’t appropriate.  For 
example, imagine that, for some reason, utility would be maximized by burning all of 
the Christian churches down.  It seems inappropriate to say to Christians, “Don’t 
worry you’re time will come later.  You’ll benefit from some other decision later 
down the line.”  The impact of such a decision is simply too pervasive and too 
continuing in influence.  Its effect will go beyond days and weeks, and might even go 
beyond months or years (depending on whether Christians are allowed to rebuild their 
churches and how long it would take).  It is irrelevant whether Christians will benefit 
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over the long run.  There are certain fundamental interests, such as our interests in 
expressing religious attitudes, that we would not be willing to sacrifice even if we 
would benefit over the long run.  Some things need to be off the bargaining table; they 
need to be guaranteed.  So, Rawls holds, Edgeworth’s argument fails when it comes to 
vital questions of policy.  Insofar as they have certain fundamental interests, rational 
people wouldn’t choose the principle of utility when it comes to the most important 
matters of social justice. 
 A similar argument applies to the case of Queen for a day.  Sometimes the 
issue to be decided will be trivial in its impact, such as the decision about whether 
electricity should be cut for a few hours in a particular neighbourhood.   Other times 
the decisions will be significant in its impact, it may concern whether certain religious 
practices should be permitted, for example.  Queen for a Day may be acceptable in the 
case of trivial decisions, but it does not seem so in the case of more vital concerns.  
Just as with the principle of utility, people would be unwilling to accept Queen for a 
day because there is always the possibility that their fundamental interests could be 
threatened in a significant way.  
 This argument might be taken to support weighted voting or some other 
arrangement that allows smart and skilled people to rule.  But the previous arguments 
against weighted voting rule out this type of arrangement.  Even very smart and skilled 
people (including judges) need to be restrained by citizens, who know best about their 
own interests.  So, when we combine the arguments against weighed voting with those 
against Queen for a day we seem to have at least some reason for supporting a 
representative democracy.  Under this scheme, the skilful are able to make decisions, 
but they are also restrained by the citizenry.   
 
 
 56 
§2.3 An Argument from Freedom as Non-domination  
Our higher-order interests in exercising the second moral power, the capacity 
for a conception of the good, and in securing the social bases of self-respect 
underwrite a third and different kind of argument for equal political liberty and its fair 
value, namely an argument concerning the value of freedom as non-domination.   
  Philip Pettit argues that the antonym of liberty is subjugation or domination.  
An agent X dominates Y if and only if (1) X has the capacity to interfere on an 
arbitrary basis, that is, without regard to Y’s perceived interests, (2) with impunity and 
at will, (3) in certain (and perhaps not all) choices that Y is in a position to make.101  
On Pettit’s view, having power over another does not necessarily mean that one 
actually interferes with the individual she has power over (though actual interference 
would constitute domination).  In fact, she needn’t have any inclination toward such 
interference; interference may even be rather unlikely.  Pettit argues that dominating 
power can interfere with one’s liberty even if it is never exerted.  The idea is that, 
usually, the (potential) victim of power and the power bearer are aware of their 
relationship; both are usually aware that the power bearer could interfere in the 
victim’s choices arbitrarily, without regard for her perceived interests.  This means 
that the victim relies on the goodwill of the power bearer not to exert her power.  The 
victim of power lives at the mercy of the power bearer; they are not on equal terms.  
This is a bad situation to be in. 
 So, on Pettit’s view, a dictatorship, however benign, is objectionable.  He 
writes, “a prince who is capable, if only within certain broad limits, of doing what he 
wills” is free to ignore the interests of the people “in the coercive legislation and 
taxation that he subjects them to and so will hold a dominating position in the 
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society.”102  As an example, Pettit describes Joseph Priestly’s articulation of the 
complaint made by American colonists against the British government: 
On his reading of that complaint, it is little consolation that the government may be fairly 
benign, taxing the Americans only for ‘one penny’; the problem is that this government has the 
power, without being forced to look to the interests of Americans, to tax them for their ‘last 
penny.’103 
Though well disposed at the moment, there is nothing about the American subjects 
that provides motivation for the continued benevolence of the British government.  
The British can freely withhold their benevolence at any time, without repercussion.  
In short, Pettit argues, because it can be taken away freely, dependence on the 
benevolence of another, when it is one sided, is always objectionable, even when it is 
not actualized. 
 So, on Pettit’s view, domination is the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary 
basis in another’s affairs; “it is the capacity to interfere in a person’s life without 
regard to their perceived interests.”104  But, one might wonder, what is so 
objectionable about this?  Pettit suggests three things. 
 First, without freedom as non-domination (FND), people lack certainty.  We 
cannot predict when interference will strike.  This not only leads to anxiety but it also 
makes it harder for people to organize their affairs and to make plans on a systematic 
basis.  Second, without FND, one must 
keep a weather eye on the powerful, anticipating what they will expect of you and trying to 
please them, or anticipating where they will be and trying to stay out of their way; it is to have 
strategic deference and anticipation forced upon you at every point. You can never sail on, 
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unconcerned, in the pursuit of your own affairs; you have to navigate an area that is mined on 
all sides with dangers.105 
This is a serious cost.  This kind of strategic disposition requires agents to “curtail 
their own choices.”106  In other words, people must deny themselves certain choices in 
order to prevent interference from others.  Third, Pettit suggests that “the victim of 
power cannot enjoy the psychological status of an equal.”107  It is difficult for a subject 
to see herself as having equal worth when she knows that the Prince can interfere in 
her life without any regard for her interests.  So, it would be hard for the subjects to 
maintain a secure sense of their self-respect under this kind of political arrangement. 
 As framed, Pettit’s argument is not entirely plausible.  It seems to me that what 
does the work here is not just the possibility of interference as such, but the fact that 
interference is a realistic possibility.  Imagine that the British were a group of monks, 
who lived frugally and were committed to the virtues of self-sacrifice, peace, and 
compassion.  I doubt that in this case any of the bad effects that Pettit describes would 
arise.  Because there is no realistic possibility of the British (monks) actually 
interfering, we will not be motivated to keep a “weather eye” on the British nor will 
we be likely to take up strategic deference, and without these things occurring 
people’s self-respect is not going to be undermined in the way that Pettit describes.  
Rather, it is only when British interference is a realistic possibility, that fear becomes a 
rational motivator and leads to the bad effects that Pettit outlines.  What leads to the 
bad effects is that the Americans, at the time, felt that British interference was a real 
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possibility.  This is what is objectionable about the British, not just the possibility of 
their interference as such.108 
 As long as there is a real possibility of interference, it seems clear that as 
citizens we are going to be concerned to prevent relations of domination, like those of 
a dictatorship, even when they are rather benign.  As argued earlier, we are moved to 
secure the social bases of self-respect at all costs.  Insofar as domination threatens self-
respect, we will wish to secure freedom as non-domination.  However, it also seems 
particularly important for those concerned with a higher-order interest in developing 
and exercising the second moral power, the capacity for a conception of the good, to 
prevent relations of domination.  Persons are conceived of as having certain ends and 
goals that they wish to pursue as part of a valuable life, and, as Pettit notes, pursuit of 
these things “is going to be facilitated by their having an ability to make plans.”109  
Yet, as was already argued, the ability to make plans is undermined by the kind of 
uncertainty that is associated with being in a relationship of domination.  Moreover, as 
part of our interest in developing and exercising our capacity for a conception of the 
good, we must ensure room for agents to develop and pursue self-chosen goals, goals 
that they identify with as moral and rational agents.  This requires that agents have 
available to them a variety of alternative options.  To know that certain religious ends 
are truly ones that you identify with, for example, you must have available to you a 
variety of alternative religious practices to test out.  I think that something like this 
holds generally.  To know that certain goals and ends are really your own, ones that 
you identify with as a rational and moral agent, you must have available to you a 
variety of options.  To know whether pink is really your favourite colour to wear 
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(rather than something your parents pressed on you, for example) you should have 
open to you the option of trying other colours, of wearing a blue dress one day and 
perhaps yellow pants the next.  Domination doesn’t seem to allow this in the sense 
that, in order to ensure non-interference, one will deny oneself certain options.  For 
example, if my master dislikes blue and yellow, then in order to ingratiate myself with 
him and to lessen the likelihood of his interference, I will not wear those colours.  I 
close myself off from certain options.  In short, allowing domination to persist is not 
consistent with leaving room for agents to develop and pursue self-chosen goals, goals 
that they identify with as moral and rational agents. 
 Pettit argues that freedom as non-domination requires democratic 
arrangements.  He writes,    
the promotion of freedom as non-domination requires . . . that something be done to ensure 
that public decision-making tracks the interests and the ideas of those citizens whom it affects; 
after all, non-arbitrariness is guaranteed by nothing more or less than the existence of such a 
tracking relationship. The decision-making must not represent an imposition of their will on 
us, as the citizens are likely to think about the matter. It must be a form of decision-making 
which we can own and identify with: a form of decision-making in which we can see our 
interests furthered and our ideas respected. Whether the decisions are taken in the legislature, 
in the administration, or in the courts, they must bear the marks of our ways of caring and our 
ways of thinking.110 
Pettit argues that the need for government to track the interest of the citizens suggests 
an electoral government.  “Under such democratization, the occupants of key positions 
in government are determined by periodic elections, where no competent adult is 
excluded from participating in them . . . and no one’s vote is worth more than anyone 
                                                
110 Ibid., p. 184. 
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else’s.”111  The establishment of an electoral government is central to ensuring FND 
because it is a way of forcing the government to track the interests of the populace.  
The governed are given the power to choose and to reject a government, and they do 
so on the basis of whether their interests are furthered or not.112   
 One might wonder at this point why, on this argument, it is important for all 
citizens to have an equally influential say (i.e., to have equal voting rights and their 
fair value) in decision-making.  The main point is this: in order to ensure FND for all 
citizens, it is important for all citizens to have an equally effective say in the electoral 
processes.  If a certain group, say racial minorities, is excluded from votes or their 
votes have less weight, then they will have less of an ability to ensure that the 
government tracks their interests and to this extent they will be dominated.  To ensure 
that this is not the case everyone must have an equally influential say.  How this can 
be accomplished is a matter I will discuss later. 
 
§3.  The value of Public Deliberation. 
Rawls has been criticized by deliberative democrats such as Michael Sandel 
for failing to account for the value of public deliberation.  The main thesis of 
deliberative democrats is that participation in political discussions with fellow citizens 
is an important good.  Arguments for the value of public deliberation take different 
forms.  Some argue for the intrinsic value of public deliberation, while others argue 
for the instrumental value of public deliberation.  On the intrinsic view, there is 
                                                
111 Pettit, “Contestatory Democracy,” p. 173. 
112 If the electoral government is popular in nature, then there is always the possibility that the interests 
of minorities will not be tracked by the government, and will thus be open to arbitrary interference.  So, 
it seems to me that we would need some kind of procedure that would work to ensure that governments 
cannot ignore or flout minority interests.  This may suggest that we should not take up popular or 
majoritarian electoral processes.  I discuss majority rule and the protection of minority interests in 
section 4.  I believe that both the procedural and non-procedural mechanisms that I argue for in § 4 will 
work to protect minorities’ interests against arbitrary interference.  Pettit himself thinks that a popular 
electoral process along with a contestatory process would be the best way of ensuring that minority 
interests are tracked.  On this point see his “Contestatory Democratization.” 
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something inherently valuable about participating in the process of deliberation.  On 
the instrumental view, public deliberation is valuable because of its contribution to just 
outcomes.   
 In many cases, the importance of political deliberation is established by an 
appeal to a comprehensive conception of the good.  Consider Sandel’s argument.  
Sandel argues for the intrinsic value of public deliberation.  He argues “it is only as 
participants in political association that we can realize our nature and fulfill our 
highest ends.”113  Sandel’s argument is Aristotelian in structure.  It is the view that 
man is a social-political animal and that his essential nature is realized most fully in a 
democratic society where participation in political life is pervasive.114  On Sandel’s 
view, taking an active part in public political discussion is not just one good among 
many but, rather, is a necessary part of the good life.  This kind of argument is not 
available to Rawls.  The Aristotelian view is a comprehensive conception of the good; 
it is a particular view of what the best human life consists in.  In the original position 
agents know that they have determinate conceptions of the good life, but they do not 
know their content.  Consequently, any appeal to a comprehensive conception of the 
good, such as the Aristotelian one, is in violation of the restrictions placed on agents 
(and their reasoning) by the original position.  These considerations suggest that 
Rawls, as he is traditionally interpreted, is unable to account for the value of public 
deliberation.   
 If we extend his arguments in the ways I have suggested, then Rawls can 
account for the value of public deliberation.  Consider the argument from ownership.  
Citizens feel a sense of ownership over political decisions when they play a role in the 
                                                
113 Michael Sandel, Democracy and Its Limits (Cambridge: First Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 7.  
Charles Taylor outlines a similar argument in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), p. 334f. 
114 PL, p. 206. 
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making of these decisions.  This is because citizens’ exercise of their sense of justice 
is given weight and taken into account in political decision-making.  So, in order for 
citizens to feel a sense of ownership over the decisions that are made, it is essential 
that they exercise their sense of justice; it is essential that they reflect intelligently on 
the common good and justice.  It is the connection between this exercise and political 
decision-making that gives rise to a sense of ownership among citizens.   
Public deliberation is vital to the exercise of one’s sense of justice in two 
respects.  First, public deliberation encourages citizens to exercise their sense of 
justice.  Hearing others’ views on the requisites of justice and the common good and 
being in a sphere that encourages citizens’ response to these views, will encourage 
citizens to think about what their own views on such matters are.  Second, public 
deliberation is necessary for the exercise of the sense of justice.  In support of this 
claim, consider the kinds of skills that are required to exercise one’s capacity for 
justice.  In reflecting on what justice and the common good require, one must take into 
account the impact of various schemes and policies on a diverse populace.  To do this 
properly it is important to take other people’s interests and points of view into account 
adequately.  Deliberating with others and hearing their views is essential to this 
process, for it is by discussing with others and hearing their views that we are able to 
understand their interests (what they are, what weight they give them, and so on).  As 
Rawls suggests, “no one . . . knows everything the others know, or can make all the 
same inferences that they can draw in concert.  Discussion is a way of combining 
information and enlarging the range of arguments.”115   In this way, deliberation is 
essential to intelligent reflection about justice.   
The practical argument also supports the value of public deliberation.  I argued 
earlier, in order to make an informed decision about whether participation in political 
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life is part of their rational conception of the good, citizens need to experience what-it-
is-like to participate in political life.  If citizens were only to vote, then they would not 
experience what-it-is-like to participate in political life.  Taken in itself, the act of 
voting is much like standing on the sidelines and watching a football game.  Voting 
requires only that one tick a box, and to tick a box is not to take an active role in 
political life.  It is more like watching politics take place than it is actually 
participating in politics.  For this reason, voting is not in itself sufficient to determine 
if participation in political life is right for me.  In order to make such a decision, I must 
take a more active role in political life.  Active participation in political life requires 
reflection about justice and the common good (i.e., the exercise of our sense of 
justice).  It also requires that we discuss and confer with fellow citizens about what 
justice and the common good require.  I must actively engage in political deliberations 
and other facets of political life to genuinely experience what-it-is-like to engage in 
political life.  This is essential to making an informed decision about what is right for 
me.  In short, insofar as it allows citizens to make an informed decision about the 
value that participation in political life holds for them, participation in public 
deliberation is essential to the exercise of their capacity for a conception of the good. 
My arguments suggest that, insofar as it facilitates the exercise of the two 
moral powers, participation in political discussions and deliberations is an important 
good.  At this point one might wonder whether I can make such claims without falling 
into the kind of civic humanism that Rawls rejects.   
Recall that civic humanists, like Rousseau and Aristotle, assign special 
importance to political participation; they see political participation as the chief, if not 
sole, human good.  My arguments do not make a similar claim.  It does follow from 
my arguments that a politically impoverished life would be missing something of 
value.  In living such a life we would miss out on something valuable to the extent that 
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we would be less able to develop and exercise the second moral power, which is part 
of our higher-order interests.  However, it does not follow from these arguments that a 
life without political participation cannot be good as a whole or that the best life is 
dominated by political concerns.  As Rawls himself suggests, political life is but one 
sphere of life and in general it has, and indeed may reasonably have, a lesser place in 
the conceptions of the good of most citizens; that is to say, that participation in 
political life may not be not be the focus of life for most citizens.116  So, even though a 
life without political participation may be missing something of value, given that the 
political sphere is only one sphere of life and that, in many cases, it is not a central 
sphere of life, a life without political participation can still be good as a whole or 
overall.    
  The argument from self-respect also supports the value of public deliberation. 
Imagine that women and racial minorities are excluded from discussions about how 
society should be organized (e.g., only white men are able to participate in such 
discussions).  The insult to women and racial minorities is similar to that involved in 
their being denied a vote.  Given that there are other feasible and more equitable 
arrangements that could be taken up – such as allowing women and racial minorities 
to participate in national political deliberations – and they are not, this suggests that 
women’s and racial minorities’ exercise of the two moral powers is not of importance.  
It suggests that women’s and racial minorities’ exercise of the two moral powers is of 
inferior value.  This is degrading. 
 Again, a life without participation in political life is not to be considered an 
impoverished form of life.  This is because our valuing of participation in political 
discussions can be more a valuing of having access to or having an opportunity to 
participate in political discussion than it is a matter of actually participating in it.  It 
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seems plausible to think that even if women (as a group) didn’t tend to participate in 
public political discussions, they would be greatly insulted if they were prevented or 
disallowed from participating in such discussion.  Even if they don’t tend to actually 
participate in public deliberations, it still suggests something negative about their 
exercise of the two moral powers (in particular) to exclude women.  The insult is 
independent of whether they would actually participate or not. 
The point becomes clearer when we consider a less controversial example.  
Imagine that you are a graduate student living away from your hometown, and that, 
for some reason, you have absolutely no desire to move back to your hometown after 
your studies are finished.  Imagine that the Mayor of the town suddenly decides to bar 
brown-eyed people from living there ever again and that you have brown eyes.  It 
seems to me that you are likely to be upset and to feel insulted.  It even seems 
plausible to think that you might wish to confront the Mayor, to question and to object 
to his/her decision.  When it isn’t an issue as to whether you can live in your 
hometown or not, living there doesn’t really interest you.  But when you are suddenly 
denied access to the town, it seems to become more important.  This example 
illustrates that being denied access to a sphere, even when you do not necessarily wish 
to participate in that sphere, is insulting.  It suggests something negative about you and 
people like you.  Being excluded from the town suggests that you and those like you 
(i.e., brown eyed people) are not worthy enough to live in the town.  This is degrading.   
I think a similar point applies in the case of public deliberation and discussion 
about basic social arrangements.  It seems important in similar ways to have access to 
this realm.  Even if you never intended to participate in political deliberations, being 
denied access would be insulting.  It suggests something negative about your moral 
powers as a citizen; it suggests that your exercise of these two powers is not of 
significance.  This is damaging of your self-respect as a citizen.   
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The account of the value of public deliberation that I have given here is 
instrumental but not straightforwardly so.  The value of public deliberation is cashed 
out in terms of outcomes, but value is also placed on the process of public 
deliberation.  Participation in public deliberation is instrumentally valuable because it 
ensures that citizens are able to satisfy their higher-order interests in developing and 
exercising their two moral powers and in maintaining a secure sense of self-respect.  
Participation in the process of deliberation is also valuable, for it is only by actively 
participating in the process of public deliberation that citizens are able to satisfy their 
higher-order interests in exercising their two moral powers.   
 
§4.  The Institutionalization of the Fair Value of Political Liberty  
Rawls does not provide any detailed proposals about how the fair value of 
political liberty should be institutionalized.  He fails to say much about how 
institutions should ensure that the votes of all citizens are equally effective and 
influential in political decision-making.  It is to this matter that I would now like to 
turn.  I think there are two aspects to the institutionalization of the fair value of liberty.  
The first aspect is procedural.  Certain procedural arrangements will be most 
conducive to the fair value of political liberty.  In particular, I argue that a bill of rights 
along with judicial review, bicameralism, minority conscious districting, and vote 
trading within the legislature will work toward instituting the fair value of liberty.  
However, I argue that even these procedural arrangements will not absolutely ensure 
the fair value of liberty for all people and groups.  There is a particular worry, even 
with appropriate procedural arrangements, that the impoverished will not have equal 
worth of political liberty.  So, the second aspect of my proposal is non-procedural.  I 
argue that there needs to be greater economic equality before fair value of liberty can 
be fully established.   
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§4.1 Procedural Solutions 
Let us begin with the question of what decision-making rule or procedures are 
most conducive to the fair value of political liberty and are most consistent with the 
values that support it.  I suggested earlier that I was reluctant to immediately link 
democracy with any decision-making rule such as consensus, supermajority, or 
majority rule.  I am now in a position to explain my reasons for being sceptical.  In 
what follows, for the sake of simplicity and also because it seems to me to provide the 
strongest argument for democracy, I will focus on considerations relating to the 
argument from self-respect.  I will try to show that from this perspective consensus, 
supermajority, and majority rule are all problematic.   
One option in decision-making is to seek a consensus.  Initially, consensus 
decision-making may seem appealing because it seems consistent with the fair value 
of political liberty.  Consensus seeks unanimity (or near unanimity), and so each 
citizen (through her representative) has equal ability to veto decisions.  In the end, 
however, this is not a compelling procedure.  First, it seems to be an unviable option, 
given that unanimity (or near unanimity) is unlikely among a number of people with a 
variety of different viewpoints and opinions on matters of justice and the common 
good.   
Second, as Christiano argues, on further examination, consensus doesn’t seem 
to be consistent with fair value after all.  He writes, 
in the case of consensus decision-making rules, the rules are not democratic to the extent that 
they give minorities a kind of veto over the decisions. Instead of each having an equal say, a 
minority has a kind of veto power.117  
Consensus decision-making actually gives the minority a more influential say than the 
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majority in the sense that it can veto any decision, even when the majority of people 
agree about what route to take.  When the minority exercises its veto, it happens that 
only the members of a small group have a say in the decisions made.  Christiano finds 
this problematic because only some of those whose interests are implicated have a say 
in the decisions made.  Christiano suggests that this is not consistent with equal 
influence because it gives the minority too much influence over the political process.   
I agree with Christiano to the extent that I also think that consensus based 
decision-making is not consistent with fair value insofar as it gives the minority too 
much influence over decisions.  In contrast to Christiano, I think, what makes 
consensus inconsistent with fair value of political liberty, is not simply the fact that the 
interests of a significant number of people are ignored in the decisions made.  This 
fact is not in itself a problem from the perspective of self-respect.  After all, the 
constitution of the majority will change (i.e., who makes up the majority will alter) 
depending on the issues at stake.  So, even if the minority exercises its veto power 
often, it may not be the same group of individuals that continues to lose out.  
Intermittent loss with respect to one’s interests does not in itself conflict with self-
respect.  Rather, it is predictable and persistent loss that constitutes a problem.  So, the 
real problem occurs when there is a well-entrenched minority that consistently and 
predictably blocks the majority.  It is only in this case that the majority’s loss is 
persistent and predictable and that their votes do not seem to have equal weight.  For 
these reasons, this kind of scheme would be undermining of the majority’s sense of 
self-respect.   
An example will help to make the point.  Imagine that the majority of people 
are not wealthy.  Imagine that the rich minority vetoed a tax increase meant to support 
better transportation for the poor.  I doubt that this would tend in and of itself to 
undermine the poor’s sense of self-respect.  But imagine that the rich minority vetoed 
 70 
all decisions that were meant to benefit the poor majority.  It seems that in this case 
the poor’s sense of self-respect would be impaired.  Persistent and predictable loss 
suggests that the poor’s (the majority’s) votes count less than those of the rich (the 
minority’s).  In such a case, consensus decision-making suggests that the majority’s 
exercise of the two moral powers and their interests are not of equal concern.  This 
suggests that if we are concerned with democratic values of self-respect, then we must 
be concerned with protecting the majority from persistent and predictable loss.  
Consensus decision-making is not consistent with this commitment.  So, consensus is 
not consistent with fair value of political liberty.  I think similar points apply in the 
case of supermajorities as well.      
Many hold that democracy requires majority rule.  Again, initially this seems 
quite compelling and perhaps even natural from the perspective of democracy.  
Consider Brian Barry’s famous example.118  Imagine that five people are in a railway 
car and are trying to decide whether to permit or prohibit smoking.  In this type of 
situation, majority rule seems the natural choice.  It seems the simplest way of 
ensuring that everyone has an equally influential say over the final decision.  While 
this may be true, it does not necessarily follow that majority rule is the most 
democratic under other conditions.   
 Consider Lani Guinier’s example.119  It raises concerns parallel to those 
considered in relation to consensus decision-making.  Guinier’s case involves the 
Brother Rice High School in Chicago.  The students were organizing the prom.  The 
prom committee hired a disc jockey, and picked music for the prom by consulting 
                                                
118 This example first appeared in Brian Barry, Political Argument (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
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Minorities” in Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman (eds.), Multiculturalism 
and American Democracy (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 112-119. 
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student preferences.  “Each senior was asked to list his three favorite songs, and the 
band would play the songs that appeared most frequently on the lists.”120  As Guinier 
notes, this “seems attractively democratic.  But Brother Rice is predominantly white” 
and “as one black student put it: ‘For every vote we had, there were eight votes for 
what they wanted. . . [W]ith us being in the minority we’re always outvoted.  It’s as if 
we don’t count.”121  Under these circumstances, majority rule sends the message to 
black students (the minority) that they don’t count.  Guinier’s case is important 
because it raises questions about whether majority rule supports the fair value of 
political liberty, for the votes of those who belong to the black minority do not seem to 
have equal weight (or equal influence).   
 Guinier’s case is different from the original railway car case in an important 
aspect.  As I mentioned, in the railway car case only one decision has to be made.  In 
contrast, in Guinier’s case, which closely resembles the normal political case, 
decision-making is continuous and voting continues over long periods of time.  
Guinier’s case illustrates that under these conditions majority rules faces a special 
problem, namely the problem of persistent minorities.  Christiano writes,  
a persistent minority is a group of persons within a society that always or almost always fails 
to get its way in democratic decision making. Since democratic decision making operates by 
the repeated use of majority rule, it is possible for such minorities to arise and indeed they have 
arisen on many occasions in democratic societies.122 
If the black students at Brother Rice only lost one vote, I doubt that such a message of 
disregard would be sent.  Rather, it is the fact that such a result is a predictable and 
common occurrence that sends such a message.  It is perpetually and predictably 
losing over long periods of time that sends a message of disregard to black students.   
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Democratic values, such as equal respect, are put at risk by majority rule in this kind 
of scenario.  The appeal of the majority principle in the railway car hypothetical is 
largely the result of the one-time nature of the decision (and use of majority rule).  
When this feature is absent, as is the case under normal political conditions, there no 
longer seems to be a democratic presumption in favour of majority rule.123  Or it is at 
least the case that, while there may be a default assumption in favour of majority rule, 
it is overridden in special cases where there is a threat of persistent minorities. 
 I have tried to show that consensus, supermajority, and majority rule all face 
important problems.  In the end, then, it isn’t clear what decision-making procedure is 
most consistent with equal worth.  Yet, for any account of democracy to be plausible it 
must provide an account of what decision-making rule will best embody the equal 
worth of political liberty and the values that underwrite it.  This is my task in what 
follows.  
 In light of what has already been argued, majority rule seems more compelling 
than consensus decision-making.  First, since it does not rely on unanimity, it is 
practically feasible.  Second, in contrast to consensus decision-making (and 
supermajority decision-making), majority rule ensures that the majority is protected 
from persistent and predictable loss.  Even if there is an entrenched minority, the 
majority is not at risk of losing predictably and persistently.  In these two ways 
majority rule is more compelling than consensus rule.   Nevertheless, as Guinier’s case 
illustrates, majority rule still faces an important problem with respect to minorities and 
their persistent and predictable loss.  However, given the advantages of majority rule, 
it is worth considering whether it can be repaired. 
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 Let us proceed by taking a closer look at the kind of political case that worries 
Guinier.  Consider the current situation in the US.  Blacks are a minority group within 
the US, representing just under 14% of the total American population.124  Because of 
their small numbers, blacks are less able to successfully elect candidates of their own 
choice to office than whites.125  Moreover, as a result, there is only a limited amount of 
minority representation within the legislature.  This means that blacks are likely to 
lose out continuously when it comes to legislative decision-making.  Decisions within 
the legislature are made on the basis of majority rule.  Since minority representatives 
are small in number, much like the blacks at Brother Rice high school, they will tend 
to lose out consistently and predictably in legislative votes.      
 As a means to resolving these problems, Guinier suggests a radical redefinition 
of majority rule.  She suggests that majority rule should be restructured so as to allow 
the minority to share in the power.  To this end, she suggests that minorities should be 
given a turn.  “Giving the minority a turn does not mean that the minority gets to rule; 
what it does mean is that the minority gets to influence decision-making and the 
majority rules more legitimately.”126   
Guinier uses the example of family decision-making to explain her conception 
of “taking turns.”  Family decision-making often uses a taking-turn approach:   
When parents sit around the kitchen table deciding on a vacation destination or activities for a 
rainy day, often they do not simply rely on a show of hands, especially if that means that the 
older children always prevail or if affinity groups among the children (those who prefer video 
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games to movies, or those who prefer baseball to playing cards). . . never get to play their 
activity of choice.  Instead of allowing the majority simply to rule, the parents may propose 
that everyone take turns, going to the movies one night and playing video games the next . . .  
or they might do both on a given night.127   
In essence, Guinier wants the internal decision-making processes of legislatures to 
embody this principle of taking turns.  In the end, even after considering the example 
of family decision-making, it isn’t entirely clear as to how this might happen.  The 
idea seems to be that the majority would share decision-making power with the 
minority on some issues.  Guinier suggests that the taking-turns approach gives those 
with the most support the most turns.128  So, the majority would prevail on the 
majority of the issues, but the majority would have to “take turns” with the minority, 
allowing the minority to prevail on some issues (presumably the issues that matter 
most to minorities).  The number of “turns” the minority would be entitled to would 
presumably correspond to its proportion within the legislature.129   
 On the one hand, it seems to me that this solution doesn’t go far enough toward 
protecting minorities from persistent and predictable loss.  With taking turns, the 
minority only gets to decide the number of issues that is proportionate to its population 
in the legislature.  In turn, if the minority is small in number then taking turns will not 
do much in the way of preventing persistent and predictable loss.  Return to the 
Brother Rice High School case.  If there were 10 dances throughout the year and black 
students represent 10% of the student population, the taking turns principle would 
ensure that black students decided the songs for 1 dance.  White students would still 
get to decide the songs for the other 9 dances.  In these cases, the black students’ loss 
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would still be predictable and persistent.  Consequently, the self-respect of black 
students is still likely to be undermined, even with the use of the taking turns method.  
On the other hand, the principle of taking turns may go too far in protecting the 
minority.  If there are 10 dances throughout the year, and black students represent 45% 
percent of the student population, then black students get to decide which songs are 
played for about 5 dances.  If black students tend to pick the same kinds of songs 
again and again, then the white student’s loss with respect to the songs chosen at the 5 
dances will be persistent and predictable.  This seems inconsistent with the self-respect 
of the white student majority.  In short, the taking turns procedure has the potential to 
be undermining of citizens sense of self-respect much in the same way that both 
consensus and majority rule do.  
More generally, Guinier’s arguments in support of taking turns are meant to 
support positive sum solutions.  She favours compromise alternatives in which all gain 
something.  Taking turns is one such alternative.  Guinier, however, also makes a 
further suggestion.130  In particular, Guinier argues for cumulative voting, which is 
meant to embody the taking turns approach.  Cumulative voting is a move toward 
proportional representation; it is what Guinier refers to as semi-proportional 
representation.131  Return to the Brother Rice case.  The idea would be to give each of 
the students at Brother Rice as many votes as there will be songs played.  If there are 
going to be ten songs played at prom, then each student is given ten votes to place on 
any number of songs in whatever arrangement he or she chooses.132  This would allow 
black students to cumulate or to aggregate their votes.  They could each place ten 
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So, I will not consider them here.   
131 Boxill also advocates a version of proportional representation. See his “Majoritarian Democracy and 
Cultural Minorities” p. 119. 
132 Guinier, Tyranny of the Majority, pp. 14-15. 
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votes on one song or place five votes on two songs.  This would allow them to select 
at least one or two songs in the set.  
 In the political case, cumulative voting requires multi-member districts.  
Instead of having single member districts, Guinier thinks that districts should be 
expanded and should elect several candidates (she advocates at-large elections).  In 
cumulative elections, the candidates with the most votes win.  Voters have the 
decision of casting one vote for each seat to be filled or to cumulate their votes in 
support of the one candidate that they prefer most.  This allows groups of voters to 
concentrate their votes to increase their chance of electing their most preferred 
candidate.  To use an example from Briffault, if there is a city of 1000 people with a 
minority of 167 people, the minority can win one of the five available council seats as 
long as each member of the minority gives all of their votes to one candidate, even if 
none of the 883 other people cast a single vote for the minority’s candidate.133  The 
minority candidate would win with 835 (167 x 5) votes.  The 883 majority voters 
would cast 4165 (833 x 5) votes.  If these votes were spread equally over five 
candidates (833 for each), not one candidate would have as much as the 835 votes for 
the candidate preferred by the minority.  The minority would win a seat.  If, however, 
the majority gave more of its votes to only four of its most preferred candidates, those 
candidates would outpoll the minorities’ candidate, but there would be fewer votes of 
the majority available for a fifth candidate, in turn, making it certain that the candidate 
preferred by the minority would outpoll the fifth place majority candidate and win a 
seat.134   
                                                
133 Ibid., p. 432. 
134 This, however, would not be the case if the minority was 100 people.  In this case, the majority could 
take all five seats.  The majority would have 4,500 (900 x 5) votes and could place 900 on five different 
candidates.  The minority would only have 500 (100 x 5) votes, and this wouldn’t even be enough to 
take one seat. This illustrates that small minorities (under 16.7 %) will still be excluded even under 
Gunier’s system of cumulative voting.   
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The basic suggestion is that cumulative voting would improve the ability of 
minorities to elect candidates of their choosing.  The hope is that by having more 
representatives sitting at the table, so to speak, minorities would have more influence 
over political decision-making.  Cumulative voting is meant to promote the fair value 
of political liberty. 
In the end, Guinier suggests that cumulative voting is to be deployed as a 
remedy only “in extreme cases of racial discrimination at the local level.”135  Since 
other people advocate some version of cumulative voting at the national level, I think 
it is useful to consider her suggestion and to consider whether it presents a plausible 
means of remedying the problem of majority rule in the national sphere.    
There are many things that are plausible about Guinier’s arguments.  In the 
main, she seems right about the fact that there are cases where certain people (namely 
persistent minorities) should be given a guarantee that their voice is heard and not 
ignored.  In a representative democracy, this means that there should be a guarantee 
that other people’s representatives will listen to their representatives.  Guinier’s 
scheme of cumulative voting is meant to ensure this.  While I find this aspect of 
Guinier’s arguments compelling, I think that her approach faces at least two important 
problems. 
Under Guinier’s scheme, voters have a choice about whether to bullet vote, 
that is, to put all of their votes on one candidate, or to spread their votes out, say by 
placing one vote on each candidate.  So, hers is a scheme where politicians can make 
good careers for themselves by appealing to the cumulaters (to those who bullet vote).  
If a politician can hook onto a group of cumulaters with the same interests, then as 
long as it is of a minimum size – in the example we were considering, the group would 
have to consist of at least 167 people in 1000 people district with 5 seats open – the 
                                                
135 Guinier, Tyranny of the Majority. 
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candidate will win.  Imagine that in the US two out of ten people are against interracial 
marriage and think that it should be illegal.136   If it is a five seat at large election, this 
would be enough to guarantee the white racists a seat.  So, under Guinier’s scheme, 
there is a big pay off for politicians who appeal to racist interests.137  This is 
problematic for two reasons.  First, the scheme encourages people to run public 
campaigns on racist platforms.  This is clearly bad for public life.  In the sense that a 
racist campaign degrades or demeans certain groups of society, it makes it hard for 
people to maintain self-respect and to relate to one another as free and equal citizens.  
Second, it means that racists will get representation in legislative decision-making.  
This is worrisome for obvious reasons.   
There is no clear solution to this problem.  One solution is to give only certain 
minority groups more votes and to give others fewer votes (i.e., to weight votes in 
favour of certain minority groups).138  This would be a more direct way of ensuring 
that, say, black interests are represented and not white racists’, for example.  I think 
this is problematic largely because it would be insulting to those who receive fewer 
votes.  It would suggest that their exercise of the two moral powers and that their 
interests and aims are of less value than minorities’.  Since, I say more about this in 
the next chapter, I won’t pursue this matter any further at this time. 
Another problem is that cumulative voting may tend to support the 
proliferation of fragmented political parties.  Parties are useful in that they serve as a 
                                                
136 In Alabama, for example, the number of people against interracial marriage is actually very high.  
CNN reports that the vote on repealing the ban on interracial marriage in Alabama, “was running 59 
percent to 41 percent [against repealing the ban], with 58 percent of the voted counted.” See CNN, 
“Alabama Repeals Century-Old Ban on Interracial Marriages” (November 2000), URL = 
<http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/11/07/alabama.interracial/>. 
137 I think this worry applies to proportional representation or choice theory as well.  In this system, 
votes are cast preferentially (ballots ask voters to rank-order their preferences). As long as white 
supremacists are above some minimum number, and they rank candidates similarly, they are likely to 
win representation. For a description of proportional representation or choice theory see Beitz, Political 
Equality, pp. 125-132.   
138 Beitz consider this as a possibility in Political Equality, p. 158. 
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focus for interest groups who form coalitions on the basis of opinions and interests.  
With cumulative voting, it happens that as long as a party can hook into an interest 
group above a certain minimum number it can survive.  That is to say, as long as a 
party garners a minimum amount of support (167 of 1000 people in the example we 
have been considering), it will be likely to win representation in the legislature.  The 
increased likelihood of success encourages the development of many different parties 
representing many different interests.  
What is problematic about the proliferation of diverse political parties?  
Political procedures are not just machines used to produce certain outcomes like the 
representation of certain groups (though this is important as well).  In order to form 
rational and informed conceptions of justice and the common good – that is, in order 
to develop and exercise our sense of justice and our capacity for a conception of the 
good – it is important to have mechanisms that encourage politicians and voters to 
think about the common good, what is in the interests of all, and this requires being 
open to the legitimate interests of others.  This is why it is especially important to 
ensure that people with distinctive interests that are vital to them have a political 
voice.  To this extent Guinier’s arguments for cumulative voting are compelling: 
cumulative voting strives to ensure that those with distinctive interests have 
representation and are given a voice in political decision-making.  However, to the 
extent that the scheme is likely to lead to a multiplicity of political parties representing 
a multiplicity of different interests, it is not compelling.  The problem with this is that 
parties and, in turn, voters will be isolated from one another.  Insofar as a number of 
different parties or interest groups are likely to win seats, there is less motivation for 
politicians to advocate and to encourage voters to think about what they see as being 
in the common good.  Insofar as they need to attract the votes of cumulaters with a 
particular set of shared interests, politicians have more grounds to pander to the 
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particular interests of a group of cumulaters than they do to advocate a conception of 
justice or common good.  This is not consistent with citizens’ interest in exercising 
their two moral powers in the sense that it does not encourage citizens to take into 
account the impact of various schemes and policies on a diverse populace.  
I would now like to consider other more compelling means of tempering 
majority rule.  Rawls suggests that the defects of majority rule can be mitigated by 
other sorts of procedural constraints.  In the US, for example,“(bare) majority rule is 
restricted by the mechanisms of constitutionalism.139  These devices serve to limit the 
scope of majority rule, the kinds of matters on which majorities have final 
authority.”140  
I think, in the first place, what concerns us most about majority tyranny is the 
possibility of the majority threatening or thwarting the fundamental liberties of the 
minority.  So, one strategy – embodied in a bill of rights – is to instate firm 
constitutional protections for certain liberties and the separation of powers with 
judicial review.141  This would put certain liberties, entrenched in a constitution, 
beyond the scope of majority regulation and, through judicial review, securing them 
                                                
139  There are also other measures that can be taken besides those contained in the US constitution.  In 
Canada, for example, minority interests are protected by requiring a large majority in certain spheres of 
negotiation between provinces.  Take, for example, the Meech Lake accord.  The Meech lake accord 
was a set of proposed amendments to the Canadian constitution (that eventually failed).  The bill was 
essentially aimed at changing relations between Quebec and other Canadian provinces.  Certain sections 
of the Meech Lake accord fell under the 7/50 formula requiring the consent of seven of ten provincial 
legislatures which represent 50% of the Canadian population.  This provision makes it more difficult to 
amend certain aspects of the Canadian Constitution, and can be used to protect the minority from 
majority rule by entrenching certain protections in the constitution. 
140 ATJ, p. 200. 
141 Some might worry that a bill of rights and judicial review cannot sufficiently temper the majority.  
The bill of rights is interpreted by the judiciary.  Supreme Court Judges are selected by those who are 
elected by the populace. So, for example, if a Republican US president picks three right winged judges 
and there are already two sitting on the bench, then in a sense the majority still has the ability to 
tyrannize the minority, even at the level of the Supreme Court.  All judicial review can do here is slow 
down the pace of legislative change and force the majority (by encouraging public debate) and those 
representing the majority within the judiciary to carefully reflect on their position before voting.  In this 
sense, a bill of rights and judicial review still work to temper majority rule, though they do not represent 
absolute protection against majority tyranny. 
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from majoritarian abuse.  Together these mechanisms would work to limit the scope of 
the majority’s authority.  
Basic liberties are usually entrenched in a constitution through 
supermajoritarian requirements.  I have suggested that, like consensus decision-
making, supermajority decision-making is not fully democratic in the sense that it 
gives the minority too much influence over decision-making.  While supermajoritarian 
requirements are a step away from fully democratic decision-making procedures, the 
use of such requirements is required in some circumstances, namely, circumstances 
that underlying democratic values pick out.142  In the case of basic liberties, 
supermajoritarian requirements seem called for because they will work to protect 
citizens’ vital interests equally, interests which are integral to citizens sense of self-
respect and to their development and exercise of the two moral powers.   
A further option found in the constitution is federalism.  Federalism divides 
authority between sub-units like states and a centre.  Federalism “limits the issues that 
a majority of the entire society will determine, and, instead, allocates some issues to 
distinctive autonomous communities within the broader society.”143   
Bicameralism also works against majority tyranny by limiting the ability of the 
majority to act.  Bicameralism is a system of government where the legislature is 
divided into two chambers or houses, an upper and a lower house.  In the US, the 
upper house or the Senate consists of 100 seats.  Regardless of population, each state 
elects, through popular vote, two representatives to the Senate.  The lower house or 
House of Representatives has 435 members.  Again, members are elected by popular 
vote.  Here, the number of seats given to each state is apportioned on the basis of 
population.  The more populous states like NY (29) have more representatives in the 
                                                
142 Christiano makes a similar point in “A Democratic Theory of Territory,” pp. 103-104.  
143 Briffault, “Lani Guinier and Dilemmas of Democracy,” p. 454. 
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House of Representatives than less populous states, like Idaho (2).  
Having two chambers is important to protecting the interests of the minority in 
legislation.  Imagine that there was just one chamber based on population.  Because of 
their small populations, people of Idaho and Wyoming would consistently lose out.  
This is a loss that we should be concerned with.  Just as black students have distinct 
and shared interests based on their race, shared history, culture, and so on, the people 
of Idaho and those of Wyoming have distinct and shared interests based on their 
shared territory.  Geography is an important determinant of interests.  As Briffault 
notes,  
‘there is a spatial dimension to human organization.’ Many of the most important interests and 
concerns people have relate to their . . . immediate surroundings.  People may choose to settle 
in territories in which, they believe, the current residents share their views and concerns, so 
that territorial and interest representation may be closely linked.  Even when the choice of 
residence is constrained by income or discriminatory practice, neighbors will have common 
experiences. These common experiences may lead to a shared perspective on public affairs and 
political values. Territory, thus, can be an important determinant of interests.144 
 Moreover, there are problems or issues that are specific to a state.  For 
example, among those residing in Quebec, there is the special concern of being 
recognized as members of a distinct culture.  It seems important for these interests to 
be represented in decision-making.   
So, to ensure that these geographic interests are protected, we must ensure that 
certain parts of the country (the more populous) do not gang up on others (the less 
populous).  For this reason, there needs to be two chambers.  Within a two chamber 
system, for any bill to pass, it must pass through both the house and the senate by 
simple majority.  This ensures that people in the more populous states (such as 
                                                
144 Briffault, “Lani Guinier and Dilemmas of Democracy,” p. 442. 
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California and New York) reach out to those in the less populous states (such as Idaho 
and Wyoming) and cannot afford to ignore them.  
 Within the House of Representatives there are also mechanisms that can 
protect minority interests from majority rule.  In the US, states are divided into single 
member electoral districts.  That is to say, states are divided into roughly equally 
populated geographic districts.  One representative from each district is elected to the 
house by majority rule.  Beitz mentions two strategies that can be employed in single 
member districts to protect minority interests.  It is important to note that both options 
may require the use of gerrymandering techniques.  First, Beitz suggests that the 
system can be designed to promote party competition. One way of doing this requires 
increasing the proportion of competitive districts, that is, the proportion of districts 
where expected partisan voting strength is evenly divided.145  “The assumption is the 
more competitive the districts, the greater the incentives for parties and candidates to 
orient their programs to attract the support of disaffected minorities.”146 
 Moreover, and in contrast to Guinier’s proposal, competitive districts 
encourage voters and politicians to consider the interests of others and what is in the 
service of the common good and justice.  If districts are fairly diverse, a winning 
politician has to appeal to a fair number of interests and backgrounds within a district.  
There is real pressure to show that she is advancing the common good in that district.  
Even candidates who are in support of pro-minority policies (such as affirmative 
action) are under pressure to show why everyone in the district, including those who 
are not minorities, should support such policies in the name of the common good.  
This is important because this kind of mechanism puts pressure on politicians and 
voters to think about the common good and to be open to the legitimate interests of 
                                                
145 Beitz, Political Equality, p. 156. 
146 Ibid., pp. 156-157. 
 84 
others which is an important part of exercising their sense of justice and their capacity 
for a conception of the good.  
Second, Beitz suggests that if it is likely that minority interests will be ignored 
even when normal party competition exists, the districting system can be structured so 
that minorities have an increased chance of legislative representation.  One example 
found in the US is the creation of majority-minority districts.147  In certain states 
where blacks (or other groups) are in the minority and unlikely to win representation, 
districts could be created so that a majority of residents are black (i.e., the district 
would concentrate black voters).  This would virtually ensure black representation for 
that district.  
The question that arises now is: by what criteria do we decide that the districts 
are properly apportioned?148  For example, how many minority representatives and, in 
turn, how many majority-minority districts should there be?  One answer is to try to 
make the proportion of minority representatives the same as the proportion of 
members of the minority group to the population in total.   
As Christiano notes, the trouble with this kind of strategy is that there are many 
minorities in a society and to some extent they overlap.149  “To ensure that women, 
African Americans, Polish Americans, Italian Americans, as well as Jews, Catholics, 
Protestants, and other minorities are proportionately represented in the legislature is 
impossible.”150   
The obvious answer is to say that only some minority groups ought to receive 
special consideration.  The further question, then, is how do we decide who ought to 
                                                
147 Districts would be of equal populations and would have to be contiguous. 
148 Related points are raised by Thomas Christiano, Rule of the Many (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 
1996), pp. 6-7. 
149 Ibid., p. 6. 
150 Ibid., p. 6. 
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receive special attention?151  I don’t have a fully worked out answer to this problem, 
but it seems to me that there are two relevant groups that ought to receive special 
attention.  First, those whose vital interests (e.g., basic liberties) are in jeopardy.  
Second, those who tend persistently and predictably to lose out in votes.   
More needs to be said about this second category of people.  It seems clear that 
we are not concerned with all persistent and predictable loss.  In this context, two 
examples come to mind. (1) If a group of white supremacists consistently lost in votes 
about what songs to play at the prom – i.e., they were never able to get white power 
songs on the list of songs to be played – I doubt that we would be concerned.  (2) In a 
sense, the rich constitute a vulnerable group.  Imagine that, in general, the rich would 
like to be taxed less.  The rich are in the minority in most countries and, on this matter, 
will tend to lose out consistently and predictably.  Again, I don’t think this is the kind 
of case that concerns us.  I doubt that any of us think that white supremacists and the 
rich should get special attention because of their losses, even when they are consistent 
and easily anticipated.  Why might this be?  
I think part of the answer is that what we are concerned with is not simply 
persistent and predictable loss, but persistent and predictable loss with respect to 
legitimate interests.  On my view, legitimate interests have two central features.  First, 
legitimate interests are interests that are consistent with the freedom and equality of all 
citizens.  The white supremacists’ interest in playing white power music – which 
advocates the superiority of whites and the unequal status of other races – is, for this 
reason, not a legitimate interest.  Second, legitimate interests are also interests that are 
consistent with the common good.  They are interests that are consistent with (and do 
not thwart) the advancement of the common good and the benefit of all.  The rich’s 
interests in being taxed less are not legitimate interests in this sense because they 
                                                
151 Ibid., p. 6. 
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benefit only the rich and are of detriment to others (though the rich would likely argue 
otherwise). 
Who falls under the two categories of special attention is something that can 
only be determined by looking at historical and cultural circumstances.  Clear 
candidates for special attention in the US are women, blacks, Native Americans, poor 
people, disabled people, gay men and lesbian women.  Historically, these groups have 
either had their fundamental interests thwarted or have suffered from persistent and 
predictable loss with respect to their legitimate interests.  In turn, my suggestion is that 
these groups would be entitled to increased chance of representation through majority-
minority districts. 
So, it is now clear that the kind of legislative districting that I have been 
advocating avoids a problem that Guinier’s approach faced, namely the problem of 
racist groups having representation, for example.  On my view, not just any minority is 
entitled to an increased chance of representation through gerrymandering techniques.  
Rather, only certain groups, groups that are vulnerable to having their vital interests 
thwarted or persistently and predictably losing out with respect to their legitimate 
interests, are entitled to majority-minority districts.  So, with legislative districting 
there is no pay off for a politician supporting something like a ban on interracial 
marriage because there would be no district where this kind of view would garner 
enough support to improve his/her chances of winning. 
There is still one problem, however: even if we implement a scheme of 
districting, and minority candidates are elected to the legislature, there is a worry that 
minority candidates will be ignored and won’t have much influence over collective 
decision-making procedures within the legislature.152  After all, minority 
representatives will still be in the minority.  If legislative decisions are made on the 
                                                
152 Similar worries are raised by Guinier, Tyranny of the Majority, p. 64.  
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basis of majority rule, then it is likely that minorities will consistently and predictably 
lose votes.  So, we need some kind of mechanism within the legislature to ensure that 
minority representatives are included in decision-making. 
 Guinier makes a suggestion that is worth considering here.  She argues that 
legislative cumulative voting is a way of ensuring that minority representatives are 
included in decision-making.  Under this scheme  
 votes on multiple bills would be aggregated or linked.  By linking votes on several  
issues to allow both weighed and split issue voting, the black representatives  
could more reliably participate in the legislative process, plumping votes to  
express the intensity of constituent preferences on some issues and trading votes  
on issues of constituent indifference.153   
In the end it isn’t clear as to how cumulative voting would work in the legislature.154  
In the case of electing representatives, cumulative voting relies on a determinant 
number – known in advance – of seats to be filled.  If five representatives are to be 
elected, then voters are each given five votes that they can cumulate in any way they 
choose.  In the legislature, there isn’t an obvious analogue, for there is no determinate 
number of bills to be passed that is known at the outset of a legislative session.  Any 
number of bills can be passed during a legislative session.   
 Even though her own solution fails, I think that Guinier’s arguments are useful 
in that they can be seen as pointing to the virtues of standard legislative vote-trading 
which is often viewed as a threat to democracy.  Vote trading will allow minority 
representatives a greater role in the legislative process.  In this sense, its benefits are 
the same as those supposed of legislative cumulative voting.  Consider an example.  If 
a minority representative, for example, doesn’t care much about issues other than X, 
                                                
153 Ibid., p. 108.  Again, Guinier also suggests supermajority vote as possible remedy.  
154 Briffault, “Lani Guinier and Dilemmas of Democracy,” p. 462 raises a somewhat similar worry. 
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let’s say, X is what would help poor people in a minority group, the representative can 
trade her votes on those other issues, thus, allowing her to accumulate support from 
other representatives who don’t care much about X either way, in exchange for voting 
in favour of their pet projects.155 
To summarize, in this section, I have argued that a number of concrete 
procedural mechanisms – namely, a bill of rights along with judicial review, 
bicameralism, minority conscious districting, and vote trading within the legislature – 
will work toward instituting the fair value of liberty.  All of these mechanisms will 
work together to protect minorities against persistent and predictable loss, which is 
important when considering citizens’ higher order interest in securing self-respect.  
 
§4.2 Non-procedural Solutions 
I think even with the kinds of decision-making procedures and other 
arrangements (such as districting, etc.) I have suggested, the votes of the poor will still 
tend to be less effective and less influential than those of the rich.  On Rawls’s view, 
this is a challenge to democracy that cannot be met by procedure.  It can only be 
solved by something similar to state-subsidized financing of parties and election 
campaigns.  For as Rawls’s argues,   
if society does not bear the costs of organization, and party funds need to be solicited from the 
more advantaged social and economic interests, the pleading of these groups are bound to 
receive excessive attention.  And this is all the more likely when the less favored members of 
society, having been effectively prevented by their lack of means from exercising their fair 
degree of influence, withdraw into apathy and resentment.156  
                                                
155 I thank Dick Miller for this point. 
156 ATJ, p. 226. 
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In the final analysis, though I think it would help the problem to some extent, I 
think that even this non-procedural solution is not sufficient.  I think Rawls would 
have to admit that public campaign finance is not going to work miracles when it 
comes to the fair value of political liberty.  Even with the public financing of 
campaigns, the votes of the poor are still likely to have unequal worth.  Their votes are 
still likely to be less effective and less influential than the votes of the rich.  Those 
with more resources usually have more leisure time available and more education, 
both of which allow for more persuasive public expression of their views.157  
Moreover, the wealthy also have more money to support well-organized lobbying 
efforts, which also works to promote their political views.  To this extent, even with 
public financing of political campaigns, the rich are still likely to have greater 
influence over elections and political debates.  This seems true even in light of the 
kind of majority-minority districting I have argued for.  For reasons similar to those I 
have just given (leisure time, education, etc.), in majority-minority districts, it is likely 
that only the wealthiest of racial minorities, for example, will tend to have the greatest 
influence over politics.  Similarly, even within majority-minority districts aimed at 
giving representation to the poor, it is the wealthiest of the poor that will tend to have 
the greatest influence over politics.  
I think that there might be a different non-procedural solution to take here: 
what might help the poor to have fair value of political liberty is egalitarian measures 
in the economy.  If there is no longer a concentration of cash in certain groups, then 
there will likely be rough equality in the use of political influence and power.  Indeed, 
Rawls suggests something similar when he considers how the fair value of liberty is to 
be secured.158  Here he suggests, inter alia, that if fair value of liberty is to be secured 
                                                
157 c.f., Harry Brighouse, “Political Equality in Justice as Fairness,” Philosophical Studies 86.2 (1997), 
p. 157. 
158 ATJ, pp. 198-200.   
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then “wealth must be kept widely distributed.”159  If this is right, then something like 
the difference principle may be appropriate.  After all, it is meant to be an egalitarian 
principle governing the distribution of income and wealth.  And to this extent it will 
diminish unequal political influence.   
 However, the difference principle may be insufficiently egalitarian to 
guarantee equality of political influence.  The difference principle does allow for 
differences in wealth to occur (e.g., in the case of incentive effects which benefit the 
worst off) and if there are significant differences in wealth, then there will be 
significant differences in political influence.160  So, something stronger than the 
difference principle may be required to secure the fair value of political liberty.  Or 
minimally, the fair value of liberty may put a limit on the kinds of inequalities 
permitted by the difference principle.  It may, for example, only allow sufficiently 
small inequalities in wealth and income.161 
                                                
159 Ibid., p. 198.  It is clear that other things besides wealth are also important for equality of influence.  
As Brighouse (in “Political Equality in Justice as Fairness,” p. 160) points out, a very rich person can 
lack influence simply because she doesn’t know how to exercise influence, because she lacks charisma, 
or because she can find no support for her views in larger society.  I take it that Rawls does not focus on 
such things because they are not things that can in and of themselves be provided by the state, at least 
without too much interference. 
160 As Rawls states: “some citizens have, for example, greater income and wealth and therefore greater 
means of achieving their ends” (PL, 326). 
161 Harry Brighouse makes a similar suggestion in, “Political Equality in Justice as Fairness,” p. 176. 
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Part II 
Global Institutions and the Democracy Deficit 
§1. Weighted Voting 
In this and the following section, I move beyond general arguments for the 
value of democracy and consider specific global institutions, namely the IMF and the 
WB, and some of their procedures.  Here, as part of my construal of the democracy 
deficit, I discuss and critique the weighted voting procedures used by the IMF and the 
WB.   
Before delving in, I want to make some background points about the structure 
of the IMF and the WB and their weighted voting procedures.  The IMF and the WB 
are structured similarly.  So, for the sake of simplicity, I will focus on the structure of 
only one institution, namely the IMF.  There are two branches within the IMF: the 
Board of Governors and the Executive Board.    
The Board of Governors, the highest decision-making body in the IMF [it makes decisions on 
all major policy issues], consists of one governor and one alternate governor for each member 
country.  The governor is appointed by the member country and is usually the minister of 
finance or the governor of the central bank.  The Board of Governors may delegate to the 
Executive Board all except certain reserved powers.  The Board of Governors normally meets 
once a year.162   
 
The Executive Board (the Board) is responsible for conducting the day-to-day business of the 
IMF. It is composed of 24 Directors, who are appointed or elected by member countries or by 
                                                
162 IMF, “IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors” (June 2007), URL = 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm>.  The IMF gives one vote for every 
$100,000 of quota plus 250 basic votes. For a list of WB member’s quotas and voting power see, WB, 
“Voting Powers,” URL = 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,co
ntentMDK:50004947~menuPK:64020025~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036,00.h
tml>. 
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groups of countries, and the Managing Director, who serves as its Chairman. The Board 
usually meets several times each week.163 
It is important to note that 8 of the Directors represent individual member countries: 
China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States (with Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US being the largest share 
holders).  16 of the Directors represent groups of countries that are similar in 
geographic location or language.164  
In the IMF, formal decision-making power is based on the size of a country’s 
quota (or capital subscription).  “The larger a country’s quota in the IMF– determined 
broadly by its economic size – the more votes the country has, in addition to its ‘basic 
votes,’ of which each member has an equal number.”165  So, each member of the 
Board of Governors has a weighted vote equivalent to its country’s IMF quota plus the 
basic votes.  While each director belonging to the Executive Board has a weighted 
vote equivalent to its constituency’s combined IMF quota plus the basic votes. 
In the IMF, the G-7 countries together have over 44% of the vote, the G-10 
countries with Switzerland have just over 51%, with the US holding just over a 17% 
share of the voting power.  In the IMF this means that in a number of important 
categories of decisions (e.g., financial policy revisions (including how its resources are 
used), constitutional revisions, and changes in quotas and membership) that require 
special majorities of 85%, the US is the only single-country to retain veto power.166  A 
                                                
163 IMF, “IMF Executive Directors Voting Powers” (June 2007), URL = 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm>. 
164 For a detailed list of the Executive Directors see ibid. 
165 IMF, “What is the IMF?” (September 2006), URL = 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm.> 
166 It has been suggested by the IMF that formal votes rarely take place at the Executive Board.  Instead, 
decisions are made by consensus, where the IMF’s Managing Director determines the consensus from 
his “sense of the meeting,” taking into account support from the various executive directors and their 
respective voting shares, such that if an issue were to be put to vote there would indeed be the required 
majority.  It seems then that, even if formal votes aren’t taken, the weighted voting system strongly 
influences the decisions that result from the consensus formation process (David P. Rabkin and 
Jonathan R. Strand reach a similar conclusion in “Reforming the IMF’s Weighted Voting System,” The 
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similar situation holds in the WB as well.  In short, the IMF and the WB, through a 
weighted voting system, end up being controlled by a small group of developed (or 
rather rich) countries, and particularly by the US.   
Intuitively, I think, many of us tend to think that weighted voting is 
objectionable.  In what follows, I try to give some support to this intuition.  My 
argument is largely a negative one.  I consider what I take to be the most plausible 
arguments for weighted voting and I try to show that they fail.   
 
§1.1  The Competence Argument  
The first argument that we will consider is one that concerns the competence of 
developing countries. This argument is very similar to Mill’s argument for plural votes 
in the domestic case.  It is sometimes argued that the votes of developed countries 
should be given greater weight because they have shown greater competence with 
respect to growth and development.  That is to say, it is argued that developed 
countries have shown greater knowledge and better judgment when it comes to these 
matters (as is demonstrated by their advanced economic position), and, for this reason, 
should be granted greater weight in decisions.   
Our answer to Mill’s proposal in the domestic case suggests a plausible path of 
response in the international case.  In the international case we have reasons that are 
analogous to those in the domestic case for rejecting weighted voting.  When 
formulating the guidelines for setting up international cooperative organizations or 
setting standards for fairness of trade and provisions of mutual assistance, Rawls asks 
                                                                                                                                       
World Economy 29.3 (2006), p. 309).  Moreover, when no consensus can be reached, decisions are 
made on the basis of a simple majority.  Abbas Mirakhor, one of the longest serving IMF board 
members, has suggested that, currently, this happens more and more because there has been a decline in 
consensus building (See Peter Chowla, Jeffrey Oatham and Claire Wren, “Bridging the Democracy 
Deficit” (Bretton Woods Project, February 2007), URL= 
<http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art.shtml?x=549743>). 
 94 
us to imagine an international original position.167  In contrast to the domestic case 
where we imagine ourselves as representatives of individuals, we must imagine 
ourselves as representatives of liberal peoples, as members of a shared liberal state.168  
“Liberal peoples have three basic features: a reasonably just constitutional democratic 
government that serves their fundamental interests; citizens united by what Mill called 
‘common sympathies’;169 and, finally, a moral nature.170  This third feature means that 
parties in the international original position have as their aim representing peoples as 
free and equal peoples in the Society of Peoples.  As free and equal, peoples see 
themselves as having certain fundamental interests.  One of these fundamental 
interests is “a people’s proper self-respect of themselves as a people resting on their 
common awareness of their trials during their history and of their culture with its 
accomplishments.”171  This “interest shows itself in a people’s insisting on receiving 
from other peoples a proper respect and recognition of their equality.”172    
This cannot be the full explanation of what grounds a people’s sense of self-
respect, however.  After all, Rawls suggests that a close parallel can be drawn to the 
domestic case.  He says that “we do somewhat the same” in the international and the 
                                                
167 Rawls specifically discusses the WB and GATT in LP, pp. 42-43, and the IMF in LP, pp. 84-85. 
168 Rawls assumes that a state is representative of a nation or a peoples.  I will follow him in making this 
assumption.  Also, Rawls actually appeals to two original positions.  The first represents the perspective 
of liberal peoples and the second represents illiberal peoples.  In this section, I will be concerned with 
the first. 
169 Following Mill (Representative Government, ch. XVI), Rawls associates peoples with an idea of 
nationality.  Mill argues that a people constitutes a nation “if they are united among themselves by 
common sympathies . . . which make them cooperate with each other more willingly than with other 
people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves, 
or a portion of themselves exclusively.  This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various 
causes.  Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent.  Community of language, community 
of religion, greatly contribute to it.  Geographical limits are one of its causes.  But the strongest of all is 
identity of political antecedents; the possession of national history, and consequent community of 
recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in 
the past.  None of these circumstances, however, are necessarily sufficient by themselves” (Mill, 
Representative Government, p. 546).  
170 LP, p. 23. 
171 Ibid., p. 34. 
172 Ibid., p. 35. 
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domestic cases.173  And as Rawls points out here, in the domestic case, what grounds 
self-respect is that, inter alia, citizens “think of themselves as having the moral power 
to have a conception of the good, and to affirm or revise that conception if they so 
decide.”  If something similar applies on the international level, it follows that the self-
respect of peoples is, inter alia, grounded in their conception of themselves as having 
the capacity to collectively form a conception of the good and to revise it as they see 
fit. 
Taking our lead from the domestic case, unequal votes in organizations such as 
the IMF and the WB, if justifiable at all, must be justifiable from the standpoint of 
those with fewer votes – the developing countries in this context.  The high burden of 
proof stems from our concern with self-respect.  Peoples ought to be able to regard 
themselves as equal participants in the system of global social cooperation.  Being an 
equal participant, in turn, involves being able to exercise the two moral powers as 
equals.  A peoples’ sense of self-respect turns on this.  Weighted voting can only be 
permitted if it is consistent with peoples’ sense of self-respect.  For weighted voting to 
be consistent with peoples’ self-respect, there must be a powerful argument that 
unequal votes will systematically serve the interests of developing countries as a 
whole. 
I think, as in the domestic case, this high burden of proof is unlikely to be met.  
This is because partiality is a great concern at the international level as well the 
domestic level.  In reality, when determining what are the best economic policies to 
take up, the representatives of each country at the IMF or the WB are likely to be 
partial toward their own citizens’ interests.  This is because they are most aware of and 
sensitive to what is in the interests of their own citizens.  Given that developed 
countries are similar, it is likely that they are going to have similar interests and, as a 
                                                
173 Ibid., p. 34. 
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result, will tend to vote together.  So, if developed countries are given a greater 
number of votes, the organization of the IMF and the WB and the economic policies 
they recommend are likely to represent the interests of the developed world and not 
those of the developing world.   
Indeed, when we consider the current operations and policies of the IMF and 
the WB, it is clear that the interests of the developed world have come to take 
precedence. Consider the example of capital mobility.  Stiglitz writes, “the developed 
countries are rich in capital, which moves around the world in search of the highest 
returns . . . For the past couple of decades, the United States and the EU have pressed, 
with considerable success, for the liberalization of capital markets which enables 
investment to flow more freely around the world, arguing that this is good for global 
efficiency”174 and “economic stability.”175  The free flow of capital is to the advantage 
of those in the developed world.  It allows investors from developed countries to move 
money – which they have a significant amount of – around freely which in turn allows 
them to make high returns.  However, the free flow of capital is not necessarily in the 
interest of developing countries who tend to lack capital.  Unrestricted capital flows 
can have devastating effects on those who need capital.  This is because capital tends 
to flow out of a country when a period of recession occurs, that is to say, precisely 
when a country needs it most.176  Just as countries need outside funds, the investors 
ask for it back.  Without foreign capital, developing countries are less able to recover 
from a recession.   
Consider the East Asian financial crisis.  After the East Asian crisis, many 
countries including Thailand, Korea, and the Philippines turned to the IMF for 
                                                
174 Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, p. 89.  
175 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), p. 
100. 
176 Ibid., p. 100. 
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financial assistance.  In order to spur recovery, the IMF had instructed the removal of 
all capital restrictions – restrictions placed on the flow of money into and out of a 
country.  This, however, only exacerbated problems as investors pulled their money 
out of investments (that is, as capital flowed out of the countries).  In contrast, the 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mohammed Mahathir did not take an IMF loan and 
imposed capital restrictions in the form of an exit tax that could be (and eventually 
was) gradually lowered.  The tax discouraged investors from pulling their money out 
of the country.  In comparison to Thailand, for example, who followed IMF 
prescriptions closely, Malaysia, through use of capital restrictions, recovered “more 
quickly, with a smaller downturn, and with a far smaller legacy of national debt 
burdening future growth.”177  It isn’t clear then that capital market liberalization is in 
the interests of people in the developing world; rather, it seems to reflect the interests 
of corporate investors in the US and the EU. 
As Stiglitz suggests, one of the main objections to globalization, as it currently 
exists, is that it “foisted on the world, including developing countries, a particular 
version of the market economy – a version that might not be well suited to their needs, 
values and circumstances.”178  Capital market liberalization is an example of how 
distinct interest groups  – those who do benefit from more liberal capital flows – can 
use ideology to advance their interests.  In short, the worry is that with weighted 
voting certain kinds of interests, namely those of the powerful developed countries, 
will end up being in de facto control and even with goodwill this is not something that 
can be avoided.  In short, on the international level, it seems clear that Rawls’s heavy 
burden of proof is not met.  For this reason we should reject the Millian kind of 
argument for weighted voting within the IMF and the WB. 
                                                
177 Ibid., p. 125. 
178 Stigliz, Making Globalization Work, p. 105. 
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§1.2 The Contribution Argument 
The main defence of weighted voting in the IMF and the WB usually takes the 
following form: Countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom should 
have a greater number of votes than, say, countries such as India and China, because 
they contribute more funds to the IMF and the WB. The votes in the IMF and the WB 
are weighted according to contribution, and how much countries can contribute is 
broadly determined by their economic position relative to others.  Call this the 
contribution argument.  Given the stated functions or goals of the IMF and the WB, 
there seems to be two different ways of defending this kind argument. 
 
The Corporate Model 
On one view, the voting scheme of the IMF and the WB is modelled on the 
corporate sphere.  In a corporation, each share of common stock entitles a stockholder 
to one vote on all matters submitted to a vote of all the stockholders of the corporation.  
On this view, the IMF and the WB are like corporations.  They serve as vehicles for 
donors to contribute to development.  It is like a joint stock company with a particular 
product, namely that of development and growth.  In short, the suggestion is, because 
the internal operations of the IMF and the WB are conducted just like those of any 
other corporation, the votes of members are distributed just as they would be in any 
other corporation.  
It would be objectionable to run a country in a similar fashion.  Imagine a 
country where how many votes you had were contingent on how much you paid in 
taxes.  Insofar as you pay more in taxes you would be contributing more than others to 
the running of the country and, on this argument, this would justify your having more 
votes than others who paid less in taxes.  In the domestic scene, this kind of 
arrangement is objectionable.  After all, as Rawls would likely argue, a country is not 
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a monopolistic firm.179  The operations of the government are important to the 
interests and life prospects of all its citizens.  This impact is broad in its scope, it 
shapes people’s prospects in many different areas.  It is also, in a sense, inevitable: one 
cannot usually just pick up and leave one’s country.  There is, of course, usually a 
right of exit in most countries, but the point is that it is usually rather difficult to 
exercise this right.  A firm is different from a government.  While it certainly does 
have an impact on its members’ prospects, a firm’s impact is much narrower than a 
government’s.  Its effects are not all encompassing like a government’s.  Moreover, 
one always has a real option for exit.  Typically, one can easily (at least more easily 
than one can leave one’s country) sell one’s stock if one doesn’t like how the company 
is being run.  
Given the large scale and the broadness in scope of the impact of the state on 
citizens’ life prospects, it is important that each citizen’s interests are taken into 
account equally.  The scheme should distribute burdens and benefits as equally as 
possible.  It would be disrespectful to ask some to bear great burdens while others 
benefit greatly, for it would suggest that some people’s interests or prospects are not as 
important or worthy of consideration as others.’  It seems that the only way to ensure 
that everyone’s interests are given equal consideration, is to give everyone an equal 
vote.   
With all of this in mind, it is not clear that the IMF and the WB are simply 
corporations. The IMF and the WB’s policies have a significant impact on people’s 
life prospects.  Usually their policies are not something that can be opted out of, at 
least not without great cost.  The IMF and the WB are essentially the only lenders that 
offer loans (particularly for such large amounts) at below market interest rates.  Most 
countries that receive financial assistance from the IMF and the WB are in desperate 
                                                
179 See PL, p. 264. 
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need of such loans (that is, loans with such low interest rates).  For this reason, while 
they can opt out of IMF and WB policy, it could only be done so at great cost.  In this 
sense, global financial institutions are more like governments.   
However, on the other hand, global financial institutions are not exactly the 
same as governments in the scale and scope of their impact.  After all, the IMF and the 
WB lend money to poor countries; they do not lay down the law.  So, I think, the IMF 
and the WB are most like the Federal Reserve (the Fed) in the United States.  The Fed 
is a big bank in many respects, but, in a sense, is more than a bank in that it has a 
serious impact on the life prospects of Americans.   
 The Fed is charged with maintaining the stability of the American financial 
system (this includes the maintenance of stable prices, full employment, etc.).  The 
Fed is an independent entity within the government; it has both private and public 
aspects.180  The Fed is an independent entity in the sense that its decisions do not have 
to be ratified by the President or anyone else in the executive or legislative branch of 
government.181  It has the freedom to formulate and implement monetary policy.  It, 
for example, is free to change official interest rates.  This kind of independence is 
necessary for the good functioning of the Fed.182  It allows the Fed to operate in a way 
that is insulated from the comings and goings of electoral politics.183  If the Fed was 
less independent, it might be tempted to pursue easy credit policies or to finance the 
government’s debt.184  
                                                
180 See Federal Reserve, “Frequently Asked Questions: Federal Reserve System” (March 2007), URL = 
<http://www.Federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/faq/faqfrs.htm>.  
181 Federal Reserve, “Frequently Asked Questions,” URL = 
<http://www.Federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/faq/faqfrs.htm>. 
182 What I say here about the importance of an independent Federal Reserve is influenced by William J. 
McDonough (President and Chief Officer of the New York Federal Reserve, 1999-2003), “The 
Importance of Central Bank Independence in Price Stability” (July 2002), URL = 
<http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2002/mcd020702.html>. 
183 The Supreme Court is independent for similar reasons.  To ensure that it does its job well, that is, 
that it protects citizens’ rights, it needs to be independent from electoral politics. 
184 McDonough, “The Importance of Central Bank Independence in Price Stability,” 
<http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2002/mcd020702.html>.  
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However, the Fed is open to legislative oversight.  For example, the Fed is 
required to present reports to congress semi-annually on monetary policy and the 
economy.  Legislative oversight also has bearing when the Senate votes on and 
confirms nominees to the Fed’s Board of Governors.  So, though the individual 
decisions made by the Fed are not open to democratic voting procedures (in the sense 
that the people do not have a say over each and every decision the Fed makes), its 
runnings are ultimately responsive to democratic processes.185  It is this democratic 
aspect that serves as the basis for the legitimacy of the individual decisions made by 
the Fed. 
 The Fed is neither a government nor is it simply a firm.  It is something in the 
middle.  In this light, its structure makes sense.  The Fed needs a certain amount of 
independence for good functioning.  Nevertheless, given that the Fed, much like the 
government, has significant and unavoidable impact on the life prospects of American 
citizens, it seems appropriate for the people to have, at some level, an equal say over 
its runnings.   Two arguments seem to support this conclusion. 
(1) If the Fed wasn’t open to some kind of democratic oversight, then it would 
be much like a dictatorship.  The argument against this kind of arrangement parallels 
the argument given above regarding plural votes for the educated.  It would be 
objectionable because a dictatorship is unlikely to take everyone’s interests into 
consideration equally; it is more likely to advance the interests of some (say the royal 
family’s) to a greater extent than others (the peasant’s); the interests of some are likely 
to be ignored.  This kind of arrangement, however, is not consistent with equal respect 
and would be rejected by parties in the original position.  The only way to ensure that 
everyone’s interests are taken into equal consideration is to ensure that everyone has 
                                                
185 Also, though the Fed is an independent government agency, in principle, ordinary legislation could 
abolish or change it. 
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an equal and effective say in processes that affect their life prospects.  So, in other 
words, insofar as many people’s prospects will be affected significantly and that we 
must ensure that everyone’s prospects are given equal consideration, the Fed’s 
operations need to be open to some kind of democratic procedures.   
One might not be convinced by my argument.  One might argue that there have 
been benevolent dictators.  For example, it is sometimes suggested that the British 
were one such dictatorship.  They provided their colonies with education, 
transportation via establishment of a railway system, and so on.  So, some might argue 
that the British were good to their colonies, even though the colonies did not 
participate in or have any say in political decision-making.  Something similar could 
apply in the case of the Fed.  As long as those who are running the Fed are benevolent, 
then everyone’s interests will be given equal consideration, even without any kind of 
democratic rights of participation.   
While the British may have ensured that some of the interests of its colony 
members were met, it is clear that they did not consider the interests of everyone 
equally.  The interests of the British were given primary consideration while those of 
the members of their colonies were only of secondary importance, and at times 
ignored altogether.  My point is that, I think, in the real world we would be hard 
pressed to find a benevolent dictatorship.  In turn, to ensure that people’s interests are 
given equal consideration, we will have to ensure that people have an equal say in 
political arrangements.   
 (2) Putting this point aside, imagine that the British Government was a 
benevolent dictatorship with respect to its colonies.  Imagine that the British were able 
to make decisions by giving equal consideration to the interests of all (of those who 
are required to follow them).  Despite all of this, I still think that a benevolent 
dictatorship of this sort would be objectionable.  
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Considerations relating to domination help us to explain what is objectionable 
about a dictatorship even when it is benevolent.  Remember, on Pettit’s view, the 
antonym of liberty is domination.  Someone has dominating power over another if and 
only if (1) she has the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis – i.e., without regard 
to other’s perceived interests; (2) with impunity and at will, (3) in certain (and not 
necessarily all) choices that the other person is in a position to make.  And, 
importantly, on Pettit’s view, having power over another does not necessarily mean 
that one actually interferes with the individual she has power over.  Dominating power 
can interfere in one’s liberty even if it is never actually exerted.  Both parties in a 
relation of domination, the potential victim and the power bearer, are aware of their 
relationship; both are usually aware that the power bearer could interfere in the other’s 
choices arbitrarily, without regard for her perceived interests.  This means that the 
potential victim relies on the goodwill of the power bearer not to exert her power.  She 
lives at the mercy of the power bearer.  This is a bad circumstance for the victim to be 
in. 
So, the idea is that even if the British government was genuinely benevolent 
and tended to take the interests of its colony members into equal consideration, being 
under the British government would still be objectionable.  This is because the British 
government has dominating power over its colonies.  Though currently benevolent, it 
seems a realistic possibility that the British government might decide at any time to 
interfere arbitrarily in the interests of its colonies.  In this sense, the members of the 
colonies are at the mercy of the British government.  Knowledge of this fact (on the 
part of those within the colonies) is likely to lead to some of the bad effects we 
discussed earlier.  In particular, fear of arbitrary interference will lead to uncertainty 
and anxiety among colony members, tend to undermine the sense of self-respect of 
colony members (insofar as they know that they can be interfered with at any time 
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without regard for their interests), and colony members (in order to win the favour of 
the British government) will tend to cut themselves off from taking up certain ends 
and ways of life.  To ensure that those within the colonies are protected against being 
dominated by the British government, they need to be involved in some kind of 
democratic processes.  This will ensure that the decisions of the British government 
track the interests of their colony members.  I think analogous arguments can be made 
in the case of the Fed.  
Therefore, in light of the two above considerations, my suggestion in relation 
to the organization of the Fed is this: insofar as we would wish to ensure that 
American citizens are not defencelessly susceptible to arbitrary interference by the 
Fed, to interference that ignores or disregards their interests, it needs to be open, in 
some sense, to democratic processes.  
 I also think something similar can be said of the IMF and the WB.  Like the 
Fed, the IMF and the WB are not governments, but surely they are not just firms 
either.  Like the Fed, they seem to fall into some kind of a middle category.  They 
have a significant impact on the life prospects of people who participate in them, and 
so we will want to ensure that people are protected against the possibility of arbitrary 
interference by the IMF and the WB.  If this is right, then it seems that the procedures 
of the IMF and the WB need to be open to more democratic procedures.  There should 
at least be democratic participation, in the sense that everyone should have an equal 
say over its functionings, at some level (i.e., some kind of democratic oversight), that 
will then serve as the basis for the legitimacy of the individual decisions made by the 
IMF and the WB. 
 This argument isn’t complete, however.  At this point, one might worry that 
my arguments extend too far.  One might wonder, what kinds of economic institutions 
aren’t subject to democratic control?  For example, couldn’t my arguments be 
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extended to multinational corporations, requiring some kind of corporate democracy?  
After all, multinational corporations such as GM, IBM, and Shell have a significant 
and profound impact on people’s life expectations on a number of fronts.186  Whether 
companies like these decide to stay in the US or to move production to Mexico, for 
example, has a substantial impact on how well people’s lives go in both the US and 
Mexico.  Increased prices in oil have a significant impact on the global economy.  In 
oil consuming countries, increased prices in oil have been shown to lead to lower 
growth rates (GDP), increased debt, and inflation.187  Also, if a country spends more 
money on oil, then there will likely be less money for other things such as social 
assistance programs.  International firms, such as GM and Shell, have a significant 
impact on people’s lives.  So, aren’t democratic processes required to ensure that the 
decisions of multinational corporations do not interfere arbitrarily in people lives and 
to ensure that decisions track people’s interests? 
 There is also a worry that pushes in the other direction.  Couldn’t my 
arguments for democracy extend to the personal or private realm?  Imagine that a 
student labour coalition is deciding what to do about Walmart’s poor treatment of 
workers.188   It seems clear that in their decision, the group is free to ignore the 
perceived interests of the owner of Walmart.  They could, for example, collectively 
decide to boycott Walmart.  Imagine that this is a realistic possibility, say, because the 
coalition has expressed a dislike of Walmart’s anti-union policies as well as a desire to 
respond publicly.  Imagining that the student’s coalition is large enough (say the 
                                                
186 Iris Marion Young raises a similar worry in relation to Rawls’s own arguments in “Taking the Basic 
Structure Seriously,” Perspectives on Politics, 4.1(2006), p. 94.  On her view, though there can be 
justification for departing from such procedures, there should be a presumption of democratic decision-
making for all institutions, not only those associated with states or governments (p. 94).   
187 IMF Research Department, “The Impact of Higher Oil Prices on the Global Economy,” (December 
2000), URL = <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/oil/2000/#III>. 
188 This example was inspired by a related example in Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice and 
Institutional Design: An Egalitarian Liberal Conception of Global Governance,” Social Theory and 
Practice 32.4 (2006), p. 728. 
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population of Cornell University), this would have very significant effects on 
Walmart.  In Ithaca, for example, the Walmart would likely have to close down and 
the storeowner would be out of work.  To the extent that the student’s coalition could 
make this kind of decision at any time and there is a realistic possibility of them doing 
so, the Walmart owner lives at the mercy of the student’s association.  It would be 
absurd, however, for it to follow from this that the owner of the Walmart has a 
democratic right to take part in the student coalition’s decision.  But this is what seems 
required by my arguments.  After all, allowing the storeowner to participate in the 
coalition’s decision-making process would ensure that his interests are given equal 
consideration. 
Though both objections push in slightly different directions, I think both raise 
an important question about when domination should be remedied by democratic 
procedures.  The second case brings forth the importance of the broadness of the 
impact of people’s decisions.  The decision of the student coalition certainly has a 
significant impact on the store owner’s life, but it is only in one contained sphere.  
This seems quite different than the case of the government or the IMF and the WB.  
Unlike the case of the student coalition, the impact in these cases is pervasive (it is 
both broad and significant).  This may explain why we tend to think that democratic 
arrangements aren’t required in the student coalition case.  The impact on the 
storeowner might be significant enough to include provision for an inclusive 
mediation process that would have a democratic aspect but it doesn’t seem enough to 
warrant a right of democratic participation in the decision-making procedures of the 
student coalition – i.e., where the storeowner gets a vote in the student coalition.  
Yet, pointing to the importance of the broadness and significance of the impact 
is not enough to explain why we tend to think that citizens should not have direct 
voting rights in multinational corporations (MNCs), for here the impact of decisions 
 107 
are significant and broad.  The decisions of MNCs such as Ford significantly impact 
people on a number of fronts.  If the Ford plant were to shutdown in Detroit, this 
would have a significant impact on the local economy.  If most of the people who live 
in Detroit only have skills appropriate to working in an automotive factory, then it is 
going to be difficult for those who lose work to find new work.  Without work, these 
people will spend less and this, in turn, will have a big impact on other businesses, 
which might eventually have to close down.  This seems much more parallel to the 
case of the IMF and the WB.  So, why aren’t democratic rights of participation 
necessary here? 
I have two responses.  One response is that democratic procedures are required 
not simply when the impact of the potential dominator’s actions/decisions will be 
significant and pervasive, but when no other methods will work to reduce the threat of 
domination.  One could then argue that in case of the government, democratic 
procedures are the only way to protect people against domination.189  In the other 
cases (the MNCs and the student coalition cases), there are other ways of securing 
FND.  For example, domination might be avoided by challenging them in the press or 
in some other public forum.  Similar options could work in the case of multinational 
corporations as well.  These are basically methods that can be implemented by and 
through the state (in the sense that the state establishes the courts and protects freedom 
of speech, and so on).  It is not clear, however, that these kinds of mechanisms are 
going to be effective in protecting against domination when it comes to the 
government.  After all, a government has the power to shut down both the media and 
the courts when it pleases.  It seems that only democratic procedures – particularly 
                                                
189 This idea was suggested to me through correspondence with Philip Pettit.  This, however, may not in 
fact be his view.  
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regularly scheduled elections – will be enough to guarantee FND and this is why they 
are required in the case of the government. 
While this response is on the right track, it is not fully satisfying.  It leaves 
open the question of why democratic procedures should only be used when absolutely 
necessary, that is, when no other methods will work to reduce the threat of 
domination.   
A second response, which, as we will see, also helps to fill the gap left by the 
last response, is derived from some of what Rawls says about the basic structure.190  
Rawls argues that there should be a division of labour between two kinds of social 
rules – namely, the rules applying to the basic structure and the rules applying directly 
to the particular transactions between individuals and associations.191   
The basic structure consists of institutions that have a deep impact on life-
prospects throughout the territory.  Furthermore,  
 the basic structure is the way in which the main political and social institutions of society fit  
together into one system of social cooperation, and the way they assign basic rights and duties 
and regulate the division of advantages that arises from social cooperation over time.  The 
political constitution within an independent judiciary, the legally recognized forms of property, 
and the structure of the economy (for example, as a system of competitive markets with private 
property in the means of production), as well as the family in some form, all belong to the 
basic structure.  The basic structure is the background social framework within which the 
activities of associations and individuals take place.  A just basic structure secures what we 
may call background justice.192 
The basic structure consists in the institutions that define the social background and 
includes those social, economic, and other political institutions that have a significant 
                                                
190 PL, pp. 257-288, JF, pp. 10-12. 
191 PL, p. 268. 
192 JF, p. 10. 
 109 
impact on citizens’ life prospects.  The main function of the basic structure is to 
preserve background justice.   
On Rawls’s view, the rules governing the basic structure do not directly apply 
to or regulate internally the interactions of individuals and associations.  However, 
firms, labour unions, churches, universities, and the family are bound by constraints 
that arise indirectly from just background institutions within which such associations 
and groups exist and by which the conduct of their members is restricted.193  And so, 
“the basic structure also enforces through the legal system another set of rules that 
govern the transactions and agreements between individuals and associations” but 
“they are framed to leave individuals and associations free to act effectively in pursuit 
of their ends and without excessive constraints.”194  Rawls argues that “if this division 
of labor can be established, individuals and associations are then left free to advance 
their ends more effectively within the framework of the basic structure.”195 
 These arguments are important because they extend to the economic realm.  
On Rawls’s view, certain endeavours and spheres must be protected from government 
intervention.  Indeed, Rawls suggests that there should be a division of labour with 
respect to the regulation of economic activity.  While the state should be concerned 
with ensuring background fairness in the economic realm, it should not be concerned 
with micro-managing the economy.  Rawls is primarily concerned with government 
interference in the economy, but since he is concerned with democratic governance, I 
think his arguments can easily be extended to explain why the kind of democratic 
intervention we are worried about is objectionable. 
It seems on Rawls’s view, firms (such as Ford and Shell) and other 
associations can, at most, be subject to, what I will call, indirect democratic 
                                                
193 Ibid., p. 10. 
194 PL., p. 268. 
195 Ibid., p. 269. 
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interference.196  Since firms and associations exist within the basic structure, their 
interactions must be constrained to achieve an economic order that preserves 
background justice.  For this reason, particular interactions between individuals or 
associations are subject to the rule of law – which is established through democratic 
procedure.  Through the rule of law, firms can be restricted in various ways.  For 
example, the rule of law secures the necessary underlying social conditions that are 
part of background justice by ensuring that excess market power is prevented, and that 
fair bargaining power, fair opportunity, and a basic minimum wage are established.197  
This kind of democratic interference is unobjectionable because it is the minimum 
amount of interference necessary to establish background justice.  The rule of law 
works to secure equal basic liberties, the difference principle, and fair equality of 
opportunity.  The rule of law also works to ensure reliable expectations and 
opportunities: it ensures that “there are no unannounced and unpredictable 
interferences with citizens’ expectations and acquisitions.”198  In these ways, the rule 
of law also works to ensure FND.  All of these elements, as somewhat different 
aspects of background justice, are necessary for self-respect and the full development 
and exercise of the second moral power.  
However, on Rawls’s view, it seems that anything more than indirect 
democratic interference in firms and associations is impermissible.  I think there are 
two reasons for reaching the conclusion Rawls does.  First, Rawls suggests that 
“organizational requirements and economic efficiency” should be taken into 
account.199  If there was too much democratic interference in private interactions 
                                                
196 Note that this argument seems to rule out what Rawls refers to as “state socialism” (JF, pp. 137-138) 
at the level of fundamental principles. 
197 Ibid., p. 267.  Rawls doesn’t himself argue for a living wage, but I think there are reasons to hold that 
such a wage is a requirement of justice. On this see Jeffery Moriarty, “Rawls, Self-respect, and the 
Living Wage,” Social Theory and Practice, 35.3, pp. 441-459. 
198 JF, p. 283. 
199 Ibid., p. 282. 
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among individuals and firms, then the economy would not work efficiently.  For 
example, Rawls suggests that wage agreements should be determined by the labour 
market itself and not by the people via the state.200  This is because economic 
efficiency would be significantly hampered if wage agreements or the prices of 
products were determined by the people, for example.  These arguments translate to 
the local level as well, for clearly a similar threat would be posed to economic 
efficiency if the citizens of Detroit had a say in the wages at Ford or in the prices of 
cars.201 
Second, what I will call, direct democratic interventions – where citizens get 
voting rights in decisions – constitute too much of an interference in what individuals 
and firms do.202  It is too intrusive because it violates citizens’ interests in exercising 
the second moral power.  This is because members of firms and other associations 
usually affirm certain shared aims and purposes as essential guidelines to the most 
appropriate form of organization.203  And so, the members of firms (and other 
associations like churches and universities) need room to form and pursue these shared 
aims and purposes.  Democratic interference, of the kind we are considering here, 
would be too intrusive because it wouldn’t give the members of such associations 
sufficient room to collectively exercise their capacity for a conception of the good.  If, 
for example, the citizens of Detroit had a vote in the decisions of Ford, this would 
leave little room for Ford’s members to form and to pursue shared aims.  In short, I 
think both of these arguments are enough to explain why MNCs like Ford are not open 
                                                
200 I assume here that, as part of background justice, the condition of basic minimum/living wage is 
already satisfied.  My claim is that, once this condition is satisfied, wage agreements should be 
determined by market forces.  
201 Again, I assume here that wages are consistent with background justice.  I am simply arguing that, as 
long as wages are consistent with background justice, for reasons of economic efficiency, firms should 
have room to set the exact amount of wages as accords with the market.   
202 I think this argument applies to the private realm in general (i.e., it applies to churches, universities, 
etc.). 
203 JF, p. 261. 
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to direct democratic interference, even when it might work to protect citizens against 
domination.   
Not only do these arguments present a plausible response to the objection 
under consideration but they also help to fill in the gap that was left by the first 
response (p. 113).  Recall that, with the first response, it wasn’t clear why democratic 
interference should be permitted only when absolutely necessary.  We now have an 
answer to this question.  As part of their higher-order interest in exercising the second 
moral power, sufficient room must be left for citizens to pursue their own ends without 
excessive restriction.  This suggests that it is objectionable to democratically intervene 
more than when is absolutely necessary (in the actions of MNCs or student coalitions, 
for example) because it would constitute too great of an intrusion in citizens’ pursuit 
of their own ends.    
Furthermore, the above arguments also help us to see why agencies such as the 
Fed, the IMF, and the WB are open to somewhat greater democratic interference than 
firms and associations.  With respect to the Fed, two considerations come into play 
here.  On the one hand, the Fed is like any other association or firm.  It is a firm in the 
sense that it consists of a group of people with shared aims that guide decisions about 
the most appropriate form of organization.  It is also a firm in the sense that members 
have the particular aim of promoting certain products, namely domestic economic 
stability, growth, and full employment, etc.  Insofar as it is a firm, indirect democratic 
interference in the Fed seems to make sense.  That is to say, in order to protect its 
economic efficiency, while also ensuring that the actions of the Fed are consistent with 
and preserve background justice, the Fed should be subject to the rule of law.   
However, on the other hand, the Fed is not simply a firm.  It is, to an extent, 
unlike a firm in the sense that it is part of the basic structure.  It works to ensure that 
certain expectations are met and can be reliably depended upon (as relating to 
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monetary policy and secure employment, for example).  Like other features of 
background justice, that these conditions can be reliably depended upon is essential for 
the exercise of the second moral power.  So, insofar as the Fed is part of the basic 
structure and is to this extent a public institution (like a government), it doesn’t seem 
to have the same right to non-interference as firms or as individuals do.  Consequently, 
further and more invasive democratic interventions, going beyond the rule of law, for 
example, as needed to temper its capacity to dominate, also seem permissible in the 
case of the Fed.  Yet, I believe the first consideration still has some significance.  To 
the extent that (unlike a government) the Fed is a private firm in some regards, I 
suggest that democratic intervention should be limited to some extent – so something 
like democratic oversight (rather than a more directly democratic procedure) is 
perhaps the most that should be permitted.   
 Return now to the IMF and the WB.  Insofar as the Fed and these institutions 
have much in common, I think similar arguments apply.  Democratic oversight seems 
a permissible interference in the decisions and actions of the IMF and the WB.  In a 
sense, the IMF and the WB are much like private firms.  Members of the IMF and the 
WB are trying to promote a certain product, namely growth, development, and 
stability.  These specific aims guide their decisions and organization.  However, in a 
sense, the IMF and the WB are more than private firms; they are part of the global 
basic structure.  The IMF and the WB play an important role in maintaining reliable 
global expectations.  They play an important role in establishing and maintaining 
sustainable global economic growth, development, and stability.  They also lend 
money to member countries – money that is used by countries to implement some of 
the ends that they have collectively chosen (with respect to the establishment of 
growth, development and stability).  So, the IMF and the WB play an important part in 
establishing global background justice, that is, in the conditions necessary for citizens 
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of member countries to collectively exercise the capacity for a conception of the good 
and to ensuring their secure sense of self-respect.  Consequently, for the same sorts of 
reasons that it seems permissible for the Fed to be open to democratic oversight, it also 
seems permissible for the IMF and the WB to be open to democratic oversight. 
 My arguments here have been somewhat long drawn and complicated.  Before 
closing, I will briefly summarize the main conclusions.  Though MNCs and other 
private associations may be pervasive in their impact, they are not open to direct 
democratic interference even if it will protect citizens against domination.  This is 
because members that belong to such associations have shared aims and ends that they 
should have room to collectively pursue as part of their interest in collectively 
exercising their capacity for a conception of the good.  Unlike MNCs and other private 
associations (universities, churches, etc.), to protect citizens against domination, 
institutions like the Fed and the IMF and the WB are open to more direct forms of 
democratic intervention because they are pervasive in their impact on the life 
prospects of citizens and also because they are not exclusively private associations and 
as such they are not privy to the same protection against non-interference as private 
associations and individuals.  But even here democratic interference should not be 
unlimited.  To the extent that the IMF and the WB are private firms, democratic 
intervention should be limited – democratic oversight is perhaps the most that should 
be permitted.   
 
The Charity Model 
So far we have been considering the view that the IMF and the WB are 
businesses whose voting procedures follow the corporate model.  Sometimes another 
kind of argument is given for votes being weighted by contribution. 
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The IMF and the WB are not simply corporations, they are also (and perhaps 
even primarily are) organizations of charity; they take one of their main goals to be 
helping developing countries to develop and grow.  Consider a charity organization 
funded mainly by the Rockefeller family.  It seems natural for the Rockefeller family 
to have a large say over the runnings of this fund.  They have given lots of money to 
the organization, and they want to have significant power over how it is spent; they 
want their views on how the money should be spent to be dominant.  There doesn’t 
seem to be anything wrong with this.  It may even seem to be the obvious or natural 
choice when it comes to the organization of decision-making.  One might suggest that 
this argument is generalizable to the case of the IMF and the WB.  One might argue, 
the G-7 mainly fund the IMF and the WB, and so their views about how best to spend 
the money, viz., about what best advances development, should be given priority. 
Part of what might be motivating our intuitions about the Rockefeller’s case is 
the belief that charity is supererogatory.204  We may tend to think that if someone’s 
actions are supererogatory they should get a lot of leeway in deciding what to do with 
it.  Imagine that the Rockefellers wanted to find a home for stray cats, even though 
there may be greater need elsewhere.  While it seems okay for us to frown on the 
Rockefellers, we do not have any grounds for preventing them from starting up a 
shelter for stray cats.  Because the donors are not doing something that is required of 
them, it may seem appropriate for them to have a lot of say over how their money is 
spent.   
 So, one response to the Rockefellers having such a dominant say in decision-
making might be to challenge the distinction between charity and obligation.  One 
could argue that much of what is usually considered charity is in fact not and that there 
are duties to aid.  For example, one could argue that aid is a Kantian imperfect duty, 
                                                
204 I thank Nick Sturgeon for pointing this out to me. 
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where one has a choice about where to do it (whether to help needy person A or needy 
person B), but not about whether to do it or not (for one must help at least one of the 
two needy people).  The suggestion is that, since helping is an obligation, one does not 
have as much of a say over it as when it is considered supererogatory.  While I may 
have some sympathy with this route, I am not going to pursue it here.  I am more 
interested in considering how we might respond if we grant the assumption that aid is 
a matter of charity.  I would like to show that even we if grant this assumption – an 
assumption that many people in fact do seem to hold – there are a few arguments to be 
given against the conclusion that the donors should be given a dominant say and for 
the conclusion that recipients should play, at least, an equal role in decision-making.    
There are some reasons for thinking that if the G-7 are really concerned with 
the good of people in developing countries, then they should include borrowers in 
decision-making.  Consider an example.  Imagine that a nephew is desperate for 
money and goes to his aunt and uncle for a loan.205  He is having trouble keeping a 
job, drifting from one to another.  If I were the nephew, I would find it objectionable if 
my uncle and aunt were to say, “Sure we’ll give you the money, but, given the trouble 
you’re having, we think that our views of where and how the money should be spent 
should be dominant. Further, we think that spending it on medical school and 
becoming a doctor would be best.”  
Why might this kind of response be objectionable?  After all given the 
nephew’s troubled past, one might think that there is good reason to direct his career 
choice.  The uncle and aunt are concerned with their nephew’s good and, given his 
past, it is likely that he will not make good use of the money they lend him.  One 
might argue, this is why they need to direct his choice.  While I think there is 
something to this line of thought, I am not fully convinced.  If the nephew’s behaviour 
                                                
205 I thank Dick Miller for this example. 
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has been particularly self-destructive (may be at times he has been unable to feed or 
house himself), it is appropriate for the aunt and uncle to play a role in deciding how 
the money should be spent, guiding him along a workable path.  However, I do not 
believe that they should play a dominant role in decisions about how the money 
should be spent.   
First, the aunt and uncle are not necessarily in a position to know what career 
path is best for their nephew.  Usually, this is not something that can be decided by 
others; it is likely something that only the nephew can decide for himself. Among 
other things, the nephew must use knowledge of his own values and interests and his 
own experiences (both of which he is particularly knowledgeable about) to determine 
which career option is best for him.  Past experiences might tell him that surgery is not 
for him.  While other experiences might suggest that being a teacher is a more 
appropriate choice.  Of course, whether this is the right choice for him is something 
that can only be fully determined by testing it out.   
Second, the nephew needs room to choose goals that are truly his own; this 
means that he must have room to make mistakes and to change his mind.  This is part 
of his interest in forming a rational conception of the good.  Along with his Aunt and 
Uncle, the nephew might tentatively hold that being a doctor is right for him.  After 
trying it out for some time, he might decide that this isn’t the right career for him after 
all.  He then needs room to revise his conception of the good and to put to a practical 
test whatever career he sees as being the most right for him (being a teacher or perhaps 
being a philosopher, for example).    
For these two reasons, it seems to me, that if the uncle and aunt are really 
concerned with the good of their nephew, they would want him to choose his own 
path, to have room to make mistakes and to change his mind accordingly.  To choose 
their nephew’s career path for him would be to deprive him of an important good.  For 
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these two reasons, it seems to me that the nephew should play a central role in making 
decisions about how to use the money.  
I think similar arguments apply on the international level.  First, developed 
countries do not know what is the best path to development and growth for developing 
countries to pursue.  This is something that is best determined at the local level.  Dani 
Rodrik argues that there is no one size fits all plan for development.  This is not to say 
that on his view anything goes.  Rodrik argues that “market-based incentives . . . 
competition and macroeconomic stability are essential everywhere.”206  However, he 
argues that successful plans for development reforms “are rarely replicas of each 
other.”207  This is because one must determine the actual policy content of these 
general principles in a country’s own particular settings and “very little is 
generalizable across countries.”208  Rodrik argues that, in order to be successful, plans 
for economic reform must be tailored to “domestic realities.”  This requires local 
knowledge and local expertise.  In short, Rodrik argues that economic reforms are best 
determined at the local level.  What economic reforms will work best for a particular 
country is not something that can be determined by some distant authority.   
In support of this claim, Rodrik points out that countries that adhered most 
strictly to orthodox reform agendas, under the authority of the IMF and the WB, for 
example, Latin American countries, have not done well, while almost all successful 
cases of development in the last fifty years have taken up more creative and 
unorthodox reforms, as in South Korea, Taiwan, China, India, Vietnam, and 
                                                
206 Dani Rodrik, “The Global Governance of Trade: As if Development Really Mattered,” United 
Nations Development Programme (October 2001), URL = 
<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/%7Edrodrik/UNDPtrade.PDF>, p. 29.  Rodrik includes property-control 
rights in this list, but it seems clear that China, despite not having such rights, has been quite successful 
in growth and development.  
207 Ibid., p. 16. 
208 Nancy Birdsall, Dani Rodrik, and Arvind Subramaniam, “If Rich Governments Really Cared about 
Development,” Unpublished Paper (2005), URL = <http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2005-07-
01/Docs/RODRIK-BRIDSALL_SUBRAMANIAN_what-rich-can-do_April2005.pdf>, p. 9. 
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Mauritius.209  For example, China and Mauritius successfully combined their emphasis 
on state regulation with unique measures of market liberalization.  Thus, Rodrik 
concludes, “the secret of economic growth lies in institutional innovations that are 
country-specific, and that come out of local knowledge and experimentation.”210  This 
suggests that the G-7 is not (and has not been) in a position to know which path is best 
for developing countries.  Thus, if the G-7 really wants progress to be made in 
developing countries (which is their mandate as a charity), then their views should not 
be given greater weight in decisions about how the IMF and the WB resources should 
be spent.  Indeed, if growth is the goal, then it seems that developing countries should 
play a central role in decision-making.211 
Second, because citizens have an interest in being able to choose and to pursue 
ends and goals that are truly our own, if developed countries are really concerned with 
the good of citizens in India, then they would want Indians to choose and pursue their 
own path, to have room to make mistakes and to change their minds accordingly.  This 
is part of forming a rational conception of the good.  To deny the citizens of India this 
opportunity, by choosing a particular path of development for them, would be to deny 
them an important good.  For these reasons, the citizens of India should play an 
important role in deciding which path to development is best for them.212 
                                                
209 On this point see Rodrik, “The Global Governance of Trade” and Birdsall, et al., “If Rich 
Governments Really Cared”, pp. 9-10. 
210 Birdsall, et al., “If Rich Governments Really Cared,” p. 10. 
211 This argument is only enough to establish that the IMF and the WB should not be the main decision 
makers.  It is not in itself enough to establish that the people, themselves, of developing countries 
should get a say.  For example, everything I’ve said so far is consistent with just giving the needed 
money to some local group, like development economists at the University of New Delhi.  So, 
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should play an important role in deciding how resources should be spent. I take the next two points 
(regarding the second moral power and domination) to establish this further point.   
212 An important question arises here: How should I respond to the fact that, in some cases, borrowing 
countries are not democratic and decisions about which path to growth and development is best to 
pursue are not going to be made by citizens, but rather by an unrepresentative government?  This is a 
difficult question, and I attempt to address the issue of non-democratic countries in §3.     
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 I think there is one final point to be made against the argument that we are 
considering here.  Even if the goal of the IMF and the WB is to help, the decisions 
made by the IMF and the WB have serious impact on the life prospects of people in 
developing countries.  Moreover, unlike the Rockefeller’s charitable organizations, 
they are also not simply private associations (they play an important role in 
establishing global background justice).  As my previous arguments suggest, these 
facts mean that member countries should have, at least at some level, a democratic say 
in the runnings of the IMF and the WB.   
 
§1.3 The Argument from Tyranny of the Majority 
Another kind of argument for the weighted voting structure of the IMF and the 
WB is suggested by some of my arguments.  I have suggested that part of showing 
equal respect is supporting mechanisms that give equal weight or equal consideration 
to individuals’ interests.  One could argue that this claim supports the weighted voting 
arrangements of the IMF and the WB. 
 Branko Milanovic argues that, when we compare the purchasing power parity 
of countries, the vast majority of people are poor.213  It turns out, then, that the 
wealthy, who are largely in the US and the EU, are in the minority.  One way of 
ensuring that there is a balance of power, that is, that interests of the wealthy are given 
equal consideration in decision-making, is to give greater weight to the votes of the 
wealthy.  The basic idea is that weighted or plural votes would reduce the danger of 
the majority tyrannizing the minority.214  If this is the reasoning behind weighted 
voting in the IMF and the WB, no citizen should feel insulted.  Having less of a vote 
                                                
213 Branko Milanovic, Worlds Apart (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).  Purchasing power 
parity is established by comparing the buying power of different currencies within their own countries. 
214 Richard Arneson suggests something similar in “Democratic Rights at the National Level,” in 
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111. 
 121 
does not convey a judgment that some citizen’s exercise of the two moral powers is of 
less value.  Neither does it convey a judgment that the interests of some are less 
worthy of attention than others.  Rather, it is meant to be an expression of the equality 
of individuals in both respects.  It seems, then, that weighted voting could be accepted 
without undermining one’s sense of self-respect. 
 The plausibility of this argument depends on what we mean by tyranny of the 
majority.  Without weighted voting, rich countries are unlikely to get the kinds of 
patent rights that they so often argue for.  I do not think that this is primarily what we 
are worried about when we are worried about tyranny of the majority, for these are not 
to be considered legitimate interests.215  However, without weighted voting, something 
like, what I will call, the “Stiglitz proposal” might well be ratified.  This poses a 
serious worry.  
Stiglitz suggests that, as part of a more fair trade regime, “rich countries should 
simply open up their markets to poorer ones, without reciprocity and without 
economic or political conditionality.”216  This kind of proposal is clearly in the interest 
of poor countries, and so without weighted voting it is likely to win if put to a vote.  
This is a problem because the Stiglitz proposal is a dangerous one.  It is dangerous in 
the sense that it may require fundamental interests of citizens of the US and the EU to 
be put at risk.  If, for example, the US were to open its market completely with no 
tariffs or subsidies, it seems that many local industries would be jeopardized, leading 
to a sense of job insecurity and actual loss of valued jobs among people, including 
steel workers, farmers, and so on.  This is a significant loss, for as Rawls argues a 
sense of long-term security and of the opportunity for meaningful work and 
                                                
215 For my account of legitimate interests see p. 93. 
216 Joseph Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, p. 83.  Andrew Charlton (a research economist at the 
Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics) was a co-developer of this 
proposal.  
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occupation is necessary for citizens’ sense of self-respect217 and, I would add, is 
necessary (or at least important) for the adequate development and full exercise of the 
two moral powers. 
Moreover, as is suggested by my earlier arguments, I think that a significant 
loss can occur even when it doesn’t involve a loss of specifically deep or fundamental 
interests.  An example I mentioned earlier will serve as a reminder.  The example, as I 
imagined it, was that because of the greater political influence of the rich, the poor 
kept getting the short end of the stick; they kept getting stuck with garbage dumps, 
poor roads, and so on.  It seems that if the poor keep losing with respect to their 
legitimate (though not deep or fundamental) interests and this is predictable, and we 
do nothing to change it, important values of democracy are violated.  It suggests that 
the poor’s interests are not of concern.  This, I have suggested, is likely to be 
undermining of their sense of self-respect.  Similarly, it seems to me, if rich countries 
were, because of their small numbers, to consistently and predictably lose out in votes 
with respect to their legitimate interests at the IMF and the WB and nothing is done to 
change this, then I think important values of democracy would be violated.  It would 
suggest that the interests of citizens in rich countries are not of significant value (at 
least not of enough value to justify changing things).  This would be damaging to their 
sense of self-respect.    
 I think these arguments show that there is something to be said about the 
importance of protecting the fundamental and legitimate interests of the vulnerable, 
even when the vulnerable are rich.  While this may be true, I don’t think this means 
that we should support weighted voting.  As part of showing equal respect for all (by 
showing equal regard for their interests), just as at the domestic level, there seem to be 
two dangers that we need to worry about when we establish voting rules at the global 
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level.  One, we need to diminish the risks of the majority ganging up on the minority; 
we need to diminish the risk of the minority suffering a significant loss with respect to 
their fundamental and legitimate interests.  Two, we also need to diminish the risk of 
the greater number, the majority of people, suffering from a significant loss with 
respect to their fundamental and legitimate interests.  We do not want the minority to 
tyrannize the majority.  This is part of showing equal respect and regard to those who 
are in the majority.  Weighted voting does not seem consistent with this requirement.  
If we give greater weight to the votes of the minority, in this case the rich, there is 
greater risk that the greater number, in this case the poor, will be deprived of what is in 
their interest.  Indeed, this is exactly what seems to have happened in the current 
system of the WB and the IMF, where votes are weighted in favour of the rich, such as 
the US and the EU.  The poor have lost out significantly because of weighted voting in 
the WB and the IMF.  Thus, I suggest that if, as part of equal respect, we are 
concerned to support mechanisms that allow for equal consideration of interests, we 
would not allow weighted voting. 
 
§2. The Conditionality of Loans 
We have just considered arguments for weighted voting and seen that, for 
various reasons, all of them fail.  I would now like, as part of my construal of the 
democracy deficit, to proceed by considering the conditionality of loans.   
 One of the clearest examples of the deficit of democracy within the IMF and 
the WB is the strong conditionality of loans.  The IMF grants structural adjustment 
loans as a means to eliminating balance of payment problems where payments for 
imports are greater than the payments received for exports.  “A member-country can 
freely draw up to 25% of its quota [that is, 25% of the money it contributes to the 
IMF] to address balance of payments deficits.  To draw on more than 25% requires a 
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special agreement with the Fund.”218  These loans are generally contingent on the 
acceptance of certain conditions.  At a minimum, a loan agreement comes with limited 
conditions.  For instance, a loan is typically contingent on the condition that it will be 
repaid, usually with a schedule attached.219  However, many loans also have strong 
conditions attached to them.  These loans are conditional on implementing specific 
policies aimed at growth and development which, in turn, are meant to resolve balance 
of payment difficulties and to ensure repayment of loans.220  The policies usually 
focus on privatization and liberalization of the economy: they tend to require a 
substantial reduction of public spending and barriers to international trade and 
international capital flows by the borrowing country’s government.  The WB also 
gives loans to developing countries for economic development and the eradication of 
poverty.  Like IMF loans, WB loans often have strong conditions involving economic 
policies attached to them.  The economic policies associated with the IMF and the 
WB’s loans are not chosen by the borrowing countries’ elected officials; they are 
usually determined by economists who work for the IMF and the WB, who, in turn, 
are greatly influenced by the US and other developed countries who have the greatest 
power over decision-making.  Critics worry that strong conditions make democratic 
processes difficult, for there is little opportunity for citizens of the borrowing countries 
(who tend to be developing countries) to influence which economic policies are 
pursued.  
I think those of us of who accept a liberal conception of justice tend to agree 
with critics and tend to think that attaching strong conditions to IMF and WB loans is 
objectionable.  In what follows, my aim is to give support to this intuition.  My 
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arguments are largely negative.  I consider what I take to be the most plausible 
arguments for strong conditions and show that they fail.   
Strong conditions can be defended in two main ways: one is based on a 
corporate model and another is based on a charity model.221  In what follows, I 
consider and reject both the corporate model and the charity model.  I also give a 
general argument against the strong conditionality of loans.  Finally, I close with some 
beginning thoughts about the proper structure of loans. 
 
The Corporate Model 
One might defend the conditionality of loans by appealing to a corporate 
model. After all, private banks typically operate in a manner similar to the IMF and 
the WB.  Business loans are usually conditional on the debtor adhering to specific 
terms and conditions specified by the bank.  For instance, property linked with the 
business must be insured against fire and earthquake, or the debtor must have a cash 
reserve or other property or assets to act as collateral security on the loan.   
This seems appropriate.  The practice of attaching conditions to loans is not 
objectionable in itself.  Lending money to others is a risky proposition.  The 
conditions attached to the loans are meant to reduce this risk, to make it more likely 
that the bank will be repaid.  The IMF and the WB seem to be doing something similar 
in attaching the conditions they do to loans.  Like private or commercial banks, the 
IMF and the WB have the goal of being repaid.  For this reason, limited conditions 
such as countries keeping enough money in reserves to make monthly interest 
payments seem fine.  The IMF and the WB, however, go beyond such limited 
conditionality, making loans conditional on adopting specific policies which are 
                                                
221 In the final analysis, as I argued earlier, I think that neither of these models apply.  The IMF and the 
WB are not simply big banks or simply big charities; they are important parts of the global basic 
structure.   
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supposed to lead to growth and development which, in turn, are supposed to lead to 
loan repayment.  Loans have typically been conditional on a country’s liberalizing and 
privatizing its economy.  I will call this strong conditionality.  
One might argue that when considering the case of a local bank or a business 
loan strong conditions do not seem objectionable either.  In support of this position 
consider the following example.  Imagine that it is your life’s ambition to start a South 
Indian restaurant and that you approach a bank for the start up money.  The loan agent 
explains to you that she and the loan committee have an obligation to the bank’s 
shareholders to ensure the continued success and functioning of the bank.  The bank 
only has limited funds and the committee must ensure that they are used wisely and 
that any loans granted will be repaid.  It happens that the bank has access to the market 
indicating that people in your neighbourhood don’t tend to eat South Indian cooking.  
So, the loan committee has decided that they will give you a loan, but conditional on 
starting a Chinese, Italian, or French food restaurant.  Instead, market research has 
suggested that these types of restaurants would do much better in your community 
than a South Indian restaurant and so are much less risky propositions.  
Few find this kind of conditionality objectionable.  There doesn’t seem to be 
anything wrong with making the loan conditional on starting up a Chinese or Italian 
restaurant because market research has shown these to be profitable businesses.  
Again, to be effective businesses, banks need to do what they can to ensure that their 
loans are repaid.  To this extent making a loan conditional on pursuing a profitable 
business seems permissible.  It lessens the level of risk associated with giving out 
business loans.   
One might argue that something similar holds in the case of strong 
conditionality in the international sphere.  Certain policies are effective in leading to 
growth and development.  Like banks, global financial institutions such as the IMF 
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and the WB have an interest in being repaid.  Repayment will typically occur only 
when there is growth and development in the borrowing country.  So, one might argue 
that making a loan conditional on taking up policies that effectively lead to growth and 
development is unobjectionable because it lessens the level of risk associated with 
giving out loans to developing countries.   
While strong conditionality might be justified in the case of private banks, I 
contend that it is not justified in the case of the IMF or the WB.  There is an important 
difference between the operations of private banks and global financial institutions.  
The difference is that while strong conditionality in private banks may be consistent 
with conditions of background justice, in global financial institutions it is not. 
First consider private banks.  Firms and associations exist within the basic 
structure of society.  The basic structure consists in the institutions that define the 
social background and includes those social, economic, and other political institutions 
that have a significant impact on citizens’ life prospects. “The basic structure is the 
background social framework within which the activities of associations and 
individuals take place.”222  Recall that a just basic structure secures what Rawls calls 
“background justice.”223  Rawls argues that individuals and associations should be 
given room to act effectively in pursuit of their ends and without excessive constraints.  
But, he also argues that their interactions must be constrained by the background 
institutions (or the basic structure) within which they operate to achieve a social order 
that preserves background justice.224  Furthermore, insofar as citizens have a higher-
order interest in exercising the capacity for a conception of the good, background 
justice requires the establishment of the social conditions that are necessary for the 
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exercise of this capacity.  This means that banks must operate in a way that allows 
citizens to exercise their capacity for a conception of the good.  
The capacity for a conception of the good is the capacity to form a rational 
conception of the good that one genuinely identifies with as a rational and moral 
agent.  It is a citizen’s capacity to make informed decisions about which final ends are 
most rational for her (e.g., which best cohere with her other commitments, values, and 
priorities).  I argued earlier that a citizen’s exercise of the capacity for a conception of 
the good requires practice or implementation.  One needs to be able to put one’s ends 
into practice in order to make an informed decision about which ends are right for her.  
For example, I cannot adequately grasp if being a doctor is part of my good just by 
thinking about and reading books about being a doctor.  I need to experience, at least 
in some sense, what is it like to be a doctor. Similarly, to determine whether starting a 
South Indian Restaurant, is part of my rational conception of the good, I must have 
room to engage in some kind of practical or experiential test.  So, because they operate 
within the basic structure and because their operations are bound by this structure, 
banks must give citizens leeway to advance themselves in ways that they identify with 
as rational and moral agents.  This means that banks must give citizens room to 
implement and test out ends of their own choosing.  
 In the case of business loans, strong conditionality does not conflict with the 
requirements of background justice.  Citizens are able to exercise their capacity for a 
conception of the good.  This explains why strong conditionality is unobjectionable in 
this case.  After all, one typically has other options to get the resources needed to 
implement one’s end of starting a South Indian restaurant.  One can put up collateral 
in some cases.  Or else one has opportunity to go elsewhere for the needed money: one 
can apply to different banks, seek investments from the private sector, borrow money 
from family members and friends, and, if it is really important to start a South Indian 
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restaurant, one can always move to another area where South Indian food is more 
popular, etc.  One can find other means of getting the resources one needs to 
implement one’s ends.  So, even if loans are conditional on meeting certain 
requirements, we still have room to implement our own ends.  This is consistent with 
the requirements of background justice. 
Consider the international case.  Though similar in some respects, the 
international case ends up being very different from the case of private banks.  As 
institutions that function within the global basic structure, they are bound by the 
conditions necessary to establish global background justice.  They must operate in 
ways that allow peoples to collectively exercise their capacity for a conception of the 
public good.  In order to determine which public ends – such as publicly supported 
health care or signing the Kyoto Protocol, for example – are most rational for them, 
peoples need room to implement and to test out their ends.  This means that people 
must have room to advance themselves in ways that they collectively identify with; 
they must have room to implement collectively chosen ends.   This is parallel to the 
case of private banks and how they are subject to the conditions of domestic 
background justice.   
Unlike in the case of private banks, in the case of global financial institutions, 
strong conditionality is not consistent with this requirement of global background 
justice.  This is largely because the kinds of borrowing options that exist at the local 
level do not exist at the international level.  An example will make the point more 
vivid.  In some countries, citizens have collectively decided (in the sense that there 
seems to be enough of an agreement among citizens) on social conditions or programs 
that require a high level of public spending.  For example, the citizens of India have 
collectively decided on a system of health care and education (including higher-level 
education) that is publicly funded.  Any substantial reduction of public spending 
 130 
would conflict with this decision.  Making the loan contingent on reducing public 
spending wouldn’t be so objectionable if there were other feasible avenues for 
borrowing the needed money – they would still be able to implement their collectively 
chosen ends – but there aren’t any.  Typically, borrowing countries are too poor to put 
up any kind of collateral.  The people of India cannot simply move to Sweden to try 
out socialized health care, for example.  Moreover, the IMF and the WB are 
essentially the same institutions in the sense that they coordinate all of their actions.  A 
country cannot get a loan from one without getting approval from the other.  
Furthermore, approval from the IMF and the WB is like a gold standard, it guarantees 
loans from other private investors.  So, if the IMF and the WB decide that a certain 
country, like India, is not worthy of a loan (say because they have a bad credit rating), 
then other lenders such as private banks or investors are unlikely to give that country a 
loan.225  In short, even if the conditions imposed by IMF and WB loans conflict with 
citizens’ ends, there are few, if any, other realistic options for borrowing countries to 
pursue.226  To the extent that Indian citizens have collectively decided on public health 
care and public education, and the conditions imposed by a loan from the IMF or WB 
would not allow them to implement these ends, and there are no other feasible avenues 
for borrowing money, little room is left for Indian citizens to collectively exercise 
their capacity for a conception of the common good.  They are not able to test out their 
tentatively held public ends which is a barrier to Indian citizens deciding which public 
ends are the most rational for them.  In short, this arrangement is not consistent with 
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background justice in the sense that it is not consistent with leaving citizens’ sufficient 
room to collectively exercise their capacity for a conception of the common good.  
 
The Charity Model 
The IMF and the WB can be conceived as something different from a 
commercial bank whose only goal is repayment.  The IMF and the WB can also be 
thought of as charities who have the goal of helping countries to develop and grow.  
Limited conditionality seems compatible with this goal.  Even as organizations of 
charity the IMF and the WB have an interest in having their loans repaid.  The IMF 
and the WB need to ensure that their money is returned so that they can continue to 
help other countries develop and grow.  For this reason, something like limited 
conditionality seems appropriate.   
What about the strong conditionality of loans?  Some might defend the strong 
conditionality of loans as being a form of justified paternalism.  Sometimes 
paternalism is justified.  For example, it is appropriate for parents to make decisions 
about what is in the interests of their children without necessarily consulting them.  It 
is appropriate to send one’s child to school without consulting her (in fact, it seems 
appropriate to do so even if the child doesn’t want to go to school).  Children do not 
have a clear idea of what is in their interests and what isn’t.  So, up to a certain age, 
parents must make decisions for them.  Something similar could be argued in the case 
of the strong conditionality of loans.  Countries that have defaulted two or three times 
on the payments of their loans have shown that they do not know what is in their 
interests; they do not know what will lead to the growth and the stability that are 
necessary to eliminate their balance of payment problems.  So, one might argue, they 
need someone else to make decisions for them. 
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While there may be some truth in this argument, it is not fully convincing.  For 
unlike the parent in the parent-child relationship, it isn’t clear that the IMF or the WB 
have superior knowledge.  Those working for the IMF and the WB do not seem to 
know more than developing countries about what leads to growth and stability.  Even 
when well intentioned, it has turned out in many cases that the conditions attached to 
loans have failed (and sometimes have even had disastrous results), leaving countries 
less able to address the pressing problems leading to their economic instability and, as 
a result, leaving them less able to repay their loans. The example of capital mobility 
that I discussed earlier is just one of many examples (for more examples see below) of 
how strong conditions have left countries with greater economic instability and lesser 
ability to pay back loans.227  Developed nations just do not seem to know what is in 
the interests of developing nations.  Consequently, I would argue, unlike the parent-
child case, paternalism is not justified here.   
The basic idea is this.  Helping is a matter of responding to a need.  Part of 
responding to a need, I take it, is providing help that is tailored, that is, help that 
actually fits the needs and interests of the recipient.  Despite not having superior 
knowledge about what leads to growth and development, the IMF and the WB impose 
strong conditions on loans.  In imposing these conditions, they make decisions about 
what is in the best interests of the beneficiaries without significant input from 
borrowing countries.  To the extent that such loans have been unsuccessful and have 
not met borrowing countries interests in growth and development, the behaviour of the 
IMF and the WB exemplifies the vice of unjustified paternalism. 
If the IMF and the WB are concerned with the good of the borrowing 
countries, there is also another reason to reject the strong conditionality of loans:  As 
part of their higher-order interest in forming a rational conception of the common 
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good, citizens have an interest in having the opportunity to shape the laws, institutions, 
and practices in ways that they collectively choose; strong conditionality is 
inconsistent with this interest.  To the extent that strong conditions attached to loans 
require that certain economic policies are implemented, and the citizens of borrowing 
countries do not have a say in what kinds of policies are implemented, they are not 
able to implement and test out the laws and practices they have chosen together.228  In 
this way, strong conditionality thwarts citizens’ interests.  So, if the IMF and the WB 
are concerned with the good of borrowing countries’ citizens, they would not impose 
conditions that infringe on their ability to collectively exercise their capacity for a 
conception of the common good.  
I think these two points illustrate that the current method of attaching 
conditions to loans is not consistent with helping or trying to do good for those in 
borrowing countries.  This is not to say that no conditions should be imposed.  After 
all, it seems permissible to have some conditions ensuring the likelihood of 
repayment, so long as they do not prevent citizens from implementing their own 
public ends.   
Finally, I think some of the points I raised in the last section also apply here.  
Charities (like other associations) are bound by the conditions of background justice; 
their conduct is restricted indirectly by the background institutions within which they 
operate.  Part of background justice is the establishment of the social conditions 
necessary for the full development and exercise of the capacity for a conception of the 
good.  To this end, associations must operate in such a way that allows citizens room 
or leeway to implement and pursue ends of their own choosing.  Even when 
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countries in a later section (§3). 
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understood as charities, the IMF and the WB do not seem to allow this.  The IMF and 
the WB are essentially the same institutions (you cannot get a loan from one without 
getting approval from the other).  Also, the IMF and the WB are essentially the only 
lenders that offer loans at below market interest rates.  There are other sources of 
money, such as foreign aid and private investment, but these are unlikely without the 
IMF and WB “golden seal of approval.”229  IMF and WB approval is typically 
contingent on acceptance of the conditions attached to the IMF and WB loan.  So, 
even if the conditions imposed by IMF and WB loans conflict with citizens’ ends, 
there are few, if any, other realistic options for poor borrowing countries to pursue.  
To the extent that citizens of borrowing countries have collectively decided to 
implement certain public ends and the conditions imposed by a loan from the IMF or 
the WB would not allow them to pursue these ends, and there are few other (real) 
avenues for borrowing money, little room is left for citizens of borrowing countries to 
collectively exercise their capacity for a conception of the common good.  In short, 
this arrangement is not consistent with background justice in the sense that it is not 
consistent with leaving citizens’ room to exercise their capacity for a conception of the 
common good.  
 The following example will help to encourage this conclusion.  Imagine that 
you are in need of assistance and that there is only one charity in your area and that 
you are not able to travel elsewhere very easily.  Imagine that it is a Catholic charity 
and that in order to receive aid you must convert to Catholicism.  Aid is conditional on 
conversion.  Imagine also that you have been reading books on Buddhism and were 
planning on becoming a member of this faith.  If there were other charities (without 
such conditions) that you could easily approach for help, the condition imposed by this 
particular charity might not seem so objectionable.  After all, if you don’t like the 
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conditions of the help, you can just go elsewhere to get the help that you need.  But 
given that you are in need of help and that there are no other feasible options, making 
aid conditional on conversion to Catholicism seems highly objectionable.  I think one 
of the reasons that it is objectionable is that, as a matter of justice, we have an interest 
in being able to implement and pursue our own ends.  Insofar as there are no other 
feasible options for aid, we do not have sufficient room to exercise our capacity for a 
conception of the good.  The charity is not functioning within the parameters of 
background justice and for this reason is objectionable.  
  
A General Argument Against Strong Conditionality 
I would now like to raise a more general argument against the strong 
conditionality of loans.  I believe that Philip Pettit’s arguments concerning domination 
can be extended to explain what is objectionable about the strong conditionality of 
loans.  I think these arguments hold whether the IMF and the WB are thought to be 
more like banks or more like charities.  
Recall that Pettit argues that the antonym of liberty is subjugation or 
domination.  On his view, X dominates Y if and only if (1) X interferes on an arbitrary 
basis, that is, without regard for or reference to Y’s perceived interests, (2) with 
impunity and at will, (3) in certain (and not necessarily all) choices that Y is in a 
position to make.230  Having power over another does not necessarily mean that one 
actually interferes with the individual she has power over.  Dominating power can 
interfere with one’s liberty even if it is never exercised.  All that matters is that there is 
a real possibility or a likelihood of such interference.231  The idea is that, usually, the 
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231 Here, I continue in my move away from Pettit’s own views.  Recall that, on Pettit’s view, the 
dominating agent needn’t have any inclination toward arbitrary interference; such interference may 
even be rather unlikely.  It is difficult to see why domination would be objectionable if there was very 
little or no possibility of interference.  Rather, it seems to me that it is only when interference is a 
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potential victim of power and the power bearer are aware of their relationship; both 
are usually aware that there is a real chance of the power bearer interfering in the 
victim’s choices arbitrarily, without regard for or reference to her perceived interests.  
This means that the victim relies on the goodwill of the power bearer not to exert her 
power. 
From the perspective of liberal peoples, being dominated, whether actual or 
potential, is a bad situation to be in and is something that would generally be avoided.  
Let us begin with actual domination.  First, it is just bad in itself for peoples to have 
their collective interests consistently ignored.  Second, having their interests 
consistently ignored and not taken into account is undermining of peoples’ sense of 
self-respect.  It is hard for peoples to see themselves as having equal value when social 
institutions and arrangements establish or reinforce the view that their collective 
interests deserve less concern simply because they are the interests of one group rather 
than another.  Peoples’ joint interests and aims are part of their conception of the 
common good.  They are part of their conception of what is valuable in human life.  
To ignore or dismiss their collective interests is to suggest that their conception of the 
common good is not as valuable as others’, is not as worthy of pursuit as others’.  This 
is undermining of peoples’ sense of self-respect.  For this reason, as representatives of 
peoples, we would not agree to political arrangements that allowed for relationships of 
actual domination.  
Turn now to potential domination.  Relationships of domination are 
objectionable regardless of whether peoples’ interests are actually ignored or not.  This 
is because, even if it is never exercised, the capacity to dominate can interfere with 
peoples’ ability to form a rational conception of the good.  As I argued earlier, when 
                                                                                                                                       
realistic possibility that fear becomes a rational motivator and leads to the bad effects that Pettit 
suggests (uncertainty, anxiety, etc.). So, I differ from Pettit in thinking that there must be a real 
possibility of interference before it can count as objectionable.  
 137 
agents think that there is a realistic chance of being dominated, in order to ingratiate 
themselves with the potential dominator and to protect themselves from domination, 
agents will close themselves off from certain ends and aims, even if they tentatively 
think that those ends and aims are best for them.  They will refrain from putting into 
practice their own self-chosen aims and ends.  For example, I might tentatively think 
that reading Tolstoy is for me.  If I am a slave and my master absolutely detests 
Tolstoy, then in order to ingratiate myself with him and to lessen the likelihood of his 
interference, I will refrain from reading Tolstoy.  I will close myself from off testing 
out certain options, even if I think that they might be best for me.  In this way, 
domination is not consistent with leaving room for agents to develop self-chosen 
goals, goals that they identify with as moral and rational agents.  Insofar as we, as 
representatives of peoples, have an interest in exercising our capacity for a conception 
of the good, we would not agree to political arrangements that allowed for potential 
relations of domination. 
 Return now to the matter of conditionality.  One would have to be against 
loans as such to hold that loans conditional on being repaid by certain dates or on 
keeping enough reserves to make the first few interest payments count as (wrongful) 
arbitrary interference.  So, again, limited conditionality is not my concern.  Rather, my 
worry concerns strong conditionality.  Take the case of South Korea, for example.  
After the Korean War, South Korea showed exceptional growth.  In the thirty years 
after the war, it increased per capita income eight-fold, reduced poverty significantly, 
achieved universal literacy, and made significant progress in technology.232  In these 
early days South Korea maintained tight control of its financial markets.  But in the 
1990’s, under pressure from the US, South Korea allowed its firms to borrow funds 
from abroad.  In 1997, there were rumours that Korea did not have the reserves to pay 
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off loans from American banks.  These rumours became self-fulfilling prophecies.  
After hearing such rumours, banks decided not to renew their loans.  When all the 
banks decided not to renew their loans, as Stiglitz says, “their prophecy came true: 
Korea was in trouble.”233  South Korea eventually sought an IMF loan.  The IMF 
imposed strong conditions on this loan.  In particular, the IMF pushed for trade 
liberalization.  The US treasury, as the IMF’s largest shareholder and the only one 
with veto power, played a significant role in determining the conditions of the loans 
and pushed for liberalization as well.234  As part of the conditions of the loan, the IMF 
and the US pushed for South Korea to lower its tariffs to US goods, goods that the US 
happened to want to export like American made sausages.235  The problem is that 
South Korea opening up its market to foreign goods could not possibly help it address 
the problems that led to its crisis.  The South Korean economic crisis was largely a 
result of bad nerves.  Investors in the US were skittish and, in turn, reacted to the 
rumours by not renewing loans.  Opening up the South Korean market to American 
goods is not a solution to this problem.  Indeed, the US, through the IMF, simply took 
the South Korean economic crisis as an opportunity to push its own interests without 
much regard for the interests of the South Koreans.  The IMF and particularly the US, 
took advantage of conditionality and used it to break open the economy, even when 
other courses could and should have been taken.  So, part of the worry surrounding 
strong conditionality is that developed countries like the US will use it to arbitrarily 
interfere in the interests of developing countries.  If, as representatives of liberal 
peoples, we are moved to protect ourselves against actual arbitrary interference and, in 
turn, to protect our sense of self-respect, we would not agree to the strong 
conditionality of loans. 
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 For those concerned with preventing relations of domination, there is also 
another reason to object to strong conditionality.  Imagine that opening up the South 
Korean market to American goods, such as American made sausages, would help to 
alleviate the South Korean economic crisis.  Unlike in the real case, in this imagined 
case, there isn’t actual domination of South Korea.  In this case, the IMF actually 
advances the interests of South Korea by helping to stop the economic crisis.  
Nevertheless, conditionality is still objectionable in this case, but for a reason that 
wasn’t highlighted before.  The worry here concerns potential rather than actual 
domination.  The IMF loan is conditional on taking up certain policies, such as 
increased trade with the US.  If these policy conditions are not met, then the IMF will 
not grant funding.  Moreover, if there isn’t compliance, then the IMF will likely fail to 
grant its “seal of approval” which negatively influences access to private investment.   
South Korea is in a great state of need and will do anything to prevent its being denied 
a loan.  So, in order to ingratiate itself with and to stave off arbitrary interference from 
the IMF and the US in particular, South Korea will curtail its choices.  If the IMF 
desires liberalization of trade, then in order to ingratiate themselves with the IMF and 
to lessen the likelihood of interference, South Korea will close itself off from certain 
political ends, say economically protectionist ends, even if it is what they think is best.  
In short, conditionality is not consistent with citizens’ interest in exercising their 
capacity for a conception of the good: rather than implementing their own political 
ends, the South Koreans have little option but to take up the political ends of the 
IMF.236  Insofar as we have an interest in protecting ourselves against potential 
                                                
236 For a parallel case, imagine a scenario where a wife knows that her husband will leave her unless she 
does exactly what he asks.  In this case, the wife would close herself off from certain options, even if 
the husband never actually leaves her.  Just knowing that there is a real chance that he could leave is 
enough to motivate her to alter her choices.  Something similar applies in the case of the IMF and South 
Korea. 
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domination, and in ensuring that we are able to exercise our capacity for a conception 
of the common good, we would not agree to the strong conditionality of loans.   
One might object to my arguments in the following manner.  Pettit’s 
arguments do seem to allow for some relationships of domination.  Imagine, for 
example, that except for one person, all the citizens of a particular country are severely 
mentally incapacitated.  It wouldn’t be objectionable for the one mentally fit person to 
govern the country and to lay down its laws.  This is the case even if the one person 
will actually or potentially interfere arbitrarily in the interests of the rest, for while it is 
an unfortunate situation, there is little alternative.  Something similar could be argued 
in the international case.  Just as the mentally incapacitated aren’t competent enough 
to lay down laws, developing countries aren’t competent enough to lay down the 
economic policies attached to IMF and WB loans.  The only competent ones are the 
economically developed countries, the G-7.  So, just as the mentally fit person should 
determine the laws that govern society, the G-7 should determine the policies that are 
attached to IMF and WB loans.  After all, there is little alternative. 
This kind of argument is not convincing.  First, it isn’t clear that those 
countries that have trouble developing are incompetent.  Countries can have problems 
developing for a variety of reasons.  To some extent, development can be a matter of 
luck.  Some countries have poor geographic locations.  For example, some are subject 
to frequent droughts and earthquakes.  This presumably has an effect on a country’s 
economic progress and is not simply a matter of competence.  Also, it seems clear that 
some countries have not done well economically largely because of foreign 
interference and not because of any lack of competence on their part.  The Latin 
American and East Asian crises (which I discuss below) are examples of this.   
Second, it is not clear that developed countries are competent with respect to 
decision-making about growth and development.  As I have argued, developed 
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countries do not seem to know what is best for developing countries to do when it 
comes to growth and development.  Adam Przeworski and James Vreeland argue that 
“if growth is the primary objective then IMF programs are badly designed.”237 Their 
research shows that the 
growth observed under IMF programs was lower regardless of the conditions under which 
countries participated . . . countries [that] remained under IMF programs even though they had 
decent reserves and low deficits . . . grew by 1.02% slower than countries which enjoyed the 
same conditions while not being subject to these programs. But even countries with low 
reserves and high deficits did better if they did not participate: their growth was 1.79% faster. 
Thus, while countries facing bad conditions grew slower, participation in IMF programs 
lowered growth under all conditions.238 
In short, countries grow much slower when they follow IMF conditions.  This 
suggests that developed countries, like the US, who largely control the IMF, do not 
know best when it comes to growth.239  In short, if the G-7 were the only ones who 
knew what tended to lead to growth and development, if they were the only competent 
ones, this might justify their being able to impose conditions on other countries.  In 
reality, this is not true.  The G-7 is not fit to make such decisions.  The objection fails. 
 A second objection may be raised.  One might argue that we need economic 
stability – stability in growth rate, employment and prices – because instability is bad 
for the poor.  However, countries are not likely to cooperate with one another to 
                                                
237 Przeworski and Vreeland, “The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth,” p. 402. 
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239 We might wonder, who does know best?  What is the criterion for competence, if any?  Rodrik 
suggests that one of the main requirements for making competent decisions about which economic 
policies to take up is local knowledge.  He argues that economic policies aimed at growth and 
development should be country specific, tailored to domestic realities.  The G-7 does not have this kind 
of knowledge when it comes to developing countries. This might explain why they have tended to make 
such bad decisions when it comes to IMF programs.  Rodrik’s research suggests that developing 
countries (i.e., the borrowers) are the only ones who can make competent decisions about which 
economic policies should be taken up.  See Dani Rodrik, “The Global Governance of Trade: As if 
Development Really Mattered,” United Nations Development Programme (October 2001), URL = 
<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/%7Edrodrik/UNDPtrade.PDF>. 
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achieve stability.  Thus, some like Robert Gilpin and Charles P. Kindleberger argue 
that the creation of economic stability requires a powerful leader or a hegemon.240  On 
their view, through exercise of its power, the hegemon gets countries to cooperate with 
one another, thus, imposing a stable and predictable economic order on the world.    
In support of this thesis, Kindleberger points to the worldwide depression in 
1929.  On Kindleberger’s view, the world depression lasted so long and was so 
pervasive because there was no dominant economic power to contain the damage that 
was done and to take on burdens in the way of extending credit (playing the role of 
“lender of the last resort”), creating and maintaining a liberal trade regime, and 
establishing an international monetary system.  In short, Kindleberger argues that the 
depression was “so deep and so long because the international economic system was 
rendered unstable by British inability and United States unwillingness to assume 
responsibility for stabilizing it.”241  This example is meant to show that in order for 
world economic stability to be achieved there must be a dominant economic power.  
So, in a similar vein, one might argue that in order to achieve the objective of 
economic stability some country, like the US, must exercise its power through the IMF 
and the WB.    
This objection is not necessarily just about the conditionality of loans.  Rather, 
it highlights larger questions about domination that are raised by my arguments.  The 
argument highlights the question of whether having a dominant power to control and 
arrange global arrangements is really objectionable after all, particularly when it will 
benefit the destitute. 
                                                
240 See Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), Robert Gilpin, “The Rise of American Hegemony” in 
Patrick Karl O’Brien and Armand Clesse (eds.), Two Hegemonies (Aldershot, ENG: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2002), pp. 165-182, and Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929-1939 
(London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1973).   
241 Kindleberger, The World Depression 1929-1939, p. 292. 
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 I think the main lines of response have already been examined.  First, the US, 
or any other dominant economic power for that matter, does not know what will lead 
to economic stability.  Indeed, US involvement through the IMF and the WB in the 
economies of other countries has lead in many cases to serious economic instability.  
Take the case of Latin America.  In the years from 1950-1980 Latin America’s per 
capita income grew at 2.8% annually.242  In the 1980’s the US dealt with its own 
inflation problems, causing it to raise its interest rates, which eventually passed 
20%.243  These increased interest rates affected loans made to Latin American 
countries and prompted the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980’s.  Mexico, 
Argentina, Brazil, and others defaulted on their loans.  During this time, “Latin 
American economic policies changed dramatically, with most countries adopting 
Washington Consensus policies,”244 a set of policies determined by Washington based 
institutions – the IMF, the WB, and the US Treasury – to be the right policies for 
growth and development.  Latin American countries needed to take loans from the 
IMF and the WB, and the Washington Consensus became the basis of the policies 
upon which IMF and WB loans were conditional.  While countries like Argentina who 
thoroughly adopted the Washington Consensus policies did resume growth and restore 
price stability, this was only for a short amount of time.  Stiglitz writes, “growth was 
not sustainable . . . Growth was to last only a short seven years, and was to be 
followed by recession and stagnation.  Growth for the decade of the 1990’s was only 
half what it had been in the decades prior to 1980.”245  This example illustrates two 
things.  First, it illustrates the problems of the US becoming a moneylender: economic 
problems within the US led to serious problems in the borrowing countries of Latin 
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America.  This suggests the importance of an independent moneylender.  Second, 
policies endorsed by the US as part of the Washington Consensus did not lead to long-
term economic stability and in fact seemed to elicit economic instability.   
 The East Asian crisis is another important example of how US involvement 
seems to have precipitated economic instability.  Stiglitz writes, 
the IMF and the US Treasury believed, or at least argued, that full capital liberalization would 
help the region [East Asia] grow even faster.  The countries in East Asia had no need for 
additional capital, given their high savings rate, but still capital account liberalizations was 
pushed on these countries in the late eighties and early nineties.  I believe that capital account 
liberalization was the single most important factor leading to the crisis.246 
Typically, the IMF and the WB, led by the US, have argued that capital liberalization 
promotes economic stability.  But as this passage shows, Stiglitz is very sceptical of 
this claim.  This is for good reason.  Full capital liberalization leaves developing 
countries open to the whims of foreign investors.  As I have already argued, this does 
not support economic stability because money often leaves countries just as they 
desperately need it.  If Stiglitz is right and capital liberalization was a major cause of 
the East Asian crisis, then, insofar as the US pushed full capital liberalization, it seems 
clear that actual US dominance is at least partially responsible for the onset of the 
crisis.  This and the last example are in direct contradiction to Kindleberger’s claim 
that a dominant economic power will lead to economic stability.   
 Second, even if it would promote economic stability, hegemony conflicts with 
citizens’ interest in exercising their capacity for a conception of the good.  Nations 
would be at the mercy of the hegemon.  The hegemon could choose to exercise its 
power at any time.  Having knowledge of this, nations would live in constant fear of 
the hegemon.  To protect themselves against possible interference, nations would do 
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what they could to gain favour with the hegemon and to ingratiate themselves with it.  
As I have argued, this type of behaviour conflicts with the exercise of the capacity for 
a conception of the good.  To ingratiate themselves with the hegemon, nations would 
close themselves off from particular ends and aims, even if they (tentatively) think that 
these ends and aims are best for them.  They would refrain from implementing their 
collectively shared ends.  In this way, even if it would promote economic stability, a 
dominant economic power or hegemon would conflict with peoples’ fundamental 
interests and for this reason would be objectionable from the perspective of the global 
original position.    
 In conclusion, my original argument stands.  The conditionality of loans is 
objectionable because it allows the G-7 to actually and potentially dominate 
developing countries.  To the extent that we are concerned to prevent relations of 
domination, potential and actual, I think that we would oppose the strong 
conditionality of loans. 
 I began this section (on the conditionality of loans) by considering what I take 
to be the most plausible arguments for the conditionality of loans – one based on a 
corporate model and another based on a charity model – and shown that they fail.  
When I considered the corporate model, I argued that strong conditionality in the IMF 
and the WB cannot be defended as it can be in private banks.  This is largely because, 
unlike in the case of private banks, placing strong conditions on loans from the IMF 
and the WB is not consistent with the conditions of background justice.  When I 
considered the charity model, my main claim was that strong conditionality cannot be 
defended as a form of justified paternalism.  I argued that this is largely because the 
IMF and the WB have not been able to make competent decisions about what will 
serve the interests of borrowing countries.  I also gave a general argument against 
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strong conditionality, arguing that insofar as we are moved to prevent relationships of 
domination, we would not permit the strong conditionality of loans.   
 So far I have left open the question of what form loans should take. This is 
something that I will come back to in more detail towards the end of this dissertation.  
As initial guidance to the structure of loans, my arguments suggest that at least two 
things are essential.  First, I have suggested that, as part of their interest in exercising 
their capacity for a conception of the good, peoples have an interest in implementing 
policies that they collectively choose.  In turn, this means that any kind of 
conditionality that is put into action must give citizens room to pursue the policies that 
they collectively choose.  Second, as part of their interest in exercising their capacity 
for a conception of the good and in ensuring self-respect, citizens also have an interest 
in preventing relations of domination, potential and actual.  So, a proper form of 
conditionality must also protect citizens against domination.   
 
§3.  Weighted Voting and Conditionality of Loans in Non-democratic Countries 
I have so far put aside the question of whether weighted voting and 
conditionality of loans are justified in the case of non-democratic countries (ndcs).  I 
would now like to turn to these matters.   
 In the kinds of nations we are considering here, injustice already exists in 
social arrangements (insofar as they are non-democratic).  So, the question here is: 
“what is the just way to answer injustice?”247  Rawls is primarily concerned with 
providing a theory of international relations for liberal peoples.  For this reason, his 
arguments do not give us a well-developed framework for determining what 
constitutes just relations between liberal peoples and illiberal (or non-democratic) 
nations.  It is true that Rawls spends quite a bit of time discussing one particular kind 
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of illiberal nation, namely decent consultative hierarchies, but (beyond offering 
principles of just war) he says little to guide the relations between peoples and other 
illiberal nations.  My hope is to make some steps toward filling this gap with respect 
to the issue of decision-making in global institutions such as the IMF and the WB.  To 
this end, I will consider whether there are reasons for liberal peoples to support or 
reject weighted voting and conditionality of loans in the case of ndcs.   
Given what I have argued so far, one might be tempted to think that weighted 
voting and conditionality of loans is always justified in the case of ndcs.  After all, in 
ndcs, citizens do not have a distinct and meaningful role in politics.  Consequently, 
one might argue that giving less weight to the ndcs’ votes or making their loans 
strongly conditional does not seem to thwart their citizens’ interest in exercising their 
two moral powers nor does it seem to insult or undermine their citizens’ sense of self-
respect in the same way it would in the case of democratic countries.  
 An example will make the point clearer.  Take the cases of children or the 
severely mentally disabled.  Refusing to give children or the mentally disabled a vote 
in domestic elections doesn’t frustrate their exercise of the capacity for a conception of 
the good.  This is because they do not have this capacity at the level necessary to be 
considered a free and equal citizen.  Moreover, it doesn’t seem insulting in the sense 
that withholding the vote from them does not suggest that their exercise of the two 
moral powers is any less important or valuable.  Rather it is representative of the fact 
that both children and the severely mentally disabled are not sufficiently able to 
rationally choose and implement their ends.  Decisions about such things need to be 
made on their behalf (there is little choice).  
 Turning now to the case of citizens of ndcs, like children and the mentally 
incapacitated, they are unable to fully exercise their two moral powers.  There are, of 
course, differences between the mentally disabled and the citizens of ndcs.  In the case 
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of ndcs, citizens’ inability to fully exercise their moral powers is not, as it is in the 
case of children or the disabled, a matter of inherently lacking the capacity 
themselves; rather, their capacities are disabled by the non-democratic and dictatorial 
governments they live under.  Insofar as citizens of ndcs are unable to fully exercise 
their two moral powers, one might argue, that weighting their votes less (or perhaps 
not giving them a vote at all) and imposing strong conditions on their loans does not 
conflict with global democratic values.  As in the cases of children and the disabled, 
weighted voting doesn’t frustrate citizens’ interest in exercising their capacity for a 
conception of the good.  This is because they are not able to exercise this capacity.  
Citizens of ndcs are not able to collectively decide on and implement, through voting, 
a conception of the common good.  They do not have an opportunity to shape the 
laws, institutions, and practices in ways that they collectively choose.  Moreover, 
giving them less votes does not suggest that their exercise of the two moral powers is 
any less important or valuable and is not insulting.  As in the case of the disabled, it 
would be representative of the fact that they are not able to choose and implement 
public ends that are truly their own.  So, choices about which ends (or social practices) 
should be implemented need to be made on their behalf. 
 Furthermore, one might point out that dictators do not tend to represent the 
interests of their citizens.  So, to give the countries less of a vote is not to suggest that 
the interests of citizens of ndcs are unimportant or less worthy of consideration (which 
would be undermining of their sense of self-respect).  Indeed, insofar as corrupt 
dictators are unlikely to make decisions that serve their peoples’ interests, weighted 
voting and conditionality of loans might work to better protect the people’s interests.  
Weighted voting and conditionality of loans might be understood as an expression of 
the belief that the interests of citizens in ndcs are of equal value and concern.  In turn, 
weighted voting and conditionality of loans would be consistent with self-respect.   
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 While I do think these arguments are successful in some cases (namely, those 
involving malevolent dictatorships), I think it would be a mistake to apply these 
arguments to all ndcs and to lump all ndcs together under one category.  It is important 
to distinguish between decent consultative assemblies, benevolent dictatorships and, 
what I will call, malevolent dictatorships.248  All three are non-democratic, but they 
differ in important respects.  A decent consultative assembly is a society that is 
respectful of human rights, and has a government who sincerely pursues the common 
good and responsively consults with all its citizens through group representation.  A 
benevolent dictatorship respects human rights and makes decisions by giving 
consideration to the interests of all but does not allow citizens a meaningful role in 
politics.  A malevolent dictatorship is hostile toward other countries, does not respect 
the human rights of its citizens, and does not allow its citizens a meaningful role in 
politics.   
It seems to me that whether weighted voting and conditionality of loans is 
justified (for the reasons given above) is going to depend on which of these categories 
a country falls under.  I will try to show that in some cases, namely, decent 
consultative assemblies and benevolent dictatorships, some of the reasons for rejecting 
weighted voting and conditionality of loans in the case of democratic countries also 
apply to non-democratic countries.  The underlying idea is that a prerequisite for just 
relations with other nations, even when they are unjust, is parity of reasons: agents 
advancing a reason in favour of a measure (or against it) must be willing to accept the 
similar relevance of the reasons in other similar cases.249   So, if liberals would accept 
certain reasons against weighted voting and conditionality of loans in the case of 
                                                
248 These categories are somewhat (though not entirely) similar to Rawls’s distinction between decent 
hierarchical peoples, benevolent absolutisms, and outlaw states (See LP, p. 4).    
249  Richard Miller, Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Power and Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010) ch.3.  Here, Miller argues that parity of reasons is a prerequisite for reasonable 
deliberations.  I take myself to be working with a similar idea.  
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democratic countries and these reasons apply in the case of ndcs, then they must 
accept those reasons there as well.  In trying to get at the kinds of reasons that are 
relevant, we might imagine ourselves in a global original position with representatives 
of both liberal and illiberal nations and the kinds of reasons these representatives could 
offer (or perhaps that could be offered on their behalf) against weighted voting and 
conditionality of loans in the case of illiberal nations.  I do not intend my remarks here 
to be conclusive.  I intend them as tentative.  At this time, my goal is mostly to 
highlight some points that must be considered more carefully in relation to weighted 
voting and conditionality of loans in the case of ndcs.   
 (i) Decent Consultative Assembly.250  A decent consultative assembly is 
democratic enough that the people have a distinct and meaningful role in political 
decision-making.  So, though they are not as just as a constitutional democracy, a 
decent consultative assembly is like a constitutional democracy in the sense that it has 
a forum for consulting with citizens about the arrangements of social institutions and 
is responsive to their views.  To this extent, citizens are able to exercise their two 
moral powers and are able to promote their own interests and, in turn, are able to 
secure some sense (though not a full sense) of self-respect.  So, though I won’t at this 
time consider those arguments again, because a decent consultative assembly is 
sufficiently democratic, I think that the arguments given in the previous sections 
against weighted voting and conditionality (in the case of constitutional democracies) 
apply here as well.  
 (ii) Benevolent Dictator.  Imagine that Frederick the Great was a benevolent 
dictator and that we knew (with a good degree of certainty) him to be one.251  (Perhaps 
                                                
250 Again, I wish to point out that it is highly doubtful that something like a decent consultative 
assembly (particularly in terms of responsiveness) is likely to exist in the real world.    
251 Though I will put these aside for the most part, I have some general doubts about whether these two 
conditions (a dictatorship being benevolent and our knowing this to be the case) could be satisfied. 
First, it is not clear to me that there could ever be such a thing as a benevolent dictator.  Because 
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he allowed us to take a poll and the poll showed that he tended to act in accordance 
with the people’s perceived interests).  It seems to me, if one is concerned to protect 
citizens from arbitrary interference from (or domination by) international agencies 
such as the IMF and the WB, then perhaps Prussian votes shouldn’t be weighted.  
Because of cognitive bias and distance, it is difficult for outsiders to understand and to 
weigh appropriately the different interests of Prussians.  So, given that the Prussian 
government sincerely wishes to and generally does promote the interests of its citizens 
(imagine, for example, Frederick the Great knows that his people prefer more socialist 
economic policies and that he pursues appropriate policies) and that we will want to 
ensure that Prussian citizens’ interests are given equal consideration, it might be best 
to give equal voting rights to the Prussian government.   
                                                                                                                                       
dictators are generally quite far removed from the people and their everyday lives, and particularly 
because there are no democratic procedures, given the human tendency toward partiality, it isn’t clear to 
me a dictator could truly know what is in the interests of the people.  Moreover, even if a dictator does 
know what is in the interests of its people and pursues these interests in his or her decisions, since there 
are no elections or other such procedures, there is no way of ensuring that the dictator will continue to 
do so, that is, continue to be benevolent.  He or she could decide at any time to become malevolent and 
not to pursue the people’s interests.  In short, democratic procedures are the surest way of identifying 
people’s interests and ensuring that people’s interests are pursued.  Without such procedures, it is 
uncertain as to whether a leader would know what the people’s interests are and whether he would in 
fact consistently pursue these interests even if he did know what they are.   
 Second, even if there were benevolent dictators, it is not clear that we (on the outside) would 
be able to identify one. A commonly cited example of a benevolent dictator is Frederick the Great.  
Frederick the Great was absolute in his power.  Yet, Frederick the Great was respectful of human rights, 
tolerant of different religions, made great economic advancement, and worked to promote the arts, and 
so on.  This sounds like a benevolent dictatorship.  Nevertheless, I am somewhat doubtful about 
whether we could truly know whether he was a benevolent dictator.  There are, for example, a variety of 
ways to promote economic growth.  Some methods, for example, favour privatization and trade 
liberalization.  Others favour more protectionist methods.  Imagine Frederick the Great promoted 
economic growth through policies aimed at privatization and trade liberalization.  From the outside, as 
long as there is economic development, it will seem like Frederick the Great is promoting the interests 
of the Prussian people.  Imagine, however, that, if you were to take a poll, the Prussian people would 
have preferred more protectionist policies.  In this case, it would seem that Frederick the Great did not 
act in the perceived interests of the people and, to this extent, would not have been benevolent (i.e., he 
would be interfering arbitrarily in their interests).  Most dictators will be unwilling to let us take these 
kinds of polls or to use other methods to determine if people’s interests are being pursued.  So, in most 
cases we can’t know whether a dictator is truly benevolent or not; we can never actually know whether 
a dictator acts in the perceived interests of his people or not. 
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 Let us now turn to the conditionality of loans.  I think there are similar reasons 
against implementing strong conditionality of loans in the case of a genuinely 
benevolent dictator.  I suggested earlier (using the example of US and South Korea) 
that developed countries have often used conditionality of loans to interfere arbitrarily 
in the interests of developing countries.  To protect citizens against having their 
interests arbitrarily interfered with, it might be better to allow local government, when 
it genuinely has the interests of the people in mind, room to implement economic 
policies of their own choosing.  Local government has the knowledge of local realities 
that is needed to implement successful economic policies.  If the local government is 
also sincerely committed to promoting the people’s interests, then I think we have 
good reason to abstain from strong conditions on loans.  It will serve to protect 
citizens from arbitrary interference from other countries.   
 Of course, since it is not democratic (and there are no checks to protect against 
this), there is always the worry that the Prussian government will become malevolent.  
If this does happen and we know this to be the case, then it should be treated as a 
malevolent dictator.  What is said in the next section is relevant at this point. 
(iii) Malevolent Dictator.  Arguments for giving equal votes and not imposing 
conditions on loans to democratic nations and decent consultative assemblies do not 
apply here.  Furthermore, the points I outlined against weighted voting and 
conditionality of loans in the case of a benevolent dictatorship do not apply here 
either.  This is because a malevolent dictator who systematically violates the human 
rights of his/her own citizens is obviously not concerned with promoting the general 
interests of his/her own people.  It is difficult to see any (moral) reasons not to give 
less weight to the votes of or impose strong conditions on the loans to malevolent 
dictatorships.  In short, I think the arguments that I outlined at the beginning of this 
section stand.  Giving less votes or imposing strong conditions on loans in the case of 
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ndcs would not thwart their citizens’ higher-order interest in exercising the two moral 
powers and it would not undermine their sense of self-respect.  Moreover, particularly, 
if the country also happens to be aggressive toward other nations, insofar as it would 
be necessary to protect the global order and stability, then there may be good reasons 
for weighted voting and imposing strong conditions on loans.  After all, we don’t want 
the global order to be open to the whims and preferences of aggressive dictators. 
 If these thoughts are right, one might wonder, why not just exclude such 
countries from participating in global institutions altogether?  Similarly, one might 
wonder why we wouldn’t simply deny loans to such countries rather that granting 
loans with strong conditions.   
 I will start with the first matter.  I think there are two reasons against excluding 
malevolent dictatorships from global institutions.  First, if a malevolent dictatorship is 
excluded altogether, the US (or other Western nations) might feel more justified in 
“eliminating” the dictator and putting in place its own preferred “liberal” leadership.  
This seems inconsistent with global democratic values.  US backed leadership would 
be tend to be highly sympathetic to and to act in support of US interests which, in turn, 
might conflict with its ability to advance its own people’s interests equally.  In other 
words, rather than protecting its own citizens from domination, a US backed leader 
would tend to promote increased US dominance in global decision-making. 
Second, those who are in most need of being included in global financial 
institutions (and perhaps in global decision-making in general) are those who tend to 
live under malevolent dictatorships (take the citizens of Rwanda during the genocide, 
for example).  Their interests are profoundly affected by decisions that take place at 
the global level.  To exclude such countries altogether would be to punish the citizens 
of these countries, citizens who are already impoverished and disenfranchised, and not 
the leaders, who should be the targets of such punishment.  In short, it makes little 
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sense to have a citizen barred from having her interests represented in global 
institutions because the leadership under which she lives is tyrannical.   
 If these considerations are on the right track, then there arises an important 
question: as Daniel Weinstock phrases it, “how should people who cannot vote, but 
who have a legitimate moral claim to representation within global institutions, be 
represented within such institutions?”252  
 Though Weinstock is concerned with global institutions in general, he makes a 
suggestion that is well worth considering in relation to the IMF and the WB.253  
Weinstock takes the domestic sphere as his starting point.  He notes that democracies 
contain a number of disenfranchised people, such as children and others who are 
judged to be incompetent.  “Though these people cannot vote, their interests are 
nonetheless represented by such institutions as youth protectors and public 
curators.”254  Weinstock suggests that something similar be pursued at the global level.  
He suggests that there should be “a global democratic sphere in which people who 
cannot select their own representatives are appointed trustees who ensure that 
decisions made at the global level take proper account of their interests.”255   
As Weinstock himself acknowledges, this suggestion raises at least two further 
questions.  First, there is the question of how these trustees should be chosen.  There is 
a danger that the West will simply appoint the trustees that serve the West’s interests 
best and who end up being poor representatives of their own people’s interests.  
Second, and related, there is the question of accountability.  How can we ensure that 
those who are appointed will represent the interests of their people? 
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 As an initial solution, Weinstock suggests the following.  Weinstock suggests 
that only those issues and policy areas that can be dealt with effectively at the global 
level are the responsibility of global institutions.  These include environmental 
protection, public health, and so on.  Weinstock suggests that in regards to these kinds 
of issues “there is a great deal of convergence between the interests of all the 
constituencies.”256  For example, “poor hygienic conditions that facilitate the 
transmission of infectious disease are a problem for all of us, wherever they occur.”257  
Presumably, global development and economic stability is an important matter for 
everyone as well.  Consequently, Weinstock thinks that the trustees will be motivated 
to act in the best interests of those they represent not because of altruism but because 
of intérêt bien compris.  Trustees will not neglect the interests of those they represent 
because their own interests are at stake as well.   
 In the end, I do not find this suggestion very satisfying.  Assume that the IMF 
and the WB, or institutions like them, can deal with global trade and finance 
effectively.  Even if this is the case, it doesn’t follow that interests are going to 
converge.  For example, what is best for the economy of one country will not 
necessarily be what is in the best interests of another country and may even harm the 
economy of another country.  In these cases, trustees may not see their ward’s interests 
as being the same as their own.  Consequently, they may not be motivated by the 
notion of intérêt bien compris.  If this is right, then it remains an open question as to 
how to ensure that trustees will represent the interests of their people.  This is not to 
say that we should not take up Weinstock’s suggestion of appointing trustees.  One 
point in favour of appointing trustees, even if we cannot ensure that they always act in 
the interests of their wards, is that, in general, we would at least be able to ensure that 
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their wards basic human rights are served by the decisions made on their behalf.  To 
this extent, a trustee still seems a better option than a malevolent dictator as a 
representative or no representative at all. 
 If appointed trustees would advance the interests of its wards (even generally), 
then I think that the trustees appointed to malevolent dictatorships should be given 
equal votes, for equal votes would protect (as far as is possible) the citizens of 
malevolent dictatorships from arbitrary interference from other nations (through the 
IMF and the WB).   
 Let us now turn to the matter of conditionality and whether loans with strong 
conditions should be granted to malevolent dictatorships.  My arguments only go so 
far as to suggest that there aren’t any good moral reasons against imposing strong loan 
conditions.  However, there may be good practical reasons for not imposing strong 
conditions on loans to malevolent dictators.  After all, currently, strong conditions 
have not guaranteed repayment or growth in borrowing countries, including dictatorial 
regimes.  Moreover, in, at least some cases, even with strong conditions, dictators 
have used the money for aggressive aims against their own people and others’.  So, 
given that the loan is unlikely to benefit people through the promotion of growth and 
stability and may even be used to harm them, it seems (and I say this tentatively) that 
we should deny such countries loans altogether.  This is an unfortunate conclusion 
(and one that I m hesitant to reach) because malevolent dictatorships tend to exist in 
the most impoverished and destitute countries, countries where people are already 
suffering and without money for growth and stability will continue to suffer.  
However, there seems to be little option. 
 In this section, I have given some suggestions about whether weighted voting 
and conditionality of loans are justified in the case of ndcs.  I outlined three different 
types of ndcs: decent consultative assemblies, benevolent dictators, and malevolent 
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dictators.  With respect to decent consultative assemblies and benevolent dictatorships, 
I suggested that weighted voting and conditionality of loans is not justified.  This is 
because some of the reasons given for rejecting weighted voting and conditionality of 
loans in the case of democratic countries apply in these cases as well.  However, since 
none of these reasons hold with respect to malevolent dictatorships, I argued that 
unequal votes and conditionality of loans is justified.  However, I also argued that, 
rather than excluding such countries entirely from voting processes, they should be 
represented in these processes by trustees.  I also tentatively suggested that since 
(strong) conditionality has not proven to be practicable and may tend to support the 
aggressive aims of such nations, malevolent dictatorships should be denied loans 
altogether.  
 158 
Part III 
Overcoming the Democracy Deficit in Global Institutions 
§1.  Timescales 
I have considered what I take to be the most plausible arguments for weighted 
voting and the conditionality of loans as implemented by the IMF and the WB 
currently, and I have tried to show that these arguments fail.  I would now like to end 
this dissertation by briefly outlining the issues that I find most pressing and the 
prospects that I find most promising in ending the democratic deficit within these 
institutions.  
 I have argued that current global financial institutions suffer from a democracy 
deficit.  The question that we must now consider is, what can be done to overcome this 
deficit of democracy?  In answering this question, I think there are two different time-
scales to consider when thinking about ways that global governance can be improved.  
First, there are projects aimed at reducing the democratic deficit that we can work 
toward now in the current generation.  Second, there are aims and projects that can 
only be pursued at some realistically hoped-for stage in future generations.  
The importance of the first time-scale seems obvious.  If we are concerned 
with the realization of justice, it is not enough to sit in judgment of the present 
structure.  We must also consider and be concerned with how things can change and 
what can be done towards establishing just international relations now.  But one might 
wonder, why focus on aims and goals that can only be pursued at some realistically 
hoped-for future stage?   Here, I follow Rawls in thinking that a vision of, what he 
calls, a realistic utopia plays an important role in political philosophy.  
On Rawls’s view, a political conception is utopian if it uses and appeals to 
“political (moral) ideals, principles, and concepts to specify the reasonably right and 
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just political and social arrangements for a Society of Peoples.”258  Rawls argues that 
there are two necessary conditions for a conception of justice to be realistic.  First, it 
must take people as they are (by the laws of nature).259  The second condition for a 
conception of justice to be realistic is that its principles and precepts be workable. 
I think my proposals meet the conditions for a realistic utopia.  This will 
become more evident as we proceed.  My arguments are utopian in the sense that they 
make use of and appeal to democratic values of self-respect, the exercise of the 
capacity for a conception of the good, and non-domination.  My arguments are also 
realistic in the two necessary senses.  First, my arguments take people as they are in 
the sense that they outline an order that is achievable by humans as they are, not as 
angels or other idealized beings.  This is not to say that the changes that need to be 
made will be easy, but rather that they are attainable.  Second, I think that the 
arrangements I argue for are workable.  This is evidenced by the fact that 
arrangements similar to those I argue for exist within the EU currently.   
I think the notion of a realistic utopia (or realistically hoped-for stage) is 
important for at least two reasons.  First, overcoming the flaws of the current order 
(domestic and global) is going to be difficult.  So, it seems important to have an ideal 
that inspires us and motivates us to persevere in changing the system.  Second, Rawls 
argues that a well-ordered society – which is part of a realistic utopia – is the right 
yardstick to apply to current domestic institutions.  On Rawls’s view, the conception 
of a well-ordered society helps us identify what needs to be changed.  It also gives us 
an order of priority in the sense that it helps us identify what changes are most 
important for justice: we begin with the most grievous as identified by the extent of 
deviation from a just society.260  I think something similar can be said of what I argue 
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for below.  In a sense, my arguments provide a recipe to the democratic kitchen of the 
future.  They provide a recipe for just global institutions and just relations between 
nations.  While we cannot at this point implement all of the things I describe, my 
arguments give us a basis for evaluating current relations and for making decisions 
about what needs to be changed most immediately.  
  
§2.  Current Generations 
Let us begin with what can be achieved by the current generation in current 
institutions.  It seems to me that the democracy deficit is something that cannot be 
overcome by institutions as they are now.  Rather, I think this is something that can be 
accomplished only after egalitarian measures in the economy have been taken and 
there is greater economic equality among nations. 
Consider again the establishment of the fair value of political liberty in the 
domestic sphere.  On Rawls’s view, and mine, this is a challenge to democracy that 
cannot be met by procedure.  Rather, he suggests, it can only be solved by something 
like state-subsidized financing of parties and election campaigns.  I argued earlier that 
even this non-procedural solution is not sufficient.  Even with the public financing of 
campaigns, the votes of the poor are still likely to have unequal worth.  I suggested 
that those with more resources will tend to have more leisure time available, more 
education, and will be more able to support lobbying efforts, all of which allow for 
more persuasive public expression of their views.  To this extent, the rich are still 
likely to have greater influence over elections and political debates.  As a better 
alternative, one that Rawls also seems sympathetic to, I suggested a different non-
procedural solution: egalitarian measures in the economy.  If there is no longer a 
concentration of cash in certain groups, then there will likely be rough equality in the 
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use of political influence and power.  Greater equality in wealth and income is most 
likely to support the fair value of political liberty.  
I think an analogous argument for taking up economic measures can be made 
at the international level.  At the international level, inequalities in wealth between 
countries are tantamount to inequalities in power and influence between countries.261  
So, if there was rough economic equality between countries participating in the IMF 
and the WB, then there would likely be equality in political power and influence.  This 
seems to support some kind of strong egalitarian measures, like a global difference 
principle, in the global economy.262  One way of satisfying the global difference 
principle is to instate a global taxation scheme.  As Tan notes, “such a taxation scheme 
would require ongoing transfers of wealth from the better off to the worst off.”263  In 
other words, wealth would be redistributed from individuals in richer countries to 
individuals in poor countries.  I do not, however, think that this is a plausible scheme.  
First, it isn’t clear that it would support the level of equality necessary for the fair 
value of political liberty (I suggested something similar in the domestic case as well).  
The difference principle allows for significant differences in wealth to occur.  If there 
are significant differences in wealth, then there will be significant differences in 
political influence.  So, something stronger than the difference principle may be 
required to secure the fair value of political liberty.  Second, there is a growing body 
of evidence that suggests that the benefits of foreign aid are rather limited.264  So, there 
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is good reason to think that any kind of direct redistribution of wealth is not likely to 
work.  What exactly is the best means of supporting global redistribution of wealth 
and global equality largely remains an open question.265 
 I have suggested that democratic values cannot be expressed by global 
institutions until there is greater economic equality among nations.  This, however, 
isn’t to say anything about current institutions and what course they should take.  The 
literature on globalization tends to support either of two options: (1) improving current 
institutions by taking up large scale reforms (within current institutions themselves)266 
or (2) completely dismantling current institutions.267  There is of course another 
option: (3) allowing institutions to exist as they are (that is, until the global 
environment is more apt for appropriate (i.e., democratic) reform).  I think my 
arguments so far suggest that (1) isn’t a viable option.  Until there is greater economic 
equality, I don’t think there are any reforms (like new policies or new procedures) that 
can end the democracy deficit within current institutions.  I also tend to think that (3) 
isn’t a good option either.  If we leave institutions as they are, then it is likely that the 
                                                                                                                                       
Effectiveness Disputed,” in Finn Tarp (ed.), Foreign Aid and Development (London: Routledge, 2000), 
pp. 103-128, Michael Clemens, Steven Radelet and Rikhil Bhavnani, “Counting Chickens When They 
Hatch: The Short Term Effects of Aid on Growth” (Center for Global Development, 2004), URL = 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=567241#PaperDownload>.  
265 For example, Richard Miller, in “Rising Temperatures and Declining Empire: The Morality and 
Politics of Greenhouse Gases” Unpublished Paper (Presented at the Ethics of Globalization and 
Development Conference, Cornell University (Sept 29-30, 2006)), argues that the US could meet its 
duties of relieving the burdens of needy people in developing countries by liberalizing labour, and 
significantly lessening its carbon emissions without demanding that countries in the developing world 
do so (at comparable levels) as well (p. 23).  Also, in “Feasible Globalization” (July 2002), URL = 
<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/Feasglob.pdf> and “How to Make the Trade Regime Work for 
Development,” (February 2004), URL = 
<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/How%20to%20Make%20Trade%20Work.pdf>, Dani Rodrik  
advocates a relaxing of restrictions on the international movement of workers through a temporary work 
visa program.  He estimates that this scheme would yield at least $200 billion annually for the citizens 
of developing countries. 
266 Robert Keohane (in “Governance in a Partially Globalized World,” American Political Science 
Review 95 (2001), pp. 1-13) and Stiglitz (in Making Globalization Work (particularly chapters 1-3)) 
both suggest that large scale reform is the way to overcome current flaws in global institutions. 
267 Walden Bello (in Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy (New York: Zed Books, 2002), 
pp. 107-118) argues that dismantling the current institutional apparatus, rather than taking up reforms, is 
the right response. 
 163 
US and other developed countries will continue to use the democracy deficit to their 
advantage and to push their own interests, while developing countries will continue to 
be disadvantaged and to have their interests subverted.  For these reasons, my 
inclination at this time is to think that (2) is the most plausible option.  I tend to think 
that, until there is greater economic equality among nations and democratic values are 
practicable, global financial institutions should be dismantled.   
If current institutions are dismantled, then there arises a further question: what 
is to be done in the mean time?  After all, countries, particularly poorer ones, will need 
loans for growth and development.  I think there are two main options here.   
One option is to set up regional banks to take the place of global ones.268  For 
example, as an alternative to the IMF and the WB, Hugo Chavez, the President of 
Venezuela, is trying to establish the Banco del Sur (the Bank of the South), a 
development bank for and funded by Latin American countries.  On the one hand, 
even within regions, there are significant differences in the economic status of 
countries.  In South Asia, India is a significant economic power in comparison to 
Bangladesh, for example.  In Latin America, Mexico is of significantly greater 
economic status than Bolivia and Nicaragua.  So, one worry is, because of these 
significant differences in economic status, regional institutions are likely to face many 
of the problems, relating to the democracy deficit, that international financial 
institutions do.  However, on the other hand, because countries within Latin America 
are more likely to have similar and joint interests – because of somewhat similar 
geographic locations, cultures, languages, economies, etc.- it seems that the interests 
of all Latin American countries are more likely to be met by regional institutions such 
as the Bank of the South than by global institutions such as the IMF and the WB.  
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Moreover, economic inequalities within regions, like Latin America, seem to be 
significantly less than across regions – less than, say, those between Latin America 
and North America or Europe.  In turn, though regional institutions are likely to face 
some problems, they seem much more hospitable to democratic values than global 
institutions.   
Another promising option is for countries to borrow from commercial banks.  
One problem comes to mind immediately.  The IMF and the WB give loans to 
developing countries at rates far below those available in the market; this is clearly of 
great advantage to poor countries that do not have a lot of money.  After all, lower 
interest rates mean that, over all, developing countries will pay much less in interest 
than they would have at higher interest rates; it also means that instalments (which are 
either quarterly or semi-annually) will be less as well.  However, unlike the IMF and 
the WB, because their main goal is to make a profit, commercial banks are quite 
unlikely to give loans at below market interest rates.  This is problematic for 
borrowing countries who may not be able to make payments at higher interest rates 
and, in turn may, not qualify for loans.  Higher interest rates are problematic even if 
countries do qualify for loans, for, overall, borrowing countries will have fewer funds 
(than they would have with the IMF and WB, for example) to invest in their own 
development and growth.   
On the other hand, higher interest rates may work to the advantage of 
borrowing countries.  Some have suggested that low interest rates actually encourage 
countries to take up risky economic policies and, because there is more at stake, that 
higher interest rates would deter countries from taking up such policies.  Furthermore, 
low interest rates may, in part, be what gives the IMF and the WB leverage over 
borrowing countries in loan negotiations.  The IMF and the WB are essentially the 
only organizations to offer below market interest rates on loans for development and 
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growth.  Because of their limited funds, borrowing countries are often desperate for 
loans at low interest rates.  In order to get these low rates, borrowing countries are 
willing, even when they do not agree with them, to take up IMF and WB loan 
conditions, conditions which usually tend to involve liberalization of the borrowing 
countries’ economies.  Lower interest rates are, in part, what seems to allow the IMF 
and the WB to get access to the economies of developing countries.  So, the fact that 
commercial banks would tend to offer at market rates might be desirable if it tends to 
reduce the leverage that lenders tend to have over them.  My thought is that if loans 
from commercial banks are given at higher interest rates, given that much more money 
will be at stake and this is something that borrowing countries tend to have little of, 
borrowing countries will tend to be more critical of the loan packages they receive and 
less likely to take up packages that they disagree with.  The stakes will be so high that 
borrowing countries will be motivated to take a more critical view of the loans they 
are offered.  In this way, because of higher interest rates, commercial banks will have 
less power (than the IMF and WB, for example) over borrowing countries.  So, while 
it is clear that commercial banking faces important problems, it seems to have strong 
benefits as well.  Given its strong benefits, I think that commercial banking should 
also be established in the place of global financial institutions.   
 I would like to conclude this section with a brief discussion of global social 
movements, for it seems to me that global social movements have an important part to 
play in the achievement of the various goals that have been described as part of 
decreasing the democracy deficit in current generations.269  A global social movement 
is an informal group of individuals, from many countries (developed and developing 
nations), who work together to achieve certain multinational goals, political and/or 
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social.  (The goals might mainly be goals within each country, so long as they are part 
of/steps to achieving some predominant multinational goal).  On Richard Miller’s 
view, examples of global social movements include the “international bunch of people 
who bash Bush, have opposed the Iraq war and occupation, seek to relieve inequities 
and burdens of globalization, call for more action against global climate change, or are 
concerned that what governments do to relieve poverty is too little or the wrong sort of 
thing.”270  Generally, governments are sensitive to and are often swayed by public 
opinion.  For example, as Miller notes, in the Vietnam era, “in the Pentagon Papers, 
outraged public opinion ranks with the provocation of Chinese or Russian intervention 
as the only reasons not to kill lots more Vietnamese in pursuit of victory.”271  This 
suggests that public opinion, as expressed through a social movement, can have real 
influence over the actions of governments.  My thought is that global social 
movements can have a similar influence in relation to ending the democracy deficit.  
Global social movements can and should work to encourage the governments (of both 
developed and developing) countries to take steps toward decreasing the global 
democracy deficit.  To this end, global social movements in current generations should 
have two main goals.   
The first goal is to encourage greater global economic equality.  Members of 
global social movements within the G-7 and the G-10, particularly, can work together 
to encourage economic powers to take up egalitarian measures, whatever they may 
turn out to be.  Even if we do figure out a plausible means of redistributing wealth, 
economic powers will still be reluctant to take up such a scheme.  More over, 
members of global social movements in developing countries can work together to 
encourage governments to behave responsibly and honestly, thus, allowing any 
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egalitarian measures taken by the economic powers to have full effect in developing 
countries.   
The second goal is to encourage the correction of the current institutional 
structure by supporting the dismantlement of the IMF and the WB.  This can be done 
in a variety of ways.  Walden Bello, for example, argues that global social movements 
could direct their efforts at encouraging the drastic shrinking of the power and 
jurisdiction of institutions like the IMF and the WB.272  He suggests that, in relation to 
the IMF, “a demand that has potential to unite a broad front of people is that of 
converting it into a research agency with no policy powers but one tasked with the job 
of monitoring global capital and exchange rate movements.”273  “In the case of the 
World Bank” he sees the most promise in “uniting with the demand to end its loan-
making capacity . . . coordinated with campaigns to boycott World Bank bonds, [and] 
deny new appropriations for the International Development Association [which is part 
of the WB].”274  Finally, Bello suggests that the main aim of global social movements 
should be the derailment of any further actions by institutions such as the IMF and the 
WB.275   On his view, global social movements should work together to prevent any 
further decisions from being made.  Global social movements must focus their 
energies on preventing agreements from coming about in any areas now being 
negotiated or about to be negotiated in institutions such as the IMF and the WB 
(presumably this would include preventing agreement on new issues of governance 
within these institutions, the negotiation of loan packages, etc.).276  On my view, 
global social movements cannot stop here.  If there are no other institutions to take 
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their place, then developing countries will suffer greatly, for they will not be able to 
get the money that they need for growth and development.  Thus, I would suggest that, 
as part of this second aim, global social movements should also work to encourage a 
shift to regional institutions and commercial banking. 
 Of course, questions about how democratic values can be expressed in global 
social movements arise.  In a sense, global social movements are not democratic.  The 
leadership of such groups is, at least currently, largely limited to those who are 
educated, English speaking, and have access to the internet (since the people who do 
the coordinating across borders are those with computers).  In other words, certain 
groups (like the educated elite) are disproportionately represented in global social 
movements.  So, while social movements may be the best method we have of 
encouraging economic powers to take up egalitarian measures and encouraging 
developing countries to stay honest and to be responsible, there is still an important 
question of how social movements can be more democratic that needs to be answered. 
 
§3.  Future Generations 
A further question arises: what is the most plausible level for democratic 
values to be put into effect in the global realm?  I have argued that current global 
institutions cannot overcome the democracy deficit.  But, if (as I have suggested) 
redistribution in wealth takes place, we will not always be where we are – i.e., there 
will not be, as there is now, such great disparity in the economic status of countries.  I 
do not think that all countries need to be as wealthy as the US for democratic values to 
be practicable at the global level.  However, it seems to me that we need to be close to 
this level.  Perhaps, the relationships between countries need to be like those within 
the EU.  Though the worst off in Greece are much worse off than those in Germany, 
Greece is much closer in economic status to Germany than most African and Latin 
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American countries are currently to the US.  When we consider the EU, it is evident 
that there is a rough balance of political power among countries.  This is likely the 
result of the closeness in economic status of the countries in the EU.  In short, once 
countries across the world have reached levels of wealth that are comparative to those 
in the EU, global financial institutions such as the IMF and the WB will be better able 
to express democratic values and can be reinstated.  If regional institutions and 
commercial banking have already been instituted, then international institutions would 
just serve as an additional option for borrowing.  
The next matter to consider is how the design and structure of international 
institutions can be faithful to democratic values and principles.  One option, modelled 
after the domestic sphere, is to implement a world government – i.e., a centralized 
political authority with the legal powers normally possessed by central governments – 
and institutions such as the IMF and the WB would function as independent world 
government agencies (just as the Fed is an independent government agency in the 
domestic sphere).  
Most thinkers have not been in favour of a world government.  Typically it is 
suggested that a world government is neither feasible nor desirable.  Yet, at first 
thought, it might not be entirely clear why this is thought to be so.  Let us begin with 
the claim about feasibility.  Critics have often argued that the lack of a common 
language will make political deliberation at the global level more difficult.  It is not 
clear, however, to what extent this worry still exists.  One might argue that English 
(more than 50 countries have it as their official language) and perhaps French 
(approximately 30 countries, though rather small and poor, have French listed as their 
official language) are emerging as something like world languages and could be used 
in political deliberations.277  One might respond at this point: while this may be true, it 
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is important to remember that there are only a small number of countries where the 
majority of citizens speak English and French fluently.  In most cases, these languages 
are not spoken by all, but are spoken only by the elite.  If this is true, then average 
people would be not be able to participate in global politics (i.e., running for office, 
etc.).  So, perhaps English and French are not common enough to be used in political 
deliberations, but there do seem to be other ways of getting around differences in 
languages.  For example, as in the EU, important documents could be published in the 
official languages of all member countries, all meetings could be simultaneously 
translated into these official languages, and so on.278  This would allow a greater level 
of participation in global politics, even among those who speak very different 
languages.  
 Others have worried about the lack of geographical proximity and how this 
might make political deliberation at the global level more difficult.  This worry seems 
less significant in the face of modern technology.  With modern means of travel, 
particularly air travel, it is fairly easy to travel to different countries.  The internet and 
cellular phones also make it much easier to be in constant contact with people from 
around the world.  All of these things make the global environment more conducive to 
the kind of communication that is necessary for democratic politics.   
Let us now to turn to the worry about the undesirability of a world government.  
Following Kant, Rawls worries that any world government would be a global 
despotism.279  If this is true, then we can see why world government would be 
undesirable.  But given (as is currently the case with the EU) that there is no dominant 
economic power at this point in the future, it is not clear that this worry would exist.  
One might still worry that some would have superior military power – but again if the 
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economic status of nations is equal or closer to equal then all nations roughly have the 
same capability for military power.  Again, it is not clear that the worry about global 
hegemony exists once countries have reached comparatively similar economic status. 
All of this said, there are still good reasons for thinking that a world 
government is neither feasible nor desirable.  The main reason is that it is doubtful that 
a global order under a world government would be stable.  I will briefly outline five 
worries that call into question the stability of the world order under a world 
government. 
One worry is that a world government – assuming that it is democratic – would 
require agreement among the countries of the world on a vast number of issues.  But 
reaching conclusive decisions will be difficult because there will tend to be no 
coherent public opinion.  Given that people have their own distinct cultures, people are 
unlikely to share the same views on the structure of global society.  They are likely to 
have different views about what constitutes the public good at the global scale.  This 
means that reaching conclusive decisions is going to be very difficult, and without 
agreement, the world order cannot be stable.     
Another worry is (and this is related to some of what was said above) that a 
world government is unlikely to be stable because of the lack of a shared identity 
among participants.  The worry is that, even if general agreement can be reached, the 
members of countries participating in a global government will not be motivated to 
adhere to the outcomes of democratic decision-making when it requires a significant 
sacrifice on their part.  Typically, in a domestic society, it is thought that a sense of 
belonging to a shared community motivates the sacrifice of one’s own interests.  The 
idea is that members of a domestic society relate with one another, they feel a sense of 
community and belonging with one another on the basis of a shared territory, culture, 
and history.  This sense of belonging motivates the sacrifice of one’s own interests and 
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will, in general, help to resolve political conflicts and problems.  In the global case, 
this notion of community or sense of belonging seems unlikely.  Because of differing 
geographies, cultures, and histories, there would be no coherent sense of community 
or shared identity among those participating in a world government.  In turn, it seems 
unlikely that all participants will comply with decisions and that the world order 
would be unstable.  
Another worry – raised by Kant – is that a world government would be 
soulless.  Kant writes: 
the idea of international law presupposes the separate existence of independent neighboring  
states.  Although this condition is itself a state of war (unless federative union prevents the  
outbreak of hostilities), this is rationally preferable to the amalgamation of states under one 
superior power, as this would end in one universal monarchy, and laws always lose in vigor 
what government gains in extent; hence a condition of a soulless despotism falls into anarchy 
after stifling seeds of good.280  
Unlike national politics, world politics takes place at a distance and is far removed 
from citizens and their daily lives.  Kant’s worry is that, because of this distance, the 
laws that are enacted and enforced by a world government will lose their grip on the 
people.  People will find it difficult to loyally support such a government and to 
willingly adhere to its laws.     
 Another problem arises from the fact that a world government would be so far 
removed from the people.  The distance of a world government makes it hard for it to 
be sensitive to the needs and interests of the people.  It is rather difficult for people to 
support a regime that ignores their interests and needs while also maintaining their 
sense of self-respect.  Insofar as citizens are moved to maintain their self-respect, they 
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will be not be moved to support a regime that undermines their sense of self-respect.  
Again, this suggests that the world order might not be stable.   
Finally, as Rawls notes, a central worry is that the empire, under a world 
government, would be fragile and “would be torn by frequent civil strife as various 
regions and peoples tried to gain their political freedom and autonomy.”281  Citizens 
have an interest in collectively choosing and implementing their own conceptions of 
the public good.  This means that they need sufficient room to choose and to 
implement their own laws and social practices.  Insofar as a world government 
conflicts with this higher-order interest (in the sense that it hands down laws and 
practices), it is likely that citizens would not willingly support such a global order and, 
because this is such a central interest, would be motivated to act against it.   
There is, however, a need for some coordination of multinational activity.  This 
is because, in the modern world, there are deep and unavoidable interdependencies 
among the world’s people.  Military, environmental, and economic issues are the most 
obvious examples.   
Military: Interstate rivalries and the threat and use of force have a deep and 
pervasive impact on all the world’s people.  The further proliferation of biological, 
chemical, and nuclear weapons coupled with interstate rivalries make the possibility of 
devastating wars a reality, putting us all at risk.282  These issues raise important 
questions: How can we protect ourselves and others from the threat of nuclear and 
chemical war? Should we engage in programs of disarmament or is it better to take up 
no first use policies, for example?   
                                                
281 LP, p. 36. 
282 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), pp. 181-
182. 
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Environment: As Iris Marion Young points out, environmental damage and 
sustainability are global in their implications.283  If the ozone layer thins, it affects all 
of us.  Pollutants that enter the air and water transcend national boundaries.  Global 
warming also has a pervasive impact on all of us.  These matters raise important 
questions about the regulation of the global environment: for example, given the fact 
that people in historically rich developed countries have had the chance to use natural 
resources and to pollute the environment, what is a fair distribution of burdens and 
benefits in the global environment?284 
Economy: In the modern world, trade is inevitable, for few countries can 
produce all of the things they need.  As we have seen, trade can have tremendous 
effects on the life prospects of citizens.  For example, as Young notes, “a change in the 
value of currency or interest rates within one country often has ripple effects on the 
financial markets of the whole world.  Commodity prices on the world market are 
determined by the interactions of many agents across borders.”285  Moreover, even at 
this economically advanced stage, some countries are still going to need loans of large 
amounts to grow and to develop and to ensure economic stability – something that is 
important to global financial markets and, in turn, to the life prospects of all citizens.  
There are important questions about who should receive such loans, for what kinds of 
projects, and so on. 
In short, some form of collective decision-making is necessary because we will 
need to establish and enforce principles and standards regarding peace and security 
(i.e., the conduct of war), the protection of basic human rights, and the protection of 
the global environment (this might include things like the Kyoto Protocal).  We will 
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also need to establish and implement principles and standards of justice governing 
economic interactions and trade as well as other cooperative institutions such as global 
lending institutions such as the IMF and the WB.  
These considerations support some kind of centralized decision-making.  The 
military, environmental, and economic matters that I described have a deep and 
pervasive impact on the life prospects of all the world’s people.  In order to insure that 
their interests are taken into account and that they are not dominated, all affected 
people should be included in decisions that have a deep and pervasive impact on their 
lives.  
That said, it doesn’t follow that everyone (all member countries and their 
representatives) should decide all matters together.  There are a few reasons for 
reaching this conclusion: First, because of the burdens that would be placed on 
individuals, it isn’t desirable for everyone to get together and decide every issue.  It 
would simply be too time consuming.  Second, as Pogge points out, in many cases, 
outsiders are more likely to lack the needed knowledge and sensitivities to make good 
judgments.  Pogge suggests that “the only practicable and moral way of delimiting 
those who are capable of such judgments is by rough geographical criteria.”286  Third, 
some issues relating to those I mentioned such as the military, the environment, and 
the economy only affect one or a few countries and their citizens.   
Fourth, there is a real worry of how to keep those who are part of global 
decision-making bodies from forming a separate identity that separates them from 
those they are supposed to represent.  There is a worry about the capacity of members 
of the decision-making body to take de facto control of global decision-making and 
institutions.  Of course, this is a worry in any modern political society, but – because 
of the amount of power at stake, and the distance of international institutions from 
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those that it represents – it seems an especially acute danger in an international 
decision-making body.  So, resolving the worry is a matter of determining how we can 
ensure that decision-makers won’t have the capacity to dominate those they are 
supposed to represent, that is, that they won’t have the power to interfere arbitrarily in 
the lives of citizens of member countries.  In the end, I think that this will always be a 
worry, at both the domestic and the international level.  Even with the right procedures 
(regular elections and transparency in decision-making, for example) and greater 
economic equality, there will always be potential for decision-makers to take de facto 
control over decision-making.  That said, I think that we can at least mitigate the 
worry somewhat by dispersing decision-making authority.  Decision-making should 
be decentralized away from the currently dominant state decision-making and away 
from possible international decision-making.  In other words, improving domestic and 
global governance requires gains in local autonomy.  This would ensure that too much 
decision-making power does not lie at any particular level (it would reduce the amount 
of power at stake at any decision-making level) and would bring politics as close to 
the people as is feasible (I say as is feasible because some – perhaps even many – 
decisions are still going to have to be made at the state, regional, and global levels).  
As Pogge suggests, “there should be a number of political units of various sizes, 
without anyone political unit being dominant.”287  Decision-making power should be 
widely dispersed over neighbourhoods, towns, countries, provinces, states, regions, 
and the world at large.  
There is then a need for both centralization (going above the level of the state) 
and decentralization (going below the level of the state), but for the reasons just 
mentioned decision-making should normally be as decentralized as possible.  
Decision-making should be centralized only when there is a conflict between countries 
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or when matters affect several or all countries together (i.e., when they are global in 
scale).     
Even in cases where all (or some of) the countries of the world are affected by 
some issues, it doesn’t follow that all affected countries should participate in decision-
making.  The EU is perhaps the closest example of a Society of Peoples that is in 
practice now.  Members of the EU are very careful about deciding who they allow to 
the join the EU and to participate in collective decision-making.  In essence, the EU 
only allows countries to join if they have a sufficient commitment to liberal values.  
But what does it mean to have such a commitment, particularly at the global level?  
What should the criteria for membership in a global Society of Peoples be? 
I cannot here fully argue for such a criteria, though I will try to highlight some 
that are particularly important for those committed to liberal values and democratic 
relations.  I see the following criteria as a minimum standard that must be met to be 
considered in good standing and to be considered for membership in the Society of 
Peoples.  My account is very much indebted to Rawls’s vision of a realistic utopia as 
outlined in his Law of Peoples. 
 It seems that any liberal criteria would include at least the following five 
conditions.288   
(1) A member country must guarantee the rule of law, which is essential to the 
protection of the social order and basic liberties.   
(2) A member country must not have aggressive aims toward other nations, 
must be willing and have the ability to take on the obligations of membership, 
including adherence to all policy decisions.   
                                                
288 The actual criteria of membership in the EU is the Copenhagen Criteria. See Europa, “Glossary: 
Accession Criteria,” URL = 
<http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm>. 
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(3) A member country must guarantee certain basic human rights.  Rawls 
suggests that among basic human rights are the right to life – that is, the right to the 
means of subsistence and security; the right to liberty – that is, to freedom from 
slavery, serfdom, forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of 
conscience to ensure freedom of religion and thought.289  The guarantee of most of 
these rights makes sense from a democratic point of view in the sense that, if people 
don’t have these rights, it would be quite difficult for citizens to have an effective and 
meaningful role in political life.  This is not to say that this is the best or even primary 
justification for such rights, but rather that they are essential from a democratic point 
of view as well as others.     
(4) A member country must guarantee respect for and protection of minorities’  
interests and rights.  All citizens, including women and members of other minority 
groups (i.e., ethnic, religious, linguistic, indigenous, etc.) must be ensured the same 
basic rights as others and should be able to enjoy them without discrimination.  
Moreover, insofar as we are concerned with the establishment of democratic relations 
for all citizens, including minorities, other rights (that go beyond basic human rights) 
protecting other fundamental interests will also need to be protected.  I will say more 
about this later.290  
(5) A member country’s government must be sufficiently consistent with the 
values of global democracy.  Ideally countries would be constitutional democracies as 
this would promote global democracy to the highest degree, but the minimum 
threshold for meeting this condition is significantly weaker than what is required to be 
respected as a fully just nation within the Society of Peoples (I say more about what is 
required to be a fully just nation with respect to democratic governance below).  Why 
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is this?  It seems to me that even if countries are not internally (or domestically) 
democratic (in the sense of being a constitutional democracy), they could still be 
hospitable to global democracy and its underlying values.   
Though I am sceptical that there could ever be a genuine decent consultative 
assembly, it seems clear that if there was it would be congenial to the values of global 
democracy, even though it is not in itself fully democratic.  Decent consultative 
hierarchies are not aggressive toward other countries.  They are also respectful of 
human rights.  Furthermore, they are such that they give citizens a substantial role in 
making political decisions. The government is in direct consultation with the citizens 
through assemblies representing various groups, including minority groups, in society.  
Through this consultative procedure, the assemblies can express political dissent and 
the government has an obligation to take this dissent seriously, to provide a 
conscientious reply, and to make institutional changes where necessary.  In other 
words, the government is responsive to the views of the people.  There is real 
opportunity for change. 
Like a constitutional democracy, a decent consultative assembly seems 
consistent with global values of democracy.  Citizens play an effective and meaningful 
role in political decision-making. They are able to exercise their two moral powers 
through responsive consultations with the government.  Through such consultations, 
the government works to implement aims and ends that are consistent with citizens 
preferred conception of the common good.  To this extent, citizens’ interest in 
exercising their capacity for a conception of the common good is satisfied.  Moreover, 
the government’s commitment to responsive consultations ensures that the decisions 
of the government track the interests of the people; this reduces the risk of domination 
in global decision-making.  Finally, insofar as citizens’ interests are going to be 
tracked and citizens are able to exercise their moral powers to a fair degree, citizens 
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will be able to maintain some sense of self-respect (though not a full sense; this is only 
possible within a constitutional democracy). 
 Turning to benevolent dictators, I think some of what I have argued earlier is 
relevant here.  Recall that benevolent dictatorships are not aggressive toward other 
nations, respect human rights, but do not grant their people a meaningful role in 
politics.  Though again I am very sceptical of there being such a thing or of our being 
able to know that there is,291 assuming that there was a benevolent dictator and that we 
could know this to be the case, there seems to be at least some reason for allowing 
membership to benevolent dictatorships (perhaps like Prussia under Frederick the 
Great).292  Because of our tendency toward partiality and because of distance, it is 
difficult for outsiders to understand and to weigh appropriately the different interests 
of people.  So, given that the government sincerely wishes to and generally does 
promote the interests of its citizens, if we wish to ensure that the interests of citizens of 
ndcs are given equal consideration in global decision-making, that they are not 
dominated in global decision-making, it seems best to include a benevolent 
dictatorship in the Society of Peoples.   
 In contrast, it seems fairly clear that malevolent dictatorships do not meet the 
minimum threshold and are not to be considered in good standing.  Malevolent 
dictatorships do not allow their citizens any meaningful role in politics; they 
systematically violate the human rights of their own citizens and are aggressive toward 
other nations.  In turn, its people are not able to exercise their two moral powers 
(given that they are already not able to exercise the second moral power, excluding 
them from global decision-making would not thwart their interest in exercising this 
power) nor are they able to ensure that their interests are pursued (which would leave 
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them open to being dominated at the global level).  Moreover, a malevolent state is not 
respectful of other nations’ independence and has a tendency towards war with other 
nations.  Consequently, malevolent dictatorships are a threat to a stable and peaceful 
global order.  For all of these reasons, it seems clear that denying membership to a 
malevolent dictatorship would not be inconsistent with global democratic values.   
 Yet, as I argued earlier, in order to ensure that they are not dominated (to 
ensure that their interests are given equal consideration), we must ensure that the 
citizens of malevolent dictatorships are somehow represented in global decision-
making.  Though this solution is far from perfect, I suggested that perhaps citizens of 
malevolent dictatorships should be represented through trustees appointed to make 
decisions on their behalf.   
 One might argue that my criteria will permit nations that shouldn’t be 
permitted, namely, nations that are not fully just or not fully liberal.  For example, in 
theory, it would allow certain decent consultative assemblies and certain benevolent 
dictators to become part of the Society of Peoples.  Imagine a decent consultative 
assembly or a benevolent dictatorship that provides an institutional basis for protecting 
the basic human rights of its citizens, and respects the civic order and integrity of other 
peoples (i.e., is not aggressive).  A decent consultative assembly or benevolent 
dictatorship of this sort would make the cut, so to speak.  
I do not see this as a failing of my view.  If a decent consultative assembly or a 
benevolent dictatorship meets the threshold for democracy along with the other 
conditions, it isn’t clear that they would be any more unjust or illiberal than most other 
nations.  Most nations in the world will fail to meet the conditions for being fully 
liberal and fully just in one way or another.  Indeed, most nations in the world will fail 
to meet the conditions for being fully democratic.  To be considered a fully just and 
fully liberal nation, the country would need to be democratic to an extremely high 
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degree.  This means that all citizens must have equal political liberties – i.e., the rights 
to hold public office and to vote – and their fair worth.  In order for citizens to have 
equal political liberty and its fair worth, there will need to be a fair equality of 
opportunity, especially in education and training.  Otherwise, as Rawls notes, “all 
parts of society cannot take part in debates of public reason or contribute to social and 
economic policies.”293  For similar reasons (as I’ve already mentioned), there will also 
need to be a decent distribution of income and wealth.  Other arrangements to ensure 
that minorities are able to have a meaningful and effective role in politics will also be 
necessary – such as districting and public financing of political campaigns.  This is a 
high standard to meet.  It is likely that, even in the realistic future, countries such as 
the US will fall well below these standards, the standards that are required for a fully 
just and fully liberal society.  In turn, allowing a decent consultative assembly or a 
benevolent dictatorship membership in the Society of Peoples seems no more 
problematic or objectionable than allowing membership to a country such as the US.  
Because of the extreme difficulty of implementing fully democratic institutions, it 
seems permissible to allow countries to join the Society of Peoples as long as they 
pass the significantly weaker conditions for democratic governance (assuming they 
meet the other conditions as well).  After all, the criteria I presented above is not 
meant to be a criteria for fully just or fully liberal nations.  It is a matter of what is at 
minimum required for justice and what is realistically achievable (the criteria for 
human rights is also well below what would be required for a fully liberal and just 
society).  This is because, as part of constructing a conception of just international 
relations that is part of a realistic utopia, it is important to have a membership criteria 
that can be realistically achieved by nations in the future.  To set the threshold for 
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democratic relations (or for protection of human rights) at the level of the fully just 
and fully liberal is simply not realistic, as most nations would not be able to meet it.  
 
§3.1 Voting Procedures 
Questions of procedure and policy become important at this point in my 
argument: if centralized decision-making is going to be implemented (in the future), 
then we need to address the questions of how votes should be distributed, how 
decisions should be made, and what form loans (from lending agencies such as the 
IMF and the WB) should take. 
Let us begin with the questions of voting procedures, that is, the questions of 
how votes should be distributed and how decisions should be reached within a Society 
of Peoples.  If global institutions are to be restored (in the future), then these are 
particularly important matters.  For even with rough economic equality, voting 
procedures have an impact on fair value.  If, for example, weighted voting was put 
into practice, then countries with fewer votes would still not have as influential and 
effective of a voice as those with more votes.  So, we have to determine what the best 
way of allocating votes is.  
 I think the arguments given throughout this dissertation can be extended in 
various ways so as to rule out most kinds of weighted voting.  So, taking our lead from 
the domestic case where votes are distributed equally and each citizen or voter is given 
one vote, one possibility that seems obviously democratic and contrary to weighted 
voting is to give each country an equal number of votes and to give one vote to each 
country.  I also think that something like this is suggested by my arguments in earlier 
sections regarding freedom as non-domination.  Decisions of global institutions 
profoundly affect the life prospects of citizens of all member countries.  To ensure that 
the interests of all are taken into equal consideration, it seems to me that all member 
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countries should have an equal say in these decisions.294   
 There is also the further question of how decisions are to be reached.  One 
option is to seek a consensus in decision-making.  I suggested earlier that this is not a 
compelling approach within the domestic realm.  For similar reasons, I also think that 
this is not a compelling approach in the international realm.  First, this does not seem 
to be a viable option, since consensus among a number of very different countries is 
unlikely.  Second, consensus decision-making isn’t consistent with democratic values 
of equal worth.  Insofar as the minority has veto power, consensus decision-making 
gives the minority a more influential say than the majority.  The minority can veto any 
decision, even when the majority agrees about what route to take.  This gives the 
minority too much influence over the political process, for if there is a well-entrenched 
minority that consistently blocks the majority, the majority is at risk of losing 
predictably and persistently with respect to their interests.  This is not consistent with 
citizens’ sense of self-respect.  I believe that similar arguments apply in the case of 
super-majorities as well. 
 What about majority rule?  I suggested above, when discussing the domestic 
case, that even this option faces a problem, namely the problem of persistent 
minorities.  While persistent minorities are a problem at the state level, Christiano 
suggests, that they pose an even greater problem at the international level: 
The larger the constituency, the larger the chances are that particular minorities would simply 
get lost in the democratic decision making. To be sure, not all minorities would be lost since 
some of them could make common cause with others on the larger global scale.  And 
presumably global democratic institutions would have to be ruled by coalitions of different 
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groups each of which is a minority on its own.  Still in a world as diverse as the one we live 
in, it seems hard to imagine that there will not be large portions of humanity that will find 
themselves not part of any winning coalition for significant periods of time. We see this 
already in modern states where the level of diversity is generally considerably smaller than the 
world overall.295 
Of course, as Christiano himself points out, not all minority groups will be subject to 
persistent and predictable loss; some minority groups will be able to join forces and to 
make common cause with others on a global scale.  In current institutions (particularly 
because of the voting power of the G-7 and the US veto), developing countries have 
suffered from persistent and predictable loss.  But this is unlikely to be a concern at 
the future point that we are considering.  Given that there is rough economic equality 
between countries participating in the IMF and the WB, there will likely be equality in 
political power and influence among these countries.  In other words, at this future 
stage, there would be enough global economic equality for countries to have an 
equally effective and influential say.  Moreover, it seems that if we did take up a more 
democratic distribution of votes – like one vote one country – it is unlikely that those 
who were previously considered developing countries would continue to lose out so 
persistently and predictably.  This is because “developing countries” could form 
coalitions with one another.  That said, as Christiano suggests, even with one vote one 
country, it still seems likely that there will be portions of humanity that will find 
themselves not part of any winning coalition for significant periods of time.296  Small 
groups of people with distinct interests such as indigenous and tribal people, and 
people of rare religious affiliation, for example, might be ignored because they can 
find no larger group of people to form a coalition with.  It seems then that because of 
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the possibility of persistent minorities, even at the international level, and perhaps 
particularly at the international level, democratic values may not be appropriately 
expressed in one voter one vote winner take all majorities.   
 In the end, as in the domestic case, majority rule is a more plausible route than 
consensus decision-making.  First, since it does not rely on unanimity, it is practically 
feasible.  Second, in contrast to consensus decision-making (and supermajority 
decision-making), majority rule ensures that the majority is protected from persistent 
and predictable loss.  Even if there is an entrenched minority, the majority is not at 
risk of losing predictably and persistently.  Third, while majority rule still faces an 
important problem with respect to minorities and their facing persistent and 
predictable loss, this is something that can be corrected.   
As I have mentioned, there are two kinds of losses that are likely with majority 
rule: loss with respect to fundamental interests and persistent and predictable loss with 
respect to legitimate (though not fundamental) interests.  So, as in the domestic case, I 
think the first step in correcting majority rule is to institute a bill of rights to protect 
citizens’ fundamental interests, interests that are essential to the exercise of the two 
moral powers of citizens.  This would take fundamental interests off the bargaining 
table.  It would, for example, protect citizens’ ability to implement their conceptions 
of the good in fundamental areas such as religion and morality.  This means it would 
basically include basic civil liberties (including freedom of association and freedom of 
expression).  However, in its protections, it seems to me that it should go further than 
this.  For example, it should protect another fundamental interest that I mentioned 
earlier, namely the right to meaningful work.  Because they also seem central to the 
exercise of the two moral powers and a secure sense of self-respect, other rights such 
as the right to equal opportunity, basic health care, an adequate standard of living for 
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oneself (and one’s family), provision of education and training, and so on might also 
be included.  
There is, however, a question of how far to go, that is, of how much to include 
in this bill of rights.  Some might wish to include something like a general right to 
gender equality, a right to gender equality in all spheres.  As part of this right, 
practices like arranged marriage and dowry would be ruled out, for example.  I do not 
have a fully worked out explanation for this claim, but I think including a right to 
freedom from arranged marriage and dowry would be going too far.  While it seems 
important for the (global) bill of rights to include a right to gender equality in the 
political sphere, it isn’t clear that it should include a right to gender equality in all 
spheres.   
In the domestic sphere, firms, individuals, and associations are bound by 
constraints that arise indirectly from the just background institutions within which 
such associations and groups exist.  But the constraints they are subject to are such 
that they leave individuals and associations free to act effectively in pursuit of their 
ends without excessive limitation.  This is to allow individuals and associations room 
to exercise their second moral power, that is, to pursue their own ends within the 
framework of the basic structure.  I think similar reasons may apply in the global case 
as well.  Peoples should be open to interference insofar as it is necessary to secure 
background global justice.  However, peoples should be free from any further 
interference so that they can freely pursue their own collectively decided upon ends.  
These considerations help to explain why including a right to gender equality in all 
spheres does not seem permissible, while including a right to equality in public life 
does.  For global background justice to be realized, it seems important for women to 
have equal access to the political realm (this seems particularly true from the 
perspective of democratic values).  This would be the minimum amount of 
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interference necessary to secure background global justice.  (I think similar things can 
be said of freedom of conscience and some of the other things I mentioned.)  
However, any more interference than this would constitute too much of an interference 
in what peoples do.  Including the abolishment of arranged marriage and the dowry 
system in a bill of rights, seems too intrusive because it interferes with the ability of 
Indian citizens, for example, to collectively implement social practices and institutions 
of their own choosing.297  As part of their collective interest in the exercise of the 
second moral power, the citizens of India need sufficient room to collectively choose 
and to implement a conception of the public good that is genuinely their own. 
Once an appropriate bill of rights is established, there would also need to be 
some kind of judiciary, or Supreme Court, to interpret and enforce these rights.  In the 
EU, for example, the European Court of Justice (ECJ or simply the Court), serves this 
purpose.  It enforces law that the EU establishes for itself and for its member states.  It 
also ensures that institutions within the EU conform with EU law.  The Court is 
composed of one judge per member state – i.e., all 27 members are represented within 
the court.  “For the sake of efficiency, however, the Court rarely sits as the full court. 
It usually sits as a ‘Grand Chamber’ of just 13 judges or in chambers of five or three 
judges.”298  All judges meet the qualifications necessary for appointment to the highest 
judicial positions in their native countries. They are appointed on the basis of 
agreement between all members of the EU.  It seems to me that something similar 
could work in the case of the Society of Peoples (the Supreme Court of the Society of 
Peoples could be composed of one judge per member country, etc.).   
                                                
297 I use the example of India because this is where the practices of arranged marriage and dowry are 
prevalent. 
298 Europa, “The Court of Justice,” URL = <http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/justice/index_en.htm>. 
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Assuming that such a court could be established, there is a further question 
concerning enforcement: How are the decisions of such a court to be enforced?299  For 
example, would enforcement require a military? It seems not.  In the EU, for example, 
compliance with court rulings is very high, even though there is no military to enforce 
decisions of the Court.  In part, compliance with these rulings is motivated by the 
threat of penalty.  If the Court finds that a member has failed to fulfil its obligations 
under EU law, the Court may impose a significant fine on that member.  In theory, 
though this has never in fact occurred in the EU, the ultimate penalty for failure to 
comply with EU law is exclusion from the EU.  If, for example, a member state 
continuously violates EU law or fails to pay its fines, then presumably it could be 
expelled from the EU.  Penalties could also include trade sanctions.  For example, 
rather than being expelled, errant countries could be prohibited from engaging in 
certain kinds of trade with other member countries.  The threat posed by this kind of 
sanction to the economy of the member country would likely be enough to motivate 
compliance.  I believe that similar methods could work in the case of a Society of 
Peoples.  A military would not be essential for the enforcement of Supreme Court 
Rulings.  
Once an appropriate bill of rights is established and enforced, it would ensure 
that people cannot persistently lose out with respect to their fundamental interests.  
This would go a long way toward tempering majority rule.  However, the possibility 
                                                
299 When member countries are democratic, members are more likely to be motivated to comply with 
the rulings of the court than they would be if they were not democratic.  Insofar as the citizens of 
member countries participate in decision-making, via judges that they have elected, they are more likely 
to see the judgments of the Court as being their own, as being the result of their efforts and intelligent 
reflection about the common good.  In turn, they are more likely to compel their governments to adhere 
to decisions.  Even so, there will still be a worry about compliance and enforcement of rulings.  For 
even if people are more motivated to follow the rulings of the court under democratic arrangements 
than they would be otherwise, this does not guarantee compliance. A member country might not comply 
for reasons of self-interest or perhaps for reasons of genuine and wholehearted disagreement with the 
decisions.  So, the question of enforcement, of how to ensure compliance, still arises.  Moreover, not all 
members of the Society of Peoples are democratic and so there will not always be a sense of ownership 
to motivate compliance.  
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that peoples can still lose out with respect to their legitimate (though not fundamental) 
interests still exists.  In order to protect citizens from predictable and persistent loss 
with respect to their other legitimate interests, as in the domestic case, two legislative 
chambers should be established.   
The European Union (EU) presents us with a plausible model that is a 
supranational analogue to the domestic model that I argued for earlier (in part I).  The 
EU has two legislative chambers: the Council of the European Union and the 
European Parliament.  Legislation passed by the Council and the Parliament deals with 
issues that are of concern to all members of the EU, including matters relating to 
foreign policy, environmental policy, agricultural policy, military and security policy, 
trade, monetary policy, membership in the EU, the annual budget, patent law, 
copyright law, and so on.  The Council represents individual member states and has 27 
members (one per state).  The representatives from each member state vary by topic.  
If trade is on the agenda, then countries will be represented by their Trade Ministers 
(who, in turn, are chosen by elected officials) in the Council.  If agriculture is on the 
agenda, then Agricultural Ministers will make up the Council.  And so on.  The 
European Parliament represents the citizens of the EU.  There are 785 Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs), which are directly elected.  Seats in the European 
Parliament are allocated in accordance with the principle of degressive 
proportionality.300  Under this principle, the population of each country is taken into 
account in the allotment of seats, but smaller states are allotted more seats than would 
be strictly justified by their populations.  Unfortunately, since the number of seats 
allocated to a country has arisen from treaty negotiation, there isn’t any strict formula 
for allocating seats according to degressive proportionality.  But the main idea is to 
                                                
300 European Parliament, “Future distribution of EP seats among EU Member States,” URL = 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/background_page/008-10268-253-09-37-901-
20070910BKG10267-10-09-2007-2007-false/default_p001c001_en.htm>. 
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base seat allocation on population (in the sense that countries with a greater population 
get more seats), but that “member states accept fewer seats than they would receive if 
the total were divided exactly in proportion to population, in order to allow for better 
representation of less-densely populated states.”301  For example, the UK, with a 
population of 58.7 million, has 78 seats while Ireland, with a population of 4.2 
million, has 13 seats.  Some countries, such as the UK, France, and Italy, are 
represented in the European Parliament on the basis of regions.  For example, the UK 
is divided into ten different regions (South East England, South West England, etc.).302  
According to the size of its population, each region in the UK has from 3 to 10 MEPs.   
Other countries, such as Belgium, are divided into linguistic regions (Dutch-speaking, 
French-speaking, German-speaking).  The regions, whether geographic or linguistic, 
are supposed to be roughly of equal population.  I think the Society of Peoples should 
be organized in a similar manner.   
 While the scheme I have argued for so far will ensure that all countries play an 
influential role in decision-making and that they are not ignored, there are still some 
groups of people – such as indigenous people and other minorities – that might be 
ignored in international decision-making.  These people tend to be the worst-off in 
society and the negative effects of globalization have had perhaps the most profound 
effect on their life prospects.  To ensure that their interests are not ignored, 
representatives in the second chamber should be allotted to countries on the basis of 
equally populated regions or districts.  To protect minorities against persistent and 
predictable loss (as well as domination), districts should be drawn so that they are 
conscious of minority representation.  So, there should be something like majority-
                                                
301 Ibid., URL = <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/background_page/008-10268-253-09-37-
901-20070910BKG10267-10-09-2007-2007-false/default_p001c001_en.htm>. 
302 For a list of constituencies and MEPs see, European Parliament, “European Parliament: Your 
MEPs,” URL, = <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/public/geoSearch.do?language=EN>. 
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minority districts.  Districts should be drawn so that there is a majority of minorities 
(blacks, women, indigenous people, etc.) in certain districts so that minority 
candidates are virtually guaranteed to win a seat thus allowing them representation in 
the Society of Peoples.303   
The question arises of who should draw the districts.  It seems to me that 
districts should be drawn by those within the countries themselves.  As long as they 
adhere to certain restrictions (e.g., districts should be of a certain population, there 
should be majority-minority districts in proportion to population), countries should be 
given room to draw their own districts.  The main reason for this is that it would be 
difficult for those outside of a country to know who has had their legitimate interests 
persistently and predictably ignored in international decision-making such that they 
would be entitled to majority-minority districts.  Those within a country are more 
likely to have access to and knowledge of the historical and cultural background 
necessary to make such decisions.  Moreover, as part of their interest in collectively 
exercising the second moral power, a nation’s people should have room to decide and 
to pursue what they think is the best arrangement.  They should also have room to 
change their minds and to implement a new arrangement if they so decide.   
I argued earlier that certain decent consultative hierarchies and benevolent 
absolutisms might meet the criteria of membership in the Society of Peoples.  How are 
they to accommodate these organizational arrangements, given that the government is 
not democratic?  Decent consultative assemblies and benevolent absolutisms would 
have to agree to protect any rights that are part of the charter or bill of rights.  With 
respect to the Council, like other nations, the government would appoint the relevant 
representatives (trade, agriculture, etc.) to the Council.  With respect to the parliament, 
                                                
303 This will likely tend to be fairly regional.  For example, Latinos largely live in the South West of the 
US.  French speaking Canadians largely live in largely in the Eastern provinces (Quebec, Ontario, and 
New Brunswick).     
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the government would, like other more liberal nations, have to agree to divide the 
country into equally populated districts.  However, here, representatives of these 
districts would not be elected; they would be appointed by the government, with the 
mandate of being sensitive to the concerns of minorities.  In the case of decent 
consultative assemblies, the representatives would (as is consistent with the 
commitments of a consultative assembly) be in direct consultation with minority 
groups within the districts through various assemblies and would be open to and 
responsive to their views.  
I also argued that malevolent dictatorships should be appointed representatives 
of some kind, trustees meant to represent the interests of the citizens of such nations.  
A number of trustees representing the relevant areas (again trade, agriculture, and so 
on) would be appointed and trustees representing equally populated regions would 
also be appointed.  Though there may be no way of guaranteeing that this mandate is 
met, one of the central mandates of trustees should be to ensure that minority rights, 
interests and viewpoints are represented in decision-making.  However, despite such a 
commitment on the part of trustees, minority interests will continue to be under 
constant threat.  It is after all a malevolent dictatorship that we are discussing and 
trustees do not have the power to make institutional or policy changes; and so it is 
unlikely that such nations will adopt a bill of rights entrenching rights protecting 
minorities, for example.  This is extremely unfortunate, but I think that if we appoint 
trustees in the manner I have suggested, then global values of democracy will be 
served as well as they can be in these less than ideal circumstances. 
At this point, one might legitimately wonder whether the kinds of global 
arrangements and institutions that I argue for can be stable without a sense of 
community or shared identity among the members of a Society of Peoples.  The worry 
is similar to that raised in the case of a world government.  The worry is that peoples 
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will not be motivated to adhere to the outcomes of democratic decision-making when 
it requires a significant sacrifice on their part.  Imagine, for example, that it is decided 
(through the kinds of democratic procedure I have outlined) that the G-7 should take 
up greater reductions in carbon emissions than others.  One might wonder, what will 
motivate the G-7 to make such a sacrifice, to sacrifice what is in their own interest?  
As I mentioned earlier, in a domestic society, it typically thought that a sense of 
belonging to a shared community motivates the sacrifice of one’s own interests.  
Members of a domestic society feel a sense of community and belonging with one 
another on the basis of a shared territory, culture, and history.  This sense of belonging 
motivates the sacrifice of one’s own interests and will, in general, help to resolve 
political conflicts and problems.  However, the worry is, because of differing 
geographies, cultures, and histories there would be no coherent sense of community or 
shared identity among the members of a Society of Peoples.  In turn, one might argue, 
it seems unlikely that all peoples will comply with decisions, leading to an unstable 
world order. 
In response two points can be made.  One, at least at first, we may have to rely 
on peoples’ sense of self-interest, for participation in the Society of Peoples is in the 
interests of its members.304  The sacrifices that peoples would be required to make are, 
in some sense, limited.  Members will not have to sacrifice anything of fundamental 
importance.  Moreover, steps have been taken to ensure that they will not always (i.e., 
persistently) be on the losing side; in other decisions, they will be the ones to gain 
from other’s sacrifices.  Consequently, it is in peoples’ self-interest to make sacrifices 
now so that they will gain later.  Knowledge of this fact might motivate a stable 
Society of Peoples.   
Two, as Rawls notes, relations of community  
                                                
304 c.f., LP, p. 113. 
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are not fixed and may continually grow stronger over time as people come to work together in 
cooperative institutions they have developed . . . as cooperation among peoples proceed apace 
they may come to care about each other, and affinity between them becomes stronger.  Hence, 
they are no longer moved simply by self-interest but by mutual concern for each other’s way of 
life and culture, and they become willing to make sacrifices for one another.  This mutual 
caring is the outcome of their fruitful cooperative efforts and common experiences over a 
considerable period of time.305 
The suggestions is that, over time, participation in a Society of Peoples will foster a 
sense of community among its members and this, in turn, will motivate people to 
make the sacrifices demanded of them and to adhere to the global order. 
We must now consider lending institutions such as the IMF and the WB and 
their role in the Society of peoples.  Indeed, one might wonder whether these sorts of 
lending institutions are necessary at this point.  After all, there are no longer any 
“developing countries” to speak of.  Nevertheless, it seems to me that there will be a 
need for lending institutions such as the IMF and the WB.   Even after a great degree 
of economic equality has been reached, countries will still need funds to develop and 
grow.  At times, countries will face economic hardships and, as a result, they may 
have balance of payment problems.  Loans might be necessary to avoid or overcome 
such problems.  Moreover, think of Greece in the European case.  Even though it 
enjoys enough economic equality with other nations to have democratic relationships 
with them, there is still a long way to go before it is as developed as the UK, for 
example.  Indeed, Greece has recently received significant financial support for 
growth and development. So, it seems that even at this advanced point, agencies such 
as the IMF or the WB are necessary.  They are necessary for continued growth and 
development among nations. 
                                                
305 Ibid., p. 113. 
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So, how are such institutions to be structured? The IMF and the WB would, 
much like central banks in the domestic sphere, work as independent agencies within 
the Society of Peoples.  Currently, the IMF and the WB have two boards, a Board of 
Governors and an Executive Board.  In the IMF and the WB, the Board of Governors’ 
main function is to oversee the Executive Board, to which it has handed over much of 
its daily decision-making power.  In our model of a Society of Peoples, the 
representatives from both legislative chambers in the Society of Peoples would play a 
role parallel to the Board of Governors.  The two legislative chambers (the Council 
and the Parliament) would oversee the runnings and operations of the lending 
agencies.306  
As I mentioned earlier, in the case of the Fed, congressional oversight works to 
ensure that its decisions represent and are accountable to the citizens of the United 
States.   Congressional oversight comes into play in several aspects of the Fed.  All 
members of the Board of Governors (the main decision-making body) within the Fed 
must be confirmed by the Senate.  The President of the Fed nominates members of the 
Board of Governors (which handles daily decision-making) and the Senate either 
approves or rejects the nominees.  To be confirmed, nominees must win the support of 
a majority of senators.  Additionally, the Fed presents monetary policy reports to 
congress semi-annually.  The Fed also gives annual reports of its operations and 
activities along with the minutes of its Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
meetings. The FOMC is the main policy making body for open market operations.  
Finally, the Fed also relays reports on a number of matters; it, for example, reports 
annually on the profitability of credit card operations.  This basically allows congress, 
                                                
306 It seems important for both chambers to play a role in the oversight of lending agencies.  Because 
members of the council are appointed (by the Presidents of each member country), they are somewhat 
removed from the people. To ensure that the peoples’ interests are properly represented it is important 
that the directly elected members of the Parliament play a role in oversight as well.   
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which represents the people, to oversee and monitor the operations of the Fed in some 
detail.   
Something similar could work in the case of global lending agencies such as 
the IMF and the WB.  Members of the Executive Board would have to present reports 
about policies, decisions, etc. a certain number of times a year to the legislature (i.e., 
the Council and Parliament).  This would allow citizens, through their representatives, 
to examine lending agencies economic outlook and policy decisions. The legislature 
would also have a role in voting for and confirming all nominees to the Executive 
Board.  And so on. 
All of this is not to say that the citizens of member countries should play an 
important role in making day to day decisions, say, about who should get loans and the 
like.  Just as domestic financial institutions like the Fed need independence for good 
functioning, global financial institutions need independence for good functioning as 
well.   This would insulate the IMF and the WB from short-term political pressures, 
and would lead to better decision-making on the part of the IMF and the WB.  For 
similar reasons, the Executive Board would largely be independent from the global 
legislature and would have the power to make (everyday) decisions without their 
being ratified by the legislature. 
I have suggested that in a number of ways the Society of Peoples should be 
modelled after the EU.  I have argued that, as in the EU, in the Society of Peoples 
there should be a bill of rights with a Supreme Court to interpret and to enforce it, 
there should be two chambers analogous to the Council of the European Union and the 
European Parliament, and so on.  One might wonder, how much like the EU the 
Society of Peoples should be.  For example, should there be a common currency like 
the euro?  Should this be an ambition?   If so, should there be something analogous to 
the European Central Bank to manage this currency?  The EU also grants aid to poorer 
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countries within the EU.  Should there be a place for this in the Society of Peoples?  
Though I cannot give them the detail and attention they deserve, I will try to provide at 
least some answers to these questions. 
Let us begin with the matter of a common currency and whether this should be 
an ambition of the Society of Peoples.  The euro is the single currency shared by 15 
members of the European Union (together these countries constitute the euro area).  
Not all countries have taken up the euro.  As part of the terms of their membership, the 
UK and Denmark have been allowed to opt-out from the adoption of a shared 
currency.  However, it does seem that a currency that is shared by all member states is 
an ambition of the EU.  In the EU, as a way of addressing common concerns relating 
to, among other things, trade and economy, members have collectively decided on 
implementing a single integrated market – a market in which all economies of the EU 
countries are unified (which is meant to promote the free movement of people, goods, 
services and capital). The main reason for a shared European currency is that it 
enables a stable and efficient integrated or single market:  
The framework under which the euro is managed makes it a stable currency with low inflation 
and low interest rates, and encourages sound public finances.  A single currency is also a 
logical complement to the single market which makes it more efficient.  Using a single 
currency increases price transparency, eliminates currency exchange costs, oils the wheels of 
the European economy, facilitates international trade and gives the EU a more powerful voice 
in the world. The size and strength of the euro area also better protect it from external 
economic shocks, such as unexpected oil price rises or turbulence in the currency markets.307  
                                                
307 Europa, “European Commission: Economic and Financial Affairs: The Euro,”  URL = 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/the_euro/index_en.htm?cs_mid=2946>. 
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The primary objective of the European Central bank is to manage the euro and 
monetary policy in the euro area.  Its main goal to establish price stability (i.e., to keep 
inflation low), which is essential to a stable and efficient single European market.308   
For the most part, the reasons for taking up a shared currency, such as the euro, 
are practical.  The members of the EU have decided on a particular end – namely a 
single integrated market – and a shared currency is a way of meeting this end.  There 
are, however, other reasons for taking up a shared currency, reasons that stem from 
political considerations: 
The euro gives the EU’s citizens a tangible symbol of their European identity, of which they 
can be increasingly proud as the euro area expands and multiplies these [economic] benefits 
for its existing and future members.309 
In other words, a shared currency is thought to promote a shared sense of identity and 
belonging among citizens of the EU. 
 In the end, it doesn’t seem to me that a shared currency and a central bank are 
necessary features of a Society of Peoples.  As I said, the main reasoning for taking up 
a shared currency is practical.  It is the best way of implementing the collectively 
chosen end of a single market.  So, if peoples in the Society of Peoples decide on a 
similar end and decide that a single market is the best way of dealing with their 
common concerns relating to trade and economy, etc., then adopting a common 
currency seems to make sense.  The other reason for taking up a shared currency 
makes more sense from the perspective of justice.  As representatives of peoples, we 
have an interest in securing a stable global order.  This is largely because a stable 
global order will allow peoples to exercise their two moral powers and to implement 
their own collective conceptions of the good.  As was suggested earlier, a sense of 
                                                
308 See European Central Bank, “European Central Bank: Tasks,” URL 
<http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/tasks/html/index.en.html>. 
309 Ibid., URL = <http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/the_euro/index_en.htm?cs_mid=2946>. 
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community and belonging is important to stability.  Peoples are more likely to make 
the kinds of sacrifices demanded by policies and decisions when they feel a sense of 
belonging with one another.  Insofar as a common currency might encourage this 
feeling, it seems that, from the original position, we may have some reason to take it 
up.  However, having a shared currency is not the only way of engendering a sense of 
community among members in the Society of Peoples.  There are numerous other 
ways of doing so.  It seems to me, if they have not already collectively decided on the 
importance of having an integrated market, adopting a shared currency seems to make 
little sense (particularly when other means to securing a stable social order are 
available).  So, again taking up a shared currency does not seem to be a necessary 
feature of a Society of Peoples.  Given that its main function would be to manage the 
common currency, a central bank does not seem necessary either. 
 Let us turn to the next matter, the matter of devoting resources to aid poorer 
nations in the Society of peoples.  The EU is committed to reducing economic 
differences and inequalities. To this end, the EU has a number of agencies devoted to 
providing financial aid in the form of grants to poorer countries within the EU: they 
include the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Cohesion Fund, and 
the Social Fund.310  The money for grants from these funds comes from the budget of 
the EU.  Most of the EU budget is obtained from various taxes levied on member 
states by the EU.  So, the ERDF, the Cohesion Fund, and the Social Fund essentially 
serve as vehicles for redistribution of wealth among nations in the EU.  The question 
now is, would similar arrangements be required in the Society of Peoples?  On my 
view, inequalities among peoples are not in and of themselves always unjust.  Rather, 
                                                
310 On these agencies see Europa, “Regional Policy: Cohesion Fund,” URL = 
<http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/cf/index_en.htm> and  
Europa, “Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities: What is the ESF?,”  URL = 
<http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/esf/discover/esf_en.htm>. 
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like Rawls, I think that when inequalities among peoples are unjust, they are unjust 
because of “their unjust effects on the basic structure of the Society of Peoples, and on 
the relations among peoples, and among their members.”311  In particular, I have 
argued that inequalities in wealth and income among peoples are unjust largely 
because they inhibit the expression of democratic values in the global basic structure.  
So, it is not my view that whenever countries are unequal in wealth and income 
redistribution must occur.  Rather, insofar as democratic relations are a requirement of 
justice, and that such relations cannot take place until there is a certain level of 
equality among countries, it is my view that redistribution should occur until there is 
enough economic equality for democratic relations to take place among nations.  In 
turn, I have also suggested that a Society of Peoples is only to be instituted after this 
level of equality has been attained.  So, for the most part, aid aimed at the 
redistribution of wealth among nations (from richer to the poorer nations) in the 
Society of Peoples will be unnecessary.  However, it is possible, due to unforeseen and 
severe natural or financial disasters, that countries could fall below the level of wealth 
that is necessary for democratic relations (this seems particularly true in the cases of 
those countries that sit at the bottom of the threshold like Greece).  In this case, it 
would seem, if we are concerned to secure democratic relations, that aid should be 
provided in these cases and that countries should be taxed toward this end.    
 
§3.2. Conditionality of Loans 
I suggested earlier that even after a great degree of economic equality has been 
reached, countries will still need funds to develop and grow.  In particular, loans will 
be necessary to help avoid or overcome economic hardship and resulting balance of 
payment problems.  Moreover, even though countries may enjoy sufficient economic 
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equality with one another to have democratic relationships, loans will be necessary for 
the further development and growth of certain countries (I gave Greece as an example 
in the European case).  As of yet, I have said nothing about the structure of loans and 
the form they should take.  I would now like to turn to these matters.  I have suggested 
that, as part of their interest in forming a rational conception of their public ends, 
citizens have an interest in having the opportunity to implement policies that they 
collectively choose.  In turn, this means that any kind of conditionality that is put into 
action must give citizens room to implement the policies that they collectively choose.  
I will outline such an account of conditionality. 
I have suggested that some kind of limited conditionality is permissible.  
Limited conditionality is a kind of conditionality that is aimed at ensuring repayment 
of loans, but that does not hinge on taking up specific policy proposals.  A number of 
conditions fall under this criteria.  First, to ensure that countries are committed to 
spending the money well and to pursuing growth and development, some kind of pre-
selection of countries (perhaps based on past track record) could be coupled with loans 
being conditional on a promise, perhaps in written form, from borrowing countries 
stating that they are committed to growth and development and that money will be 
well spent (not on drugs or war, for example).  Second, conditions might, for example, 
involve keeping enough money in reserves to make the first few monthly interest 
payments.  Of course, some exceptions should be made here when it comes to post-
war countries, or extremely poor countries that do not have such reserves.  This seems 
consistent with the more charitable goals of the IMF and the WB.   
Third, loans should be contingent on countries showing that they have chosen a 
reasonable path to the promotion of growth and development.  In part, then, this means 
that countries must show that they have a plan for the implementation of things 
essential to growth and development such as market-based incentives, competition, 
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and macroeconomic stability.  Of course there are a variety of different ways of 
implementing these things, and it isn’t always going to be clear as to what counts as a 
feasible means of doing so.  So, in the end, all that might be required of countries is to 
show that they do have some plan for promoting market-based incentives, 
competition, and macroeconomic stability.  (The point is simply that if a country had 
no plan for facilitating these things, then it would be safe to say that such a plan is not 
a feasible.)   
Fourth, I also think that outcome based conditionality should be implemented.  
This kind of conditionality can ensure repayment of loans without requiring borrowing 
countries to take up particular policies.312  Under this scheme, initial funding would be 
conditional on borrowing countries meeting the three conditions I suggested above, 
that is, they must show that they have a made a commitment to the promotion of 
greater growth and development, that they have funds to pay the first few interest 
payments, and that they have a real plan for developing the things essential to growth 
and development.  Future financing would then be conditional on the borrowing 
country meeting certain desired objectives or outcomes rather than implementing 
specific policies.  Under this scheme, outcomes would be negotiated with the IMF and 
the WB.  That is to say, outcomes would be mutually decided upon by both lender and 
borrowing countries.313  To this extent, borrowing countries would play an equal role 
                                                
312 Others have advocated something similar.  Birdsall et al. (“If Rich Governments Really Cared About 
Development”, p. 11) makes brief mention of outcome based conditionality.  More detailed discussion 
can be found in Omotunde E. G. Johnson, “Country Ownership of Reform Programs and the 
Implications for Conditionality,” G24 Discussion Papers No. 35 (January 2005), URL = 
<http://www.g24.org/ojohnson.pdf>, and Mohsin S Khan and Sunil Sharma, “IMF Conditionality and 
Ownership of Programs,” IMF Working Paper No. 1/142 (2001), pp. 25-28, URL =  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=879938#PaperDownload>. 
313 There is a very real chance that, in at least some cases, there will be disagreement about what 
constitutes appropriate target outcomes.  As I see it, target outcomes should be viewed as negotiated 
compromises between the IMF or the WB and the borrowing country.  There is then the question of 
how a compromise is to be reached – particularly when disagreement is entrenched.  Reaching a 
compromise is never easy, but presumably there are mechanisms that can foster this.  I will have to 
think more about what these mechanisms are.  
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(equal to lender countries, that is) in deciding which outcomes should be aimed at.  
They would have an equal role in stating what counts as progress.  Moreover, policy 
content would be left up to borrowing countries to decide on their own.314  Only the 
desired outcomes would have to be agreed upon by borrowing countries and the 
IMF/WB staff, not the mechanisms that lead to the outcomes.  This would give 
countries greater room to design their own economic policies, while also providing 
countries with an incentive to implement appropriate policies, that is, policies which 
will lead to certain desired (and negotiated) outcomes.  Examples of appropriate 
outcomes might include, financial support being contingent on reaching certain levels 
of growth, inflation, or net international reserves, or reductions in balance of payments 
problems, and so on.315  If the predetermined outcome is not reached, then the country 
would receive less or no funding.  
I think the kind of limited conditionality that I have advocated here is 
extremely beneficial in the sense that it would allow the IMF and the WB to meet their 
goal of ensuring repayment while also meeting their goal of helping.  IMF and WB 
funds are safeguarded to the extent that money is conditional on reaching desired 
outcomes.  Insofar as certain desired outcomes are reached, repayment becomes more 
likely.  Moreover, allowing the borrowing countries to play an equal role in specifying 
the desired outcomes and also giving them room to choose their own path (policies) to 
development and growth avoids the paternalistic bend of the current method while 
also allowing citizens the room they need to implement social practices and policies in 
ways that are consistent with the development and exercise of their capacity for a 
conception of the good.  Furthermore, this type of minimal conditioning will, for the 
most part, eliminate the possibility of lending countries arbitrarily interfering in the 
                                                
314 Khan et al, “IMF Conditionality,” p. 25. 
315 Johnson, “Country Ownership of Reform Programs,” p. 20. 
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interests of borrowing countries and hence will prevent relationships of domination 
from occurring. 
However, there may be some difficulties in implementing outcome based 
conditions.  First, outcomes like an increase in growth (in GDP or PPP), or reduction 
of balance of payment problems, etc. will take time to meet and will likely not be able 
to be assessed in periods less than a year.316  For this reason outcome based conditions 
might be more difficult to implement in the case of short-term loans.  I do think it is 
possible, however.  But in order for outcome based conditions to be feasible in the 
case of short-term loans, we would need to come up with desirable outcomes that can 
be reached in the short-term.       
Moreover, deciding when to disburse money may be difficult.  This is because, 
as Sunil Khan and Mohsin S. Sharma note, there can be some difficulties in assessing 
whether an outcome was not met because of a country’s bad policies or exogenous 
factors not under their control.317  So, evidence will need to be analyzed carefully in 
order to determine whether outcome targets were missed because of exogenous factors 
or because the countries’ policies came up short.318  If it is the former, then there is 
case for a waiver and the country should still receive funding. 
What if it is the latter?  Should the next instalment be withheld?  This is a 
difficult question to answer.  If a borrowing country does not receive funds, its 
currency could collapse (as in the cases of Mexico and Argentina, for example).  This, 
in turn, means that the citizens of borrowing countries, particularly the poorer ones, 
will suffer greatly as the prices of goods increase drastically and they are no longer 
able to afford them.  And in part IMF and WB loans are meant to help such people.  
                                                
316 Ibid., p. 20. 
317 Khan et al, “IMF Conditionality,” p. 26. 
318 Ibid., p. 26. 
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That said, there should be some consequences for failing to meeting stipulated 
outcomes – otherwise there is nothing to ensure repayment of the loan.   
I suggest the following as one way of dealing with countries that fail to meet 
target outcomes.  It seems to me that, at least, initially, say the first few times a 
country fails to meet the target outcomes, further conditions (aimed at securing 
repayment) should be attached.  First, I think the instalment should either be decreased 
in amount (i.e., the country should receive less money) or should be contingent on 
accepting higher-interest rates.  These negative consequences will work to motivate 
countries to meet outcomes in the first place and to continue to do so.  Second, the 
country must show that it has identified the problems that led to not meeting the 
specified outcomes.  Third, it should show that it has some concrete plan for dealing 
with and overcoming those problems.  Once these conditions are met, I think the 
instalment should be distributed.  Notice that these conditions still allow countries to 
implement their own policies and, in turn, to collectively exercise their collective 
capacity for a conception of the good, while working to ensure repayment of the loan. 
What about those countries that continuously fail to meet the target outcomes? 
Unfortunately, there must, at some point, be a cut off point.  When countries 
perpetually fail to meet the target outcomes, two things should occur: (1) further 
instalments should not be distributed and (2) future access to IMF and WB funds 
should be adversely affected (i.e., it should be much harder for countries to qualify for 
loans the next time around).  The motivation for (1) is as follows: Countries that fail to 
meet the target outcomes are unlikely to be able to make monthly interest payments 
and, in the end, are unlikely to be able to repay the loan.  Whether the IMF and the 
WB are thought to be big banks or charities, this is not desirable.  In both cases, the 
IMF and the WB have an interest in being able to continue lending money to countries 
for growth and development.  If countries consistently fail to pay back their loans, 
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then the IMF and the WB will not be able to continue lending money.  The motivation 
for (2) is as follows.  If consequences were simply in the short-term (i.e., with respect 
to this particular loan), after receiving the first instalment, countries might be tempted 
to ignore the target outcomes. (2) is meant to guard against this.  Insofar as there are 
consequences for future borrowing, countries will have greater motivation to keep up 
with target outcomes.   
In some cases, if loan instalments are suspended, this could lead to a very bad 
situation for the citizens of borrowing countries.  First, without funds, citizens of 
borrowing countries will not be able to exercise their collective capacity for a 
conception of the good.  They may not be able to implement various social policies 
and the like.  Second, as I mentioned, currencies can crash, inflation can increase 
severely, and so on.  The situation can become very dire for the people of such 
countries very quickly.   
It seems clear that something must be done to help such countries.  Yet, at this 
point, it isn’t clear to me what should be done.  One solution may be to give these 
countries a grant or gift that is part of an aid package rather than a loan.  This grant 
could come from another agency devoted specifically to the task of dispersing 
humanitarian aid or it might come from money within the IMF or the WB devoted to 
this specific task (which would seem to be consistent with their goals of charity and 
helping).319  However, there are important drawbacks to this solution.  First, giving 
grants to countries that continually fail to meet outcomes and have failing economies 
might provide incentive to continue these things.  Grants are likely to be preferred by 
borrowing countries over loans.  After all, grants do not have to be paid back and, 
                                                
319 It also seems to me that we have a general duty to aid those who are suffering greatly or are in great 
need.  This duty would also support having some kind of funds devoted to aid.  If it falls to the IMF and 
the WB to provide these funds, they might be collected by adding a small charge on all loans or by 
increasing interest rates slightly and putting the extra money toward humanitarian aid.  
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generally, do not have any conditions attached to them.  If grants are given only when 
countries continue to fail to meet target outcomes, then countries have no incentive to 
meet target outcomes and may prefer not to in order to receive grants.  This is 
problematic not only because it seems to encourage economic failure but also because 
agencies like the IMF and the WB could not continue giving out money in the form of 
grants since grants are not repaid.  Second, while a big influx of cash will help to 
alleviate immediate suffering (i.e., famine and the like), it may not help in the long 
run.  Since it comes without conditions, money can be used in any way the country 
chooses, and so grants may not encourage or foster growth and development.  Money 
could continue to be squandered and used in ways (i.e., on policies) that do that not 
promote growth and development and continue to foster economic failure.  This seems 
particularly likely given the country’s history of economic failure.   
Another solution may be to give these countries a loan with strong conditions.  
In repeatedly failing to meet target outcomes, the country has shown that it is not able 
to pick policies that work.  So, one might suggest that the case against strong 
conditionality – where policies are chosen (mainly) by those at the lending agency – is 
less strong.  Yet giving a loan with strong conditions is far from ideal.  One worry is 
that if policies are chosen for them, citizens of borrowing countries will not be able to 
collectively exercise their second moral power.  But this is not the prime worry, for if 
money is not lent to these countries, then they will be unable to collectively exercise 
this power anyhow (i.e., there will be no funds for implementing collectively chosen 
policies without a loan).  Furthermore, presumably, if the conditions work and growth 
and development occur, then, once the loan is paid off, the citizens of the borrowing 
country will regain their ability to exercise their second moral power (that is, they will 
regain the ability to implement social policies of their own choosing).  The main worry 
is that, as we have seen, strong conditions have generally not lead to growth and 
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development.  And so a loan with strong conditions is unlikely to be any more 
successful than the country itself was in bring about growth and development or 
ending economic failure, and people will continue to suffer.  In the end then it is 
unclear what the best solution is.   
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